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Abstract
The analysis of inherent role conflicts in the governance of Michigan charter
school boards contracting with full-service, for-profit private management companies
provided quantitative and qualitative perspectives of experienced board members. These
perspectives included their view of board governance and how responsibilities are
divided and shared with for-profit private management companies.
The triangulated analysis included three major sources of data: quantitative
research, qualitative research, and a qualitative contractual analysis that provided the
essence of the contracts between charter school boards of directors and their contracted
for-profit private management companies. The theoretical framework that grounded this
analysis was inclusive of three theories: agency theory, stewardship theory, and contract
failure theory. These theories were collectively grounded in economic, psychological,
and sociological foundations. The theories synergistically illustrated a framework of
potentially inherent conflicts in the relationship between the agent and client.
The charter school boards (client) relationships with the full-service for-profit
private management companies (agent) encompassed the complexities of non-profit
entities working side-by-side with private for-profit entities. This relationship creates
anomalies that contribute to confusion, tensions, and factors that result in governance
conflicts, which affect the operations of charter schools. The anomalies were a
phenomenon of parallel governance, which is covertly impacting the governance of
charter schools.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
Introduction
The effective governance and leadership of public schools is imperative to
achieve academic progress and ensure the transparent, accountable, and the efficient use
of public tax dollars. As a response to the educational reform challenge, one of the
strategies was the creation of charter schools in the early 1990s. Subsequently, charter
schools have become a very heated topic of discussion as it introduces new models of
governance inclusive of volunteer appointed boards of directors, non-profit management
companies, full-service, for-profit private management companies, and authorizers. This
study primarily focuses on two of these major actors: charter school volunteer appointed
boards of directors and full-service, for-profit, private management companies. Both
actors have roles and responsibilities for which they were designed and intended.
However, despite their design and intent, the functional lines of responsibilities are
blurred due to the overlapping of governance, which perpetuates conflicts. These
conflicts are prevalent in the state of Michigan due to the amount of charter schools
managed by full-service, for-profit, private management companies. The overlap and
conflicts cause great demand for legislative and policy responses to these complex
circumstances that have developed over two decades.
These issues were highlighted in the topics of Dixon’s (2014a) investigation for
the Detroit Free Press entitled, “State of Charter Schools: How Michigan Spends 1
Billion But Fails to Hold Schools Accountable.” The investigation uncovered role
conflicts in charter school governance, concerns surrounding for-profit private
management companies’ operations and performance, and issues of transparency and
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accountability involving public tax dollars. Challenges in governance have always been a
part of education reform; however, the overlap in governance between authorizers,
management companies, and boards of directors increases the probability of conflicts.
Although the authorizers have primary oversight, the overlap in governance between
boards of directors and management companies exists and intensifies their conflicts.
The Detroit Free Press investigation provided multiple examples of conflicts
inclusive of management companies refusing to provide financial information to the
boards of directors when requested, financial concerns stemming from the existence of
excessive management fees, providing minimally required accounting and finance
information, and the implications of the confusion of governance principles and practices
that would allow such occurrences. Other role conflicts include the selection process for
the boards of directors, the managing of bid processes, human resource management, and
transparency and accountability matters. Blitz (2011) stated, “The tension that exists
between authorizer-based accountability and market-based accountability is part of the
potential conflict facing charter school leaders. Failure to meet either of these types of
demands could lead to school closure; yet, these demands also come into conflict.” (p.
358) These conflicting perspectives collide where there is overlap that causes ambiguity
with governing roles and responsibilities.
Statement of the Problem
Despite more than twenty years of charter school existence in the state of
Michigan, governance has become more challenging, confusing, and conflicting due to
the overlapping responsibilities between charter school boards of directors and fullservice, for-profit private management companies. More research is needed on the impact
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of the overlapping of governing bodies that perpetuate role conflicts in Michigan charter
schools. Effective governance will continue to be problematic without clearly defined
roles between boards of directors and the full-service, for-profit private management
companies. The contracting of full-service, for-profit private management companies
exacerbates role conflicts by diminishing and transferring the boards’ governing power
and authority to the full-service, for-profit private management companies. The conflicts
in these relationships become more complex by issues involving the transparency and
accountability of public tax dollars.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this mixed methodology study is to gain insight into the
overlapping roles of governance and conflicts in Michigan charter school boards
contracting with full-service, for-profit private management companies and the impact
these roles and conflicts have on the ability to provide effective and transparent
governance.
Justification and Significance of the Study
Research on charter school governance and leadership is imperative to
understanding the current challenges of mitigating the overlapping roles of the
authorizers, management companies, and the boards of directors, and how it may
improve the ability to provide effective governance and transparency. The research
provided by the study allows insight into the perspectives of how boards of directors view
the conflicts resulting from the overlap of governance roles and how such conflicts may
be decreased, eliminated, and addressed.
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The study of effective leadership and governance in charter schools is critical in
order to deliver on the promises for which charter schools were predicated. Currently,
there is minimal research on the impact of the overlapping of governance that perpetuates
role conflicts in Michigan charter schools. Appointed charter school board members in
Michigan have a high probability of experiencing confusion because a universal road
map does not exist for board members to engage and improve their governing capacity.
Authorizers oversee differently, management companies manage differently, and board
governance differs from one charter school to the next. Given the complexities of
governance, it takes more than a two-hour-per-month meeting to become an informed,
knowledgeable, and engaged board member. This becomes problematic when boards
contract with full-service, for-profit private management companies whose main purpose
is to generate profit. When looking at the complexities of governance in Michigan charter
schools, it becomes reasonable to expect high levels of conflicts.
This study has significance to those who lead charter schools in Michigan because
exploring governance roles and the experiences of charter school board members will
provide insight through their perspectives. Obtaining such information may provide
knowledge on how to make charter school governance more effective. In addition, the
board members’ perspectives of these relationships with full-service, for-profit private
management companies and how it may cause potential conflicts are important. This
study may provide impetus for future researchers to further explore strategies to improve
charter school governance and diminish or prevent inherent conflicts between boards of
directors and full-service, for-profit private management companies.
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The perspectives and experiences of charter school board members are factors
that may provide guidance to better prepare and develop current and future board
members in their endeavors to become effective leaders and contribute to the critical
governance component of charter school evolution.
Research Questions or Hypotheses
The research questions the study seeks to answer emanate from general topics of
charter school leadership and governance. Specifically, investigating the consequences of
charter school boards of directors contracting for comprehensive services with for-profit
private management companies in the state of Michigan. The study focused on obtaining
the perspectives of charter school board members in regards to conflicts created by
overlapping governance roles with full-service, for-profit private management companies
and how such conflicts may be decreased or preempted.
The three questions of the research study are specific to charter school governance
and the role conflicts that occurred between charter school boards of directors and the
full-service, for-profit private management companies. These management companies
were selected by the charter school boards of directors to comprehensively manage the
operations of the school. The following questions included:
1. Do the contractual relationships between Michigan charter school boards of
directors and full-service, for-profit private management companies contribute to
conflicts in governance?
2. Assuming that parallel governance systems created in charter schools whose
boards of directors contract with full-service, for-profit private management
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companies contribute to governance conflict, what are the factors in the
relationship that contribute to conflict in governance?
3. Are accountability and transparency of public funds affected when Michigan
charter schools’ boards of directors contract with full-service, for-profit private
management companies?
Research Design and Methodology
Methodology
The research was a mixed methodology approach incorporating quantitative and
qualitative designs. This dual approach enabled the capturing of experienced board
members’ perspectives through surveys and interviews. The results from the mixed
methodology were cross-analyzed for statistical inferences and the identification of
common themes. A qualitative contract analysis was conducted to assist with the
development of questions for surveys and interviews. Subsequently, an in-depth review
of the contracts provided additional data to triangulate with the survey and interview
results.
Research Design and Instruments
The research design from a quantitative perspective explored and compared
elements regarding the participants’ responses to survey questions. This survey
instrument captured experienced board members’ perspectives on leadership roles and the
resulting conflicts regarding the governance of charter schools based on their individual
experiences. (See Appendix A for the survey instrument.) The distribution of surveys
targeted 40 to 50 respondents of charter school board members who contracted with fullservice, for-profit private management companies for comprehensive management
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services. The boards were purposely selected to have cross-representation from contracts
with different management companies and different authorizers.
The research design from a quantitative perspective included a hard copy survey
for boards of directors who hold an executive position such as president or vice president
to distribute and collect from their fellow board members. The participants were surveyed
with questions divided into specific categories based on the guiding research questions:
Do the contractual relationships between Michigan charter school boards of directors and
full-service, for-profit private management companies contribute to conflicts in
governance? Assuming that parallel governance systems created in charter schools whose
boards of directors contract with full-service, for-profit private management companies
contribute to governance conflicts, what are the factors in the relationship that contribute
to conflicts in governance? Are accountability and transparency of public funds affected
when Michigan charter schools’ boards of directors contract with full-service, for-profit
private management companies?
The research design from a qualitative perspective included in-depth interviews to
provide inquiry to the perspectives of experienced charter school board members. The
interview respondents had a preferred minimum of fifteen years board experience with
various roles of leadership appointments. As part of this process, seven participants were
purposely selected to capture their responses to research questions regarding experiences
of contracting with full-service, for-profit private management companies. The interview
candidates served as board members with at least five years and preferably fifteen years
of experience as members of various charter school boards of directors. A series of open-
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ended questions were utilized to engage the participants and allow subjective detailed
responses. (See Appendix B for the qualitative interview questions.)
Each interview respondent was taped with an audio recorder. The tapes were
transcribed and electronically saved.
Part of the qualitative portion included exploration and comparative analysis of
contracts between charter schools and their selected for-profit private management
companies. Five contracts were selected for analysis. Each contract was unique to a board
of directors and their contracted full-service for-profit private management company. The
contracts were analyzed for patterns of content, terms, and conditions that may
potentially cause overlap and conflicts during the life of the agreement. The analysis of
contracts assisted with providing insight to the disposition of the contractual parties and if
it caused overlap and conflicts from the start of the agreement between the boards of
directors and the full-service, for-profit private management company.
The results from the mixed methodology approach enabled a cross-reference of
findings gathered from three separate methods of data acquisition; contract analysis,
survey questionnaires, and interviews.
Definition of Terms
Parallel Governance: Parallel governance structures are defined by Alexia Stainer
(July, 2010) as,“ Parallel governance is closely related to the concept of institutional
multiplicity, as both refer to situations where non-state actors perform state functions.
These are associated with conflict situations and have impact on the processes of state
formation.” (Parallel Governance section, para. 1).
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Power relationships: Established among those involved in governance.
Governance connotes a functional perspective of power, where power is used as a way to
manage potential or real conflict, to create group cohesion and collaboration to enforce a
dominant view of the way things ought to be, and to maintain order and regulate
behavior, both formally and informally through authority and influence (Marshall &
Scribner, 1991, p. 349).
Conflict: Lead in a different direction to focus on the competition over scarce
resources. People with competing values or competing priorities seek to have their
priorities and values prevail. They seek social domination (Morgan, 1986). Conflict is
neither something to be maintained nor to be diffused or integrated. Conflict serves as a
change function, giving individuals and groups an opportunity to affect existing power
relationships. Collaboration, cohesion, and maintenance of order occur only when one
group successfully dominates. The dominance of this group is often reified by the
structure of bureaucracy, thus disguising power and diffusing conflict under the guise of
bureaucratic rationality (Marshall & Scribner, 1991, p.349).
Charter School/Public School Academy: A public school of choice created by a
motivated individual or group that has designed a model or program guided by principles
outlined in its charter and agreed to by the home district (Brody, 2009; Carpenter, 2006
as cited by Horsburgh, 2011, p.10).
Governance: The set of processes, customs, policies, laws, and institutions by
which an organization is controlled. It defines the relationships among the many players
who have stakes in an organization’s activities and outcomes. Formal governance
arrangements therefore ensure representation of key stakeholders. Governance and
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leadership are different. The essence of leadership is influencing the behaviors of others;
governance constrains leadership (Hill and Lake, 2006, p.3).
Authorizer/Sponsor: The Michigan Department of Education (2012) explains their
role by stating, “Pursuant to section 380.502(4): An authorizing body shall oversee, or
shall contract with an intermediate school district, community college, or state public
university to oversee, each public school academy operating under a contract issued by
the authorizing body. The authorizing body is responsible for overseeing compliance by
the board of directors with the contract and all applicable law” (Michigan Department of
Education, 2012, p.13).
EMO (Education Management Organization): A for-profit private management
company that provides various ranges of educational and operational services to public
schools and charter schools.
CMO (Charter Management Organization): A nonprofit management company
that provides various ranges of educational and operational services to public schools and
charter schools.
Market-based Accountability: The dynamics that occur in the market, driven by
demands on charter schools from parents, communities, students, and any local
stakeholders of the school and not affiliated with an authoritative position.
Authorizer-based Accountability: The dynamics that occur from
authorizer/sponsor demands on a charter school. These demands are based on oversight
related to school finances, compliance to state and federal rules and regulations, and
academic outcomes related to the schools’ state performance testing on student
achievement and growth.
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Transparency: The ability to reasonably and accurately account for revenues from
public tax dollars expended for the operations of charter schools.
Delimitations
The delimitations of this study included the population of boards of directors and
full-service, for-profit private management companies limited to operations in the state of
Michigan and primarily operating in the Metro Detroit area. The other delimitations
related to the qualitative study where candidates’ responses were based solely on their
experiences with full-service, for-profit private management companies operating under
Michigan legislation, compliance, and authorizers. This study does not account for the
differences in legislation, policy, and law as it pertains to states other than Michigan.
Limitations
The mixed method approach allowed for encounters with board members with
varying years of experience during a period of heavy accountability from federal and
state agencies. Also, the preparation, capacity, skills, knowledge, and professionalism of
the boards were collectively unique to each governing body. Every board of directors
operates within a specific community that presents challenges different from other
districts. These experiences make the professionalism and composition of each board
different and therefore varied in how each manages the conflict presented in its district.
Summary
Chapter 1 introduced the challenges of charter school governance in the state of
Michigan. The study focuses on analyzing inherent role conflicts in the governance of
Michigan charter school boards contracting with full-service, for-profit private
management companies in the state of Michigan. With more than eighty percent of its
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charter schools managed by full-service, for-profit private management companies,
Michigan has unique governance challenges inclusive of role confusion, accountability
and transparency of public tax dollars, overlap of responsibilities, and board uncertainty
around their collective authority, power, and control of the operations of their charter
schools. These challenges result in conflicts that impact the governance of Michigan
charter schools.
The research methodology is fortified by a mixed approach inclusive of
quantitative and qualitative designs. There is a separate qualitative element in the form of
an analysis of contracts between boards of directors and for-profit, private management
companies. The approach provided multiple data sources to address the research
questions.
Chapter 1 also provided conceptual frameworks inclusive of the agency theory,
stewardship theory, and contract failure theory. These theories provided multiple lenses
to review and help explain the phenomenon of governance conflicts in Michigan charter
schools that have contracted with full-service, for-profit private management companies.
Chapter 2 provides a literature review based on previous studies on charter school
governance, board member roles and responsibilities, and the status and effects of various
models of management available for charter school boards to select. Chapter 3 details the
mixed methodology approach to provide both quantitative and qualitative data along with
a subsequent contract analysis and triangulation. Chapter 4 provides the findings and
analysis resulting from the mixed methodology approach, and Chapter 5 subsequently
provides a conclusion to the study with recommendations for future research and
analysis.

CONFLICTS	
  IN	
  THE	
  GOVERNANCE	
  OF	
  MICHIGAN	
  CHARTER	
  SCHOOLS	
  	
  

13	
  
	
  

Chapter 2: Literature Review
Conceptual Framework
The conceptual framework encompasses three theories used to provide context to
the phenomenon of inherent role conflicts in the governance of Michigan charter school
boards of directors contracting with full-service, for-profit private management
companies. The theories provided a basis of understanding of the relationship
mechanisms between the charter school boards of directors (clients) and the full-service,
for-profit private management companies (agents). The agent-to-client relationship
included social, psychological, and behavioral implications that define the inter-relational
dynamics between the two parties. The relationships represented somewhat polarized
derivatives, such as the nonprofit values of the boards of directors and the for-profit
values of the management companies in the state of Michigan. The conceptual
framework included agency theory, stewardship theory, and contract failure theory.
The dynamics of charter schools are complex, ambiguous, and contentious due to
rapidly changing circumstances in educationally underserved areas where government,
community, and business entities attempt to improve student outcomes by providing
solutions with this alternative model of public education. The problem is magnified with
these entities working in isolation and not having cohesive planning, development, and
deployment of resources to systematically resolve pervasive issues that plague public
school education.
Three of the main actors in Michigan’s charter education system include the
authorizers, boards of directors, and full-service, for-profit private management
companies. The boards of directors may contract with for-profit private management
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companies, which present situations primed with potential role conflicts that permeate the
charter school industry in the state of Michigan. The relationship forms an agent-to-client
scenario wrought with misperceptions, mainly by the boards of directors, as to which
entity has authority and empowerment regarding charter school governance. The
challenge of finding a theory that increases understanding and helps explain the relational
phenomenon falls short and therefore warrants multiple theories to help provide
perspective. These theories come together to develop the conceptual framework that was
used in the study. This framework was developed inclusive of the following theories:
agency theory, contract failure theory, and stewardship theory. These three theories
provide lenses to view the relationships between charter school boards of directors and
the entities they contract with to manage the operations of their charter school. The
concepts apply to the macro-dynamics of any charter school in the country. However, this
application is specifically for the circumstances of charter schools operated in the state of
Michigan where more than eighty percent of the charter schools have contracts with fullservice, for-profit private management companies.
Agency Theory
In the early 1970s, the concept of agency theory emerged from the desire to
explain agent-to-client relations and how the objectives of the two parties may conflict
given various behaviors that reflected in their individual motivations. According to
Mitnick (2013),
The first scholars to propose, explicitly, that a theory of agency be created, and to
actually begin its creation, were Stephen Ross and Barry Mitnick, independently
and roughly concurrently. Ross is responsible for the origin of the economic
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theory of agency, and Mitnick for the institutional theory of agency, though the
basic concepts underlying these approaches are similar. Indeed, the approaches
can be seen as complementary in their uses of similar concepts under different
assumptions. In short, Ross introduced the study of agency in terms of problems
of compensation contracting; agency was seen, in essence, as an incentives
problem. Mitnick introduced the now common insight that institutions form
around agency, and evolve to deal with agency, in response to the essential
imperfection of agency relationships: Behavior never occurs as it is preferred by
the principal because it does not pay to make it perfect. But society
creates institutions that attend to these imperfections, managing or buffering them,
adapting to them, or becoming chronically distorted by them. Thus, to fully
understand agency, we need both streams ---to see the incentives as well as the
institutional structures. (p. 2)
Ross (1973) continues the co-explanation of the agency theory from an economic
perspective with focus on the client. Ross stated:
The relationship of agency is one of the oldest and commonest codified modes
of social interaction. We will say that an agency relationship has arisen between
two (or more) parties when one, designated as the agent, acts for, on behalf of, or
as representative for the other, designated the principal, in a particular domain of
decision problems. Examples of agency are universal. Essentially all contractual
arrangements, as between employer and employee or the state and the
governed, for example, contain important elements of agency. (p. 134)
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The agency theory describes how the self-interests of different entities permeate
the motives, behaviors, and actions of two parties that contractually have the same goals
in mind. Contractual parties may have positive intentions; however, these intentions may
turn into negative interactions and results when the agent deliberates behaviors that are
more beneficial to their existence as opposed to exhibit behavior that is congruent with
the goals of their client. Within the context of this study, the boards of directors are the
clients in the charter school industry and the full-service, for-profit private management
companies are the agents contracted to manage the operations of the charter schools.
The nuances of the agency-to-client relationships may take on many forms given
the vast applications related to social, psychological, commerce, and business scenarios.
The common element should be that the agent is supposed to align itself to the benefit of
the client. It is not a partnership but a unilateral relationship, mutually beneficial for both
parties given common objectives. The objectives are predicated on the mission of the
client, which the agent adjusts and adapts to the will and purpose of the client. Deviations
from this fundamental principal are a philosophical breach of the fundamentals upon
which such relations have derived. As stated by Shapiro (2005), “In an agency
relationship, one part acts on behalf of another ”(p.263). The author continued to
elaborate on the agent to client relationship:
The assumption that principals are in the driver’s seat ---specifying preferences,
creating incentives, and making contracts, that agents must follow –-is also
problematic. When principals seek out agents for their expert knowledge, when
principals are one-shotters and agents repeat players, when principals are
unexpectedly foisted into a new role with no time or life experience to formulate
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preferences, let alone a contract or monitoring strategy (e.g., the new parents of an
ill newborn, the asymmetry of power shifts from the principal to the agent. (p.
267)
Shapiro gives a perspective that highlights issues regarding the experience of
agents in contrast to the novice disposition of clients. The repetitive nature of the subject
industry gives agents an advantage, especially when the agent has multiple clients,
however the client only has one agent. The author continued:
Agency relationships are enacted in a broader social context and buffeted by
outside forces –- other agency relationships, competitors, interest groups,
regulators, legal rules, and the like –- that sometimes right information all
imbalances, offer or constrain incentives, exacerbate the risk of adverse selections
or moral hazard, provide cover or opportunity for opportunism, and so forth.
Relationships endure over time, affording principals and agents occasions to
gather data about one another. Principals learn better which incentives are likely
to work. Agents learn more about the preferences of the principals they serve.
Relationships become embedded as parties develop histories and personal
relationships and become entangled in social networks. (p. 269)
The nature of the agency relationship may benefit the agency more so than the
client over time given the agent’s desire to expand its network of additional clientele. The
client, on the other hand, may risk becoming more dependent on the agent over time as
the agent manages the specific duties outlined in the contract. Shapiro (2005) explained:
Over time, agents acquire constituencies other than their principals that buffer
them from the contracting, re-contracting, and sanctioning of their principals. And
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as agents (government bureaucrats, corporate managers) outlast their principals
(legislators, CEOs), the balance of power between principal and agent may shift.
(p. 269)
Whereas the agent may develop buffers to leverage it against the risk of losing
clients, the client does not have such a buffer and must rely on its one agent. The risk of a
dysfunctional relationship and the negative implications of such are greater for the client
than the agent. These situations may derive from issues of conflicts in goal attainment or
conflicts in how to achieve specific goals. Dysfunction due to separations in perspectives
will result in problematic circumstances that may not have apparent resolution. Shapiro
(2005) continued:
The classic agency paradigm, with its eye on the principal, perceives goal conflict
as the departure of agents from the interests of the principal. Hence, the solution
to this agency problem is to come up with incentives that will align the interests
of agents with those of the principal. Keep the agent from shirking by paying her
a piece rate, perhaps. The agency problem looks quite different from the
perspective of the agent, though. Conflicts between the interests of the agents and
those of the principal are the least of the agent’s problems. The real problem is
that the agent is most likely serving many masters, many of with conflicting
interests. Even if the agent is able to silence his or her own interests, there is a
matter of how to maneuver through the tangled loyalties he or she owes to many
different principals and how to negotiate through their competing interests and
sometimes irreconcilable differences. (p. 278)
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The interests of the client must be a priority of the agent if there is to be a
cohesive relationship focused on achieving the objectives of the client. In the charter
industry, the clients are the boards of directors and the agent are the full-service, forprofit private management companies. Bonazzi and Islam (2006) expounded on the effect
of agency theory on corporate governance. They stated:
Separation between ownership and control of corporations characterizes the
existence of a firm. The design of mechanisms for effective corporate control to
make managers act in the best interests of shareholders has been a major concern
in the area of corporate governance and finance, and continuing research in
agency theory attempts to design an appropriate framework for such control. In a
corporation, the shareholders are working on behalf of, and for the interests, of the
principals. (p. 7)
The previous statement ties agency theory to the effectiveness of the boards of
directors to govern. They illustrate how boards of directors need to have accurate metrics
to monitor and evaluate the performance of the agents in regards to meeting or exceeding
the objectives of the client. Bonazzi and Islam (2006) concluded, “The greater the level
of monitoring, greater the probability of success or enhanced financial performance” (p.
11).
Contract Failure Theory
Contract failure theory provides a view of the complexity of having a consumer or
client in a position where they cannot adequately monitor or measure the quality of their
service or product. In regards to the charter industry, the contract failure theory explains
why the majority of the country has charter schools operated by nonprofit organizations.
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The reason is primarily due to the high cost of monitoring and the challenges to define
the product or service in terms of what are successful outcomes. Hansmann (1980)
explained the contract failure theory, “I am suggesting that nonprofit enterprise is a
reasonable response to a particular kind of ‘market failure,’ specifically the inability to
police procedures by ordinary contractual devices, which I shall call ‘contract failure’”
(p. 845). The author goes onto explain the circumstances that give rise to contract failure.
Hansmann (1980) stated:
In some instances, the circumstances that give rise to contract failure are simple
and reasonably obvious. This is the case, for example, with institutions such as
redistributive philanthropies and with institutions that provide complex personal
services. In other instances, the problems of contract failure that give rise to
nonprofits are embedded in, or with institutions in which contract failure is bound
with problems of public goods, price discrimination, and imperfect loan markets.
In considering these latter institutions, it will be necessary to examine in some
detail the full complex of factors that give rise to the need for nonprofit
organizations. (p.846)
It is very difficult for charter school boards of directors in Michigan to understand
and define quality outcomes relative to the intangibles of the products or services
provided. Morley (2006) elaborated on Hansmann’s theory of contract failure:
Hansmann’s theory can explain the dominance of nonprofit firms in the charter
school market. Several interest groups influence a charter school’s success and
failure, including parents, government agencies, and donors. Each of these groups
have goals they want the charter school to meet (generally centering on academic
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achievement), and each faces significant monitoring costs that prevent them from
assessing and enforcing the school’s attainment of those goals. These groups face
common monitoring problems, including perceiving and measuring students’
achievement and enforcing the threat of accountability. Hansmann’s theory
explains nonprofit dominance as a product of these groups’ efforts to reduce
monitoring costs. These groups prefer nonprofits because nonprofits offer
assurances that managers will not cut costs and quality in imperceptible ways. (p.
1797)
This theory is rationally applicable to the charter industry in most states except for
the state of Michigan, which has about ten percent of its charter schools managed by
nonprofit organizations and more than eighty percent of charters managed by full-service,
for-profit private management companies.
Morley (2006) continued by explaining the challenges that three significant
charter school stakeholders have in terms of difficulties to monitor the performance of the
managerial agent and student performance. The three stakeholders include parents,
government agencies, and donors. The other stakeholders that may be added are the
authorizers or sponsors of the charter school. There is not a universal template that
charter school authorizers deploy to monitor student performance and overall success.
Parents have challenges with understanding what should be monitored and how may they
keep informed of important matters relative to their child’s academic, behavioral, and
social performance. There are not consistent ways that public schools, let alone charter
schools communicate with parents. In terms of the government, most policies and
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legislation differs by state. Other than regulated state testing mandated by the federal
government, there is no consistency of how to test for student performance.
Government, donors, and authorizers all have challenges related to monitoring
success indicators for charter schools. All three typically have different metrics they
would like tracked. These metrics usually serve their own specific interests and their
interests may not be linked to those of others but specific to their own agendas.
Stewardship Theory
The second concept to assist with providing meaning to the governance
phenomenon between boards of directors and full-service, for-profit private management
companies is the stewardship theory. Davis, Shoorman, and Donaldson (1997) explained:
Stewardship theory defines situations in which managers are not motivated by
individual goals, but rather are stewards whose motives are aligned with the
objectives of their principals. Because stewardship theory is relatively new, its
theoretic contribution has not been adequately established. (p. 21)
The authors go on to provide the psychological and sociological roots from which
the theory derived. Davis, Shoorman, and Donaldson (1997) stated:
Stewardship theory has its roots in psychology and sociology and was designed
for researchers to examine situations in which executives, as stewards, are
motivated to act in the best interests of their principals (Donaldson & Davis,
1989, 1991). In stewardship theory, the model of man is based on a steward
whose behavior is ordered such that pro-organizational, collectivistic behaviors
have higher utility than individualistic, self-serving behaviors. Given a choice
between self-serving behavior and pro-organizational behavior, a steward's
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behavior will not depart from the interests of his or her organization. Stewards
will not substitute or trade self-serving behaviors for cooperative behaviors. Thus,
even where the interests of the steward and the principal are not aligned, the
steward places higher value on cooperation than defection (terms found in game
theory). Because the steward perceives greater utility in cooperative behavior and
behaves accordingly, his or her behavior can be considered rational. (p. 24)
Stewardship theory provided a conceptual premise based on an agent’s intrinsic
motivations to align with the corporate goals and objectives of its client. The stewardship
theory differs from the agency theory in that it bypasses motivation and self-interest
motivations. Donaldson and Barney (1990) explained:
The executive manager, under this theory, far from being an opportunistic shirker,
essentially wants to do a good job, to be a good steward of the corporate assets.
Thus, stewardship theory holds that there is no inherent, general problem of
executive motivation. Given the absence of an inner motivational problem among
executives, there is the question of how far executives can achieve the good
corporate performance to which they aspire. (p. 51)
The stewardship theory presents a possible unique structure that would enable a
different unit of management structure having top administrative leadership report to the
board of directors. Such a reporting structure may diminish potential conflicts by having
a key role reporting to the boards of directors of charter schools. Donaldson and Davis
(1991) concluded:
Stewardship	
  theory	
  stresses	
  the	
  beneficial	
  consequences	
  on	
  shareholder	
  
returns	
  of	
  facilitative	
  authority	
  structures,	
  which	
  unify	
  command	
  by	
  having	
  roles	
  of	
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CEO	
  and	
  chair	
  held	
  by	
  the	
  same	
  person.	
  The	
  empirical	
  evidence	
  is	
  that	
  ROE	
  (return	
  
on	
  equity)	
  returns	
  to	
  shareholders	
  are	
  improved	
  by	
  combining;	
  rather	
  than	
  
separating	
  the	
  roles-‐holders	
  of	
  the	
  chair	
  and	
  CEO.	
  (p.	
  62)
Such a role in the charter industry would be equivalent to the superintendent and
principal roles reporting directly to the charter school board of directors. The stewardship
theory and the agency cost theory both consider the relationship between the agent and
client from different perspectives. Donaldson and Davis (1991) expounded:
Although agency theory appears to be the dominant paradigm underlying most of
the governance literature, researchers have suggested theoretical limits of agency theory
and proposed stewardship as an alternative theory of management (Davis et al., 1997, p.
20). Stewardship theory has its roots in psychology and sociology and can be divided into
two branches (Caers et al., 2006). The first branch also starts from a conflict between the
goals of the principal and the agent, but assumes that the agent will be motivated to act in
the interest of the principal (Davis et al., 1997). This implies that, even when the interests
of the agent and the principal are not aligned, the agent can attain a higher utility level by
acting in the principal’s interest because doing so might lead to opportunities for desired
personal outcomes such as achievement, affiliation, and self-actualization (cited from
Davis et al., 1997; Tosi et al., 2003). The second branch assumes that the agent’s goals
are perfectly aligned with those of the principal (cited from Sundaramurthy & Lewis,
2003). Both agency theory and stewardship theory focus on the relationship between
principals and agents, but start from different assumptions and prescriptions.
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Organizational identification is defined as, “A perceived oneness with an
organization and the experience of the organization’s successes and failures as
one’s owns” (cited from Mael & Ashforth, 1992, p. 103). Agency theory assumes
that agents have a low identification with the organization and may externalize
organizational problems to avoid blame. Stewardship theory, in contrast, assumes
that agents have a high identification with the mission of the organization. The
attribution of organizational successes to themselves will contribute to their selfimage and self-concept (cited from Davis et al., 1997). Concerning the agent’s
motivation, it is possible to distinguish two basic classes of motivations to
perform an activity: intrinsic motivation and extrinsic motivation (cited from
Deci, 1972). Stewardship theory stresses the agent’s tendency to be collectively
oriented and intrinsically motivated (cited from Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003).
(p. 436)
Muth & Donaldson (1998) cited Perrow (1986) to explain:
Stewardship theory is an alternative to agency theory and offers opposing
predictions about the structuring of effective boards. The stewardship model is
one based on manager as “steward” rather than the entirely self-interested,
rational economic man of agency theory. Agency theory, with roots in the fields
of economics and finance, examines the structures of capitalism, finds only selfinterested behavior, and assumes “this is human nature…” and neglects the
enormous amount of neutral and other-regarding behavior that exists…and the
structures that might increase. (p. 6)

CONFLICTS	
  IN	
  THE	
  GOVERNANCE	
  OF	
  MICHIGAN	
  CHARTER	
  SCHOOLS	
  	
  

26	
  
	
  

These outlined theories provide conceptual frameworks that help analyze the
phenomenon of charter school boards of directors contracting with full-service for-profit
private management companies in the state of Michigan. Table 1 compares these
theories:
Table 1
Comparison Chart of Agency Theory, Stewardship Theory and Contract Failure Theory
Dimension

Agency Theory

Stewardship Theory

Theoretical Basis

Economics and
finance

Psychology and
sociology

Contract Failure
Theory
Psychology and
economics

Approach

Control (distrust)

Collaboration (trust)

Uncertainty (trust)

Principal-Agent
Relationship

Goal conflict

Compatible or
aligned goals

Somewhat
compatible

Agent’s Motivation

Mainly extrinsic

Intrinsic

Somewhat intrinsic

Organizational
Identification

Low identification

High identification

High identification

Human Behavior

Individualist

Collectivist

Collaborative

Governance
Mechanisms

Monitoring and
incentives

Empowering
structures

Monitoring and
empowering

Source: Based on Puyvelde, Caers, DuBois, and Jegers (2012) and Morley (2006).
The charter school boards of directors have governance and oversight
responsibilities that include fiduciary, compliance, and outcome dimensions. The
selection of managerial models that boards of directors implement have significant
ramifications regarding their authority and empowerment to provide effective governance
as they work with full-service for-profit private management companies. Figure 1
illustrates how the conceptual framework is applied to the study’s topic of the
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relationship between charter schools’ boards of directors and full-service, for-profit
private management companies.	
  
Summary of Triangulation of Data
Full Service, For-Profit Private Management Companies
&&&&&&&&&&&
Education Management Organization (EMOs)

Micro Contributors
•

Hiring Key Leadership

•

Varying Incentive Levels

•

Governance Confusion

•

Overlapping of Roles

•

Level of Contract Awareness

•

Accountability

•

Lack of Transparency

!

Agency
Theory

Agent&
&EMO&

Stewardship
Theory

Agent&
&EMO&

Contract Failure
Theory

Agent&
&EMO&

!!Conﬂict!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!Conﬂict!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!Conﬂict!
Client&
&BOD&
High
Conflict

Client&
&BOD&
Moderate
Conflict

Client&
&BOD&
Moderate
Conflict

Macro Contributors
•

Charter Industry
Dynamics

•

Charter School
Legislation

•

Charter School
Governance

•

Charter School Policy
and regulation

•

Difficulty of Monitoring

!!
!

Nonprofit Charter School Boards of Directors (BODs)

Figure 1. Conceptual framework synthesizing agency theory, stewardship theory and
contract failure theory.
For-Profit Private Management Company Operations and Performance
The issues around the challenges of the governance structure were strongly
represented in the Detroit Free Press 2014 investigation. An area of conflict that came
from their examination centers on for-profit private management companies. As
opportunities for charter schools have grown, so has the interest from full-service, forprofit private management companies. These entities have appeared on the scene with the
promise of providing boards of directors with comprehensive educational services to
manage the academic and non-academic operations of the charter school. Chi and Weiner
(2008) stated:
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The role of EMOs (Education Management Organization) can vary widely, from
contracting a specific service to managing the entire school (cited by author
Buckley and Fisher 2002). By definition, such privatization detracts from the
public nature of charter schools (see Molnar 2001 for a more complete critique).
Notwithstanding some potential advantages to private-sector involvement primarily the infusion of stronger market forces - laws (even those providing for
public oversight) that allow even greater EMO involvement undermine the initial
vision of charter policies as a public realm, school-choice alternative to voucher
policies. (p. 285)
Wilson (2005) explained how for-profit companies became a part of the charter
schools movement:
The last decade has witnessed a new approach to school reform of radical
promise. New systems of public schools, overseen by a private organization and
operating under a common “brand,” aim to move beyond the isolated success of
individual charter schools and bring high-quality schooling to scale. Approaches
vary, and their proponents insist on unique designations. The first branded
operators, dubbed education management organizations (EMOs), were generally
organized as for-profit entities that managed schools, whether charter or district,
comprehensively. Typically they sought to impose, with varying degrees of
prescription, a school design (including such elements as school structure,
schedule, curriculum, instructional programs, and use of technology) on their
clients. Education entrepreneurs saw an opportunity: Private organizations could
help start and run public schools, free of many debilitating constraints of the
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school district. Many organizations managed schools in their entirety,
implementing their own curriculum, hiring the school staff, overseeing all day-today operations, and assuming responsibility for academic outcomes. (p. 89)
Wilson (2005) further explains how the business model for education
management companies (EMOs) work:
In addition to Edison, other major EMOs include National Heritage (with more
than twenty thousand students), Chancellor Beacon Academies (seventeen
thousand students) the Leona Group, K12, Mosaica Education, Charter Schools
USA, White Hat Management, and Victory Schools. The business of education
management organizations is to assist school boards in starting and running public
schools. At first glance, EMOs that manage schools comprehensively all deploy
the same business model. Each enters into management agreements with the
boards of either individual charter schools or school districts, under which it
assumes responsibility for running one or more schools. In exchange for these
services, it either is paid a fixed management fee (generally between 12 and 15
percent of the school’s revenues) or retains the surplus of each school’s revenues
over its costs. With enough schools under management, the individual
management fees in the aggregate will exceed the costs of running the corporate
office, and the EMO will realize a profit. (p. 90)
These full-service, for-profit private management companies are a new part of
education reform with the emergence of charter schools and this means that they have
brought with them new challenges and potential areas of conflicts. Interestingly, in many
instances, EMOs have been contracted to manage all key aspects of school activities,
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including curriculum design, hiring and professional development of staff,
administration, and building management. Allen and Mintrom (2009) stated, “The rise of
EMOs in the charter sector has served to diminish the role of traditional actors in school
oversight, especially citizen voters who can exercise little or no voice under such
administrative structures” (p. 458).
There are generally two sides when it comes to the benefits and drawbacks
concerning EMOs. According to Hannaway & Sharkey (2004),
The management of public schools by for-profit firms elicits strong feelings and
conflicting arguments about the possible merits and risks of such a management
arrangement. Some reformers see EMOs (Education Management Organizations),
as for-profit education contractors are commonly called, as a panacea that will
free schools from deadening bureaucracy, introduce new accountability pressure,
and bring the presumed efficiency benefits of market forces to public schools,
especially in urban areas. Others see EMOs as profit-oriented entities that will
sacrifice education quality for the sake of the bottom line. (p. 27)
Much of the potential conflict involving for-profit, private management
companies (EMOs) surround community needs versus corporate needs. This phenomenon
is explained in the Harvard Law Review (1999):
Education occupies a lofty position in the United States. Political and judicial
rhetoric declare educational opportunity for all to be critical in both promoting
individual and societal welfare. But almost as uncontested as education’s
importance is the sense of crisis in American public education… A market
delivery approach, which displaces government control, has even extended an
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opportunity for-profit seeking enterprises to enter a realm traditionally occupied
by public and nonprofit providers … This note examines companies that contract
for full management of public schools and intend to profit by offering education
more cost effectively than publicly administered schooling. The introduction of
profit motives into education more sharply raises the concerns about turning
public schooling into a product privately selected and privately delivered.
Publicly funded for-profit ventures pose hazards distinct from those of private
schools because for-profit ventures are paid out of general public funds, and from
those of public charter schools because for-profit ventures are experiments of a
larger scale. Because for-profit education companies rely on economies of scale to
turn a profit, they propose to change the system in its entirety rather than
accommodate individual opt outs or school by school exit innovations. (p. 695696)
The Harvard Law Review’s article, “Hazards of Making Public Schooling a
Private Business (1999),” also stated, “Private providers may not balance social and
individual interest or serve all constituencies equally” (p.700). The article then goes onto
explain, “Private delivery introduces several risks to that equitable ideal, and an
additional quest for profit injects uncertainty about the provider’s commitment to
delivering the best education possible within the constraints of tight budgets and evolving
community standards of education” (p.704). The Harvard Law Review (1999) clearly
identifies the inherent conflict between public schooling and corporations:
The nature of public education may not be amenable to profit which has proven
elusive in corporate ventures into public education. For-profit contracting
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amplifies these risks because of its incentive and its scope. The profit motive
makes schooling a business like any other, not a social enterprise, and elevates
personal choice over public good. (p. 709)
In Michigan, the conflict potential is high according to Morley (2006). In the
article, “For Profit and Nonprofit Charter Schools: An Agency Cost Approach,” the
author stated:
More detailed observation supports the story these national statistics tell of deep
involvement by for-profit firms. A report issued by Western Michigan University
found that for-profit management companies in Michigan –- a state with an
unusually high percentage of for-profit schools –- often own charter schools’
buildings, equipment and supplies; nominate and cultivate support for board
members of nonprofit entities that apply for charters; and contribute startup
capital. In fact, some management companies in Michigan refuse to contract for
anything other than “full service” agreements that grant them total authority over
the schools. The existence of a number of for-profit management companies
serving only one school suggests that the line between nonprofit charter holding
entities and their for-profit management companies is thin. (p. 1791)
The practice of contracting comprehensive educational services places the
advantage with the management company and makes the board of directors extremely
vulnerable and dependent on the management company for just about everything. This
makes it very difficult for a board to consider terminating, not renewing, negotiating, or
even augmenting its management agreement with full-service, for-profit private
management companies. Harvard Law Review (2009) explains,
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This “full service agreement” often makes it difficult for boards to govern over
areas that would be within their rights in a different arrangement, such as human
resources, resource allocation, and other areas that the management companies
feel falls within their jurisdiction as outlined in the contract. Disagreement about
performance measures can prove fatal to contracts. Private providers may be
especially nervous about basing compensation on student performance that is
partially dependent on inputs beyond its control. (p. 704)
An exemplary example of potential conflict lies in the area of hiring and firing
staff. The school principal may be terminated, removed, or demoted without any input
from or notice to the charter school board of directors. The potential areas of conflicts
between governing boards and for-profit private management companies can also center
on the services provided due to the corporate mindset of these companies. Harvard Law
Review (2009) further explained:
Private for-profit providers introduce an additional concern because they
invariably wrestle with a conflict of interest between shareholders and customers.
Profits depend on the extent to which costs are lower than revenues. But revenues
are fixed in management contracts, which are set by the school districts.
Especially when the product is undefined, maximizing profitability may cut cost
at the expense of student needs. (p.705)
The maximization of profit is a complex phenomenon within the social dynamics
of American education. Nonetheless, as opportunists made promises to improve
education and close gaps between classes and races, the door opened. Bennett (2008)
explained this new transition in education:
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Beginning in the late 1990’s, for-profit education management organizations
(EMOs) like New York City-based Edison began expanding at what Steven F.
Wilson, author of Learning on the Job, called a “dizzying pace.” Edison, founded
by publishing millionaire Christopher Whittle in 1992, grew to 51 schools in just
four years; Advantage, which Wilson started in 1997, was managing 16 charter
schools within two years. But even that pace was not good enough, and only a
handful of EMOs became profitable before their capital ran out and they had to
close some of the schools they had just opened. Edison spent a disastrous two
years as a public company and now operates 31 schools and provides
management services to 54 district schools. Advantage was merged into Mosaica,
which runs 35 charter schools in eight states and the District of Columbia.
According to the National Charter School Research Project (NCSRP), the country
now has 24 EMOs and about 30 CMOs. Most of these organizations are
controlled from a front office and are growing slowly because their headquarters
staff can only manage the complicated task of opening one school at a time.
Those who thought that proven models could be rapidly scaled up have concluded
that they underestimated the difficulty of creating substantially better schools
from scratch,” the NCSRP report explains. The entire charter movement, once
hailed as a vehicle for transforming education, serves less than 3 percent of the
nation’s schoolchildren, less than the percentage that are schooled at home. (p.
30)
In 2013, the National Center for Education Statistics reported that the national
average of schoolchildren attending charter schools has grown to 5.1% (2016, April).
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Retrieved from http://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/indicator_cgb.asp. Even though the
macro-perspective of charter school growth seems marginal; the infiltration of fullservice, for-profit private management companies in the state of Michigan has been
prolific. In Detroit, for example, more students attend charter schools than public and
private combined. Some concerns from critics include the trade-off of quality versus
cost. Robertson and Dale (2013) found that:
For-profit charter schools tended to ‘crop off’ services to students who were
difficult to educate, thus minimizing their costs so as to maximize quality gains.
And it is here that profit as a driving motivation (both necessary and inevitable
when private providers are involved) will tend to override concerns for education
quality in all of its complexity (reducing teacher salaries; staffing ratios, nonunionized labor and so on). (p. 439-440)
Transparency and Accountability Involving Public Tax Dollars
Some of the primary actors in Michigan charter schools include authorizers,
boards of directors, and full-service, for-profit private management companies. The
dynamics of their relations significantly impacts the success or failure status of individual
and collectively charter schools. Each actor has a critical role in the complex forums that
determines the performance, continuation, and progression of the charter schools as the
viable academic entities for the constituents they serve. All players are important;
however, research indicates that the ultimate power lies with the authorizer. Their range
of power to grant and terminate charters clearly distinguishes authorizers from the boards
of directors and the full-service, for-profit private management companies. Management
companies may come and go, board members may change, but for the life of most
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charters, the authorizer is there from beginning to end. The authorizers therefore have
tremendous responsibilities when it comes to holding the boards of directors accountable.
In the same respect, the boards of directors have the responsibility of holding the
management companies accountable. Sometimes the lines of accountability become
blurred and conflicts result. Bulkley (1999) supported this position with research on the
various types of accountability:
Sponsors are also responsible for “holding schools accountable” –- however, what
it means to hold a school accountable is not always clear. Three types of
accountability are commonly used by charter school authorizers: fiscal
accountability, which involves the proper use of public funds; compliance
accountability where sponsors look at whether schools are in compliance with
state and federal regulations, as well as specific procedural portions of their
charters (e.g. are they using curriculum they said they would, are they following
the appropriate governing board procedures); and outcome accountability, which
emphasizes the school’s success in increasing student performance. (p.676)
The state of Michigan is more unique than most states given the high penetration
of full-service for-profit private management companies in charter school districts. The
for-profit companies do wield power and influence given their level of entrenchment in
the charter school movement. Bulkley (1999) explained, “
In Michigan, the traditional idea of government control and governance assurance
of quality remains an important influence on charter school sponsors. As such,
pressures to be legitimate in the eyes of the public and political actors have [sic.]
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created more uncertainty in Michigan and thus pushed Michigan sponsors to
mimic existing institutions more than Arizona sponsors. (p. 695)
All parties in the oversight, governance, and management of charter schools
should all be held accountable. It is sometimes unclear how this is carried out and how it
can be addressed through legislation and policy. Even though the concept of
accountability rings loud in public forums and written documents, it continues to be
evasive and warrants attention, discussion, clarity and improvement. Mintrom and Vegari
(1997) summarized it by stating,
It is interesting to consider whether a reform intended to promote greater
accountability may, in some ways, result in diminished accountability for the
public dollars spent. In contrast to local school district boards, charter school
boards are not elected. Thus, some analysts wonder whether charter school
decision makers may prove even less accountable to the taxpaying public than
traditional school boards. Further, as charter schools engage in varying amounts
of contracting with private entities, questions may arise over whether given
service providers were chosen properly. Finally in cases where public entities
with appointed governing boards may sponsor charter schools, issues of adequate
charter school oversight and public accountability again arise. Charter school
advocates address such issues by noting that parents of charter school students
will ultimately ensure accountability. However, others maintain that the
accountability issue extends beyond the students who attend charter schools to the
general citizenry whose tax dollars fund such schools. (p. 159)
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Frazier (2011) elaborated on some of the issues regarding charter school
authorizers (sponsors) and boards of directors and supported further research in an area
that has not emphasized their roles:
However, charter school board accountability continues to be a problem in charter
schools in part because sponsors and boards are making up the rules as they go
along. Since their inception in 1991, many charter schools have closed due to
administrative and fiscal oversights (Center for Education Reform, 2002). These
oversights have focused attention on the capacity of charter school boards to
successfully govern their schools. This focus is important because boards have
been generally overlooked in charter school research. (p. 1)
Inherent Role Conflicts
Graham (2004) explains the inherent conflict when it comes to management
companies and accountability. He stated,
Some people and politicians alike would like to create a smokescreen to hide the
fact that they are not providing resources, financial or otherwise, to predominantly
urban, minority and low achieving school districts. Any meaningful discussion of
this endemic problem must be couched and wrapped in language of competition,
academic achievement, and accountability. (p. 1)
Frazier (2011) supported this by stating,
Public school boards receive considerable attention from diverse stakeholders
such as the general public and elected officials. However, charter school boards
have remained out of the limelight even though the number of charter schools in
the nation has significantly increased since 1991. The lack of substantive
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information about charter schools’ boards of directors contributes to the
ambiguity surrounding charter schools and has raised questions about
accountability. (p.3)
Typical management company contracts contain management fees, which are
normally based on a percentage of aggregate state per pupil funding ranging from 5% to
amounts above 10%. Other provisions may allow the full-service, for-profit private
management company to retain fund balances or obtain sub fees from managing grantrelated financial and in-kind resources. Some of the EMOs require a percentage of
vending and fundraising because the revenues fall under their financial management. The
role of the governing body becomes ambiguous, if not compromised, with unavoidable
inherent conflict as the power and control of the for-profit private management company
increases. The relationship is also fraught with potential minefields as the volunteer spirit
upon which the board was formed conflicts with the entrepreneurial premise for which
the for-profit private management company exists: to make a profit. Conn (2002)
elaborated:
In the euphoria of “solving” America’s educational woes, a basic inconsistency in
the notion of private, for-profit corporations controlling public education escaped
serious consideration. Private corporations are legal entities established within a
paradigm of maximization of profits. For those who provide the working capital
of the organization: the shareholders. The directors of such organizations owe
fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to the shareholders. They owe, under the law,
no concomitant duties to other constituencies. (p.129)
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Issues regarding accountability and transparency surface as boards try to enforce
their governance responsibilities, while some management companies try to legally
provide as little information as possible. Sometimes for-profit private management
companies say they do not have to provide information because they are private
companies. Dixon (2014b) explained in her article entitled, “Charter School Board
Members Found Themselves Powerless,” that at a board meeting there was discussion
about the amount of the EMO’s management fee:
A representative of the EMO clarified that the entire amount received by the
management company was the management fee according to the contract and that
there was no separate line item for a “management fee.” He stated that he would
not disclose a specific dollar amount for management fees. The appropriateness of
this position was questioned since public money was involved. The EMO
representative stated that the public dollars became private when they were
received by the EMO. He further indicated that because the EMO is a private
company; the information needs not be disclosed. (p. 2)
This area of conflict between public interests versus corporate interests, which
presents itself in discussions over transparency in decision-making and profitability are
exacerbated by the role of the authorizer. Wilson (2005) explained:
Entering into management contracts with local school boards, whether district or
charter, proved more often a hindrance than an efficient means of running schools
and systematically implementing an educational program. The school’s board
remains a legally separate entity from the management company and retains by
statute ultimate oversight over all aspects of the school. In many cases, school
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staff are required to be public employees of their charter school or district. This
structure gives rise to enormous problems. The organization, its client board, and
the school director vie for control over the school. When the school’s board lays
claim to the school as truly its own, the law is in its favor…The organizations
naturally seek as much authority as possible to ensure that they can generate
financial and academic results and protect their financial investment. Even when a
local board was willing to delegate much of its day-to-day management to the
education contractor, state regulators and charter authorizers often prevented it
from doing so. Authorizers took the position that boards could not delegate
powers assigned to them by the charter statute to contractors. (p. 100)
Two types of management services generally offered include non-profit charter
management organizations and educational management organizations (EMO), which are
for-profit corporations. As stated earlier, the EMOs dominate the educational service
provider market in Michigan. Lacireno-Paquet (2005) explained, “And although these
differences in charter school type are beginning to be explored, some have voiced
concern that for schools associated with EMOs the profit motive might become the
primary focus, with quality and equity lost by the wayside” (p. 81). Wood (2013) further
elaborated,
EMO opponents are also concerned about cost. They worry that the same
incentives compelling EMOs to operate schools more efficiently might cause
EMOs to sacrifice quality and effectiveness. Opponents assert that the costminimizing incentive will leave EMOs to cut spending in ways harmful to student
achievement. (p.4)
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All of these dynamics result in many areas of conflict beyond the public and
corporate interests. Wilson (2005) further explained:
With such a muddled chain of command, it was probably inevitable that some
boards and EMOs would fight, from the earliest days of their marriage, over the
most basic components of the new schools. Where should the school be housed,
and at what cost? What instructional programs should be used? Who should lead
the school? Once the school was launched, new opportunities for conflict arose,
often more personal and bitter. One common area of conflict was the hiring of
school staff and the letting of contracts. Education management organizations
knew charter authorizers wanted to see “community members” on the boards of
charter schools they approved, so EMO staff recruited –- often with little
diligence –- parent activists, local church leaders, and their friends and colleagues
to serve on the new boards. Many such trustees were well intentioned but
unsophisticated when it came to their ethical responsibilities as public fiduciaries.
Some saw nothing wrong with lobbying the principal to hire a friend or decreeing
that a male kindergarten teacher could not be hired.
When tensions arose between the board and the management, the board
naturally sought to enlist the principal to its side. It took courage to defy trustees
who were in and out of the school every day, disparaging the management
company, and telling you what to do. Soon enough the relationship between all
three parties running the school –- board, EMO, and principal –- all deteriorated.
Avoiding conflict with his customer boards was the “single biggest problem
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we’ve had,” Mosaica’s chief executive officer, Michael Connelly, reports. Other
CEOs say the same.
Some boards threatened to terminate their management contracts when the
relationship deteriorated or the school struggled to live up to its promises. If state
officials were unwilling to hold trustees of charter schools to their contracts, the
only alternative for EMOs was to litigate. Most found this option unattractive.
Entering such a public fight could prove to be a public relations’ nightmare. Faced
with these options, most EMOs chose to do everything possible to maintain their
engagement with the school. With the contract on the line, they often agreed to
renegotiate, resulting in a lower fee, elimination of contract renewals provisions,
lost of supervisory authority over school personnel, reduction in responsibilities,
and shortened contract terms. (p. 100)
Maximizing Profitability: For-Profit Versus Non-Profit Models
Kohn (2002) explained this difficult relationship in the following excerpt:
In the final analysis, the problem with letting business interests shape our
country’s agenda for education isn’t just the executives’ lack of knowledge about
the nuances of pedagogy. The problem is with their ultimate objectives.
Corporations in our economic system exist to provide a financial return to the
people who own them: they are in business to make a profit. As individuals, those
who work in (or even run) these companies might have other goals, too, when
they turn their attention to public policy or education or anything else. But
business qua business is concerned principally about its own bottom line. Thus,
when business thinks about schools, its agenda is driven by what will maximize
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its profitability, not necessarily by what is in the best interest of students. Any
overlap in those two goals would be purely accidental –- and in practice, turns out
to be minimal. What maximizes corporate profits often does not benefit children
and vice versa. (p. 118)
With all of these areas of conflict, the question arises as to the reason that these
companies are able to survive and flourish. Morley (2006) explained:
Given that monitoring costs in for-profit charters are so high, it seems strange that
any parents, agencies, or donors would prefer for-profits. Since nonprofits control
agency costs more efficiently than for-profits do, why do for-profits exist at all?
The answer lies in for-profit schools’ superior ability to raise capital and to
exploit economies of scale.
There is ample evidence to suggest that most for-profit charters schools
operate at a larger scale than nonprofits do. Scale in schools can be measured both
in individual school size and in school network size. For-profit schools’ ability to
run large networks stems largely from their superior access to capital, the most
essential ingredient in economies of scale. There are many potential economies of
scale in education, both on the individual and network levels. Large individual
schools experience economies of scale because they can spread fix costs –- such
as football fields, administrators, libraries, classrooms, driver’s education practice
ranges, and cafeteria equipment –- across many students. They accomplish this by
using these resources intensely.
Large schools may also allow more subject specialization among teachers.
Large school networks experience similar economies of scale. For example, they
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allow managers to centralize decision-making, eliminating the need for each
school’s principal to invest time into becoming fully informed and weighing the
options for every decision facing the school.
Networks can also centralize data collection, reporting, and accounting,
which may become major burdens for small schools. Additionally, networked
schools can centralize purchasing, perhaps obtaining volume discounts from
suppliers.
Finally, large networks diversify risk and provide additional security for
creditors. There is undoubtedly a tension between the efficiencies gained from
scale and the harmful effects of large schools on achievement. Large classrooms
or perhaps even large schools arguably hurt achievement. Indeed, one of the more
subtle goals of charter policy is to reduce school size. How for-profit schools
balance this concern against the disadvantages of school is not clear. It appears,
however, that the benefits of scale are sufficiently large to create spots for at least
a significant minority of for-profit schools. (p. 1081)
Morley’s excerpt illustrated why the potential for conflict is so high in the state of
Michigan. The majority of the states have an inversed ratio, with non-profit companies
dominating their charter schools’ management. Since for-profit companies dominate the
Michigan educational landscape, there is a greater need to address these areas that could
lead to conflicts between these corporate entities and the public that the school boards
serve.
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The Challenge of Transparency with Public Tax Dollars
In addition to issues including governance and the financial management by forprofit private management companies, important areas of conflicts exposed in Dixon’s
(2014a) article in the Detroit Free Press were around accountability and transparency
with the use of public tax dollars. The issues surrounding the use of public tax dollars in
the charter world is under major scrutiny. Transparency and accountability become
confusing when it is not clear who is in control of financial planning, monitoring and
reporting. The boards of directors’ roles become more ambiguous as for-profit
management companies are hired to manage all aspects of the public school academy
including operations, curriculum, hiring, recruitment, finances, and budgets.
As we proceed into the third decade of charter school reform we see trends that
are both negative and positive. Positive trends reveal evidence of creativity and autonomy
that was hoped for in the beginning of the movement. However, just as there have been
some successes, critics provide evidence that many charters are not producing any better
results than traditional public schools. Some charters are being closed based on the
legislation metrics of academic performance such as No Child Left Behind and school
rankings from Race to the Top legislation. The complexity has been magnified, especially
in Michigan as it boasts the greatest penetration and number of full-service, for-profit
private management companies; more than any other state in the country. The high
penetration of for-profit management companies complicates the dynamics of the
Michigan Education landscape given its already historic challenges related to economics,
urban decline, funding, union battles, and the inability to diminish poverty. On the
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contrary, growing concerns have germinated around transparency, accountability, and the
effective monitoring and ethical management of taxpayers’ dollars.
Toch (2010) explained these issues and how they are more complex with the
involvement of for-profit companies:
Charter schools have brought many talented people to the cause of public school
improvement. This new generation of social entrepreneurs includes Ivy League
graduates and Rhodes Scholars committed to helping the disadvantaged and
drawn to public schooling by the independence offered charter schools. The
charter movement has also attracted bad actors more [sic.] interested in enriching
themselves than students. There [sic.] are stories of educational failure and
financial malfeasance in charter schools just as unscrupulous trade schools fed off
the federal financial aid system for years. But accountability remains weak in a
number of states, and the charter world remains deeply divided over whether the
locus of accountability should rest with consumers or regulators. (p. 70)
This need for accountability is hampered by a lack of resources dedicated to
charter school oversight. As Morley (2006) explained:
Government monitoring has also been hampered by a wide range of failings that;
though not inherent in charter theory, arise frequently in practice. For example,
charter schools and government agencies are often uncertain about the scope of
the government’s monitoring authority. The most recent study of the Public
Charter School Program found that charter school legislation in the states has
provided virtually no guidance on how authorizers should approach the
accountability processes. Monitoring agencies also frequently lack adequate
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resources. In fact, most monitoring bodies have no staff specifically devoted to
charter school issues at all. The symptoms of this problem have included limited
communication between agencies, poor information gathering, and in some states,
the failure of any agency to take responsibility for assessing charter school
performance. What few resources agencies devote to charter schools may have
limited effect because charter schools often fail to set clear and measurable goals
for themselves. (p. 1081)
In the Annenberg Institute for Charter School Reform report (2014) entitled,
“Public Accountability for Charter Schools,” they explained that there is an inherent lack
of transparency in charter school governance:
Charter schools, authorizers, and management organizations are sometimes
exempted from transparency and public accountability regulations that other
publicly funded institutions must adhere to. Lack of transparency has been a
significant challenge for authorizers as well as parents and policymakers and
opens the door to malfeasance (p.5).
Resnick (2010) contended that, “The public wants their voices heard inside the
schoolhouse wall. They want to know that their tax dollars are being spent effectively and
responsibly.” He also explained that accountability does not only revolve around
financial matters. “Increasingly, local school boards are charged with ensuring that
broader state and federal education requirements are met while translating local values
and priorities into policies to meet the goal and aspirations of parents, taxpayers, and
local businesses. By engaging their communities, school boards create a culture that
supports schools in their main mission: raising student achievement” (p. 11).
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Resnick (2010) made it clear along with the Detroit Free Press investigation, that
the lack of accountability and transparency in charter schools is a primary source for
oversight and governance conflicts. The unique quality with this category of conflicts is
that all three actors (charter school boards of directors; full-service, for-profit
management companies; and authorizers) previously mentioned contribute to the
concerns of transparency and accountability. According to the Annenberg Institute on
Charter School Reform (2014), management contracts are a source for issues around
accountability and transparency:
Many of the most significant concerns around governance and transparency relate
to external charter management companies. Nearly every state allows charter
school governing boards to subcontract with a non-profit charter management
organization (CMO) or a for-profit management organization (EMO) for virtually
every facet of school management. Some of these EMO/CMOs have steadfastly
refused to open their financial books to the public, even though they are receiving
– or are nearly wholly supported by public funds. (p. 6)
In the relationship between all three actors, the authorizer has the main task of
providing oversight and accountability. The Annenberg Institute on Charter School
Reform (2014), further explained that this is often a challenge:
In most states, charter authorizers are tasked not just with granting charters, but
with providing oversight and technical assistance to schools that they authorize,
ensuring that each school is in compliance with state and federal law as well as
with its individual charter agreements. The rapid expansion of the charter sector
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has left authorizers in many states woefully understaffed and unable to
appropriately monitor the schools they have chartered. (p. 12)
In conclusion, all of these areas of conflict, which culminate in the requirements
for greater accountability and transparency, lead to a reason to review and perhaps revise
the charter school laws. The Annenberg Institute on Charter School Reform (2014)
makes this recommendation:
Most state charter school laws were written in the 1990s, when the charter schools
were expected to only be a small component of state systems of public education.
There was little concern that ineffective or unethical charter operators would use
schools as nightclubs, or that for-profit corporations would buy up property and
lease it back to schools at a substantial profit. Regrettably, the exponential growth
of the charter industry over the last twenty years has not coincided with increased
oversight. It is time to revisit state charter laws to monitor and ensure the
appropriate and effective use of public dollars. (p.12)
Charter School Autonomy and Accountability
Barghaus and Boe (2011) explained that there is a trade-off with charter schools
being able to have greater autonomy:
Charter schools fundamentally represent a trade-off--- greater autonomy for
increased accountability (Finnigan 2007). Curiously, 72 percent of states with
charter school legislation specify more accountability as an objective, while only
27 percent of such states specify increased autonomy (Smarick 2005). (p. 78)
Autonomy and accountability are essential to improving education. Legitimacy
has still not been achieved for charter schools; it is currently in a state of mixed reviews.
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But the goal must still be pursued given the high level of importance of public education
and what it means for the future for the state of Michigan and the country. The National
Conference of State Legislature (2015) explains in their website article entitled, “Charter
Schools in the State,” the important role that policy and legislation have in ensuring the
quality of these organizations:
Charter schools are publicly funded, privately managed and semi-autonomous
schools of choice. They do not charge tuition. They must hold to the same
academic accountability measures as traditional schools. They receive public
funding similarly to traditional schools. However, they have more freedom over
their budgets, staffing, curricula and other operations. In exchange for this
freedom, they must deliver academic results and there must be enough community
demand for them to remain open.
The number of charter schools has continued to grow since the first charter
law was passed in Minnesota in 1991. Some have delivered great academic
results, but others have closed because they did not deliver on promised results.
Because state laws enable and govern charter schools, state legislatures are
important to ensuring their quality. (“Charter Schools In the State,” 2015)
Conclusion
Charter schools have become entrenched into the fabric of American education.
For the foreseeable future, charters are here to stay. Once their permanence is accepted,
we can hopefully move forward with authentically pursuing better education for the
masses including those in less wealthy districts. We have a very long way to go and the
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areas to start with include better governance, authorization, and management. The actors
who directly impact the regulation and delivery of education to children must not only
create, but also promote collaborative policies, legislation, and laws. Michigan has a
unique challenge in the charter realm given the high penetration of full-service, for-profit
private management companies. The challenge is elevated because of the volunteer spirit
of board governance and the profit mission of for-profit management companies. Making
a profit is not a bad thing; however, it has not historically been the basis of American
education. It does become a problem when issues surface regarding accountability,
transparency, financial management, exorbitant charges, and lopsided contracts that favor
the management company.
Charter schools will hopefully revisit their reasons of origin. Graham (2004)
states,
Charter schools by their very design embody many of the qualities that
lawmakers, parents, and concerned citizens are desperately searching for in a
reform and governance model. They were created to improve student
achievement, provide accountability, and provide expanded choice which was a
missing ingredient in public schools (p.5).” Frazier (2011) explained, “Charter
schools’ boards are accountable to stakeholders and the general public who
entrust public education and public dollars to charter schools. (p. 4)
Frazier (2011) contributes to the research study by providing recommendations
for future research regarding governance:
Perhaps the most needed recommendation for future research is that policymakers
take a closer look at the lack of information about charter school boards, and
begin collecting and analyzing data about charter school board members, their
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roles, responsibilities and practices to identify successes and opportunities for
improvement. There is not much evidence that charter school boards are operating
well, and they may need to develop additional or improve their governance skills.
Hence, policymakers should also look at providing opportunities for mandatory
board development activities around leadership, communication, and
administrative and fiscal management. (p. 82-83)
This need for more information about charter school boards of directors and
identifying factors that will lead to their improvement have lead to exploration of what
prevents effective governance as it relates to the relationship with full-service, for-profit
private management companies with a focus on improving accountability and
transparency. The charter school experiment was designed to provide autonomous
creativity and innovation, but something has gone awry and conflicts have infiltrated the
pursuit of education excellence, thus far preventing Michigan and our country from
providing education equality for all children.
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Chapter 3: Research Design and Methodology
Introduction
The research questions of the study emanate from the general topic of charter
school leadership and governance. Specifically, investigating the consequences of charter
school boards of directors contracting with full-service, for-profit private management
companies in the state of Michigan. The study focuses on obtaining the perspectives of
charter school board members in regard to role conflicts created by overlapping
governance with full-service, for-profit private management companies and how such
conflicts may be at least mitigated if not eliminated.
Research Questions
The three questions of the research study are specific to charter school governance
and the role conflicts that occur between charter school boards of directors and the fullservice for-profit private management companies. These management companies are
selected by the charter school boards of directors to comprehensively manage the
operations of the school. The questions include the following:
1. Do the contractual relationships between Michigan charter school boards of
directors and full-service for-profit management companies contribute to conflict
in governance?
2. Assuming that parallel governance systems created in charter schools whose
boards of directors contract with for-profit management companies contribute to
governance conflict, what are the factors in the relationship that contribute to
conflict in governance?
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3. Are accountability and transparency of public funds affected when Michigan
charter schools’ boards of directors contract with full-service for-profit private
management companies?
Methodology
The proposed research is a mixed methodology approach incorporating
quantitative and qualitative designs. The results from the mixed methodology were crossanalyzed for statistical inferences and the identification of common themes. According to
Creswell (2014),
The key assumption of this approach is that both, qualitative and quantitative data
provide different types of information-often detailed views of participants
qualitatively and scores on instruments quantitatively-and together they yield
results that should be the same. It builds off the historic concept of multi-method,
multi-trait idea from Campbell and Fiske (1959); who felt that a psychological
trait could be best understood by gathering different forms of data. Although the
Campbell and Fiske conceptualization included only quantitative data, the mixed
methods researchers extended the idea to include the collection of both
quantitative and qualitative data. (p.219)
This dual approach enabled the capturing of experienced board members’ perspectives
with quantitative surveys and qualitative interviews.
Research Design and Instruments
The research design from a quantitative perspective was explored and compared
elements regarding the participants’ responses to survey questions. This survey
instrument captured experienced board members’ perspectives on leadership roles and the
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resulting conflicts regarding the governance of charter schools based on their individual
experiences. (See Appendix A for the survey instrument.) The distribution of surveys
targeted 40 to 50 respondents of charter school board members who contracted with fullservice, for-profit private management companies for comprehensive management
services. The boards were purposely selected to have cross-representation from contracts
with different management companies and different authorizers.
Creswell (2014) explained, “A survey design provides a quantitative or numeric
description of trends, attitudes, or opinions of a population by studying a sample of that
population. From sample results, the researcher generalizes or draws inferences to the
population” (p. 155). The research design from a quantitative perspective included both
hard copy surveys for board members who hold an executive position, such as president
or vice president, to distribute and collect from their fellow members, and electronic
surveys were sent to eligible board members with permission from their board officers.
The participants received survey questions divided into specific categories based on the
guiding research questions: Do the contractual relationships between Michigan charter
school boards of directors and full-service, for-profit private management companies
contribute to conflicts in governance? Assuming that parallel governance systems created
in charter schools whose boards of directors contract with full-service, for-profit private
management companies contribute to governance conflicts what are the factors in the
relationship that contribute to conflicts in governance? Finally, are accountability and
transparency of public funds affected when Michigan charter schools’ boards of directors
contract with full-service, for-profit private management companies?
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The research design from a qualitative perspective included in-depth interviews
that provided inquiry to the perspectives of experienced charter school board members
(preferably with a minimum of ten years board experience) with various roles of
leadership appointments. As part of this process, seven participants were purposely
selected to capture their responses to research questions regarding experiences of
contracting with full-service, for-profit private management companies. The interview
candidates served as board members with at least five years and preferably ten to fifteen
years of experience as members of various charter school boards of directors. A series of
open-ended questions were utilized to engage the participants and allow subjective
detailed responses. (See Appendix B for the list of interview questions.) Each interview
respondent was taped with an audio recorder. The tapes were transcribed and
electronically saved. Bloomberg and Volpe (2016) explained,
Qualitative research is suited to promoting a deep understanding of a social
setting or activity as viewed from the perspective of the research participants.
This approach implies an emphasis on exploration, discovery, and description.
Quantitative research studies cause-effect phenomenon. Both research approaches
involve complex processes in which particular data collection and data analysis
methods assume meaning and significance in relation to the assumptions
underlying the larger intellectual traditions within which these methods are
applied. (p.38)
Part of the qualitative portion included exploration and comparative analysis of
contracts between charter schools and their selected full-service, for-profit private
management companies. Five contracts were selected for analysis. Each contract was
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unique to a board of directors and their contracted full-service, for-profit private
management company. The contracts were analyzed for patterns of content, terms, and
conditions that potentially caused overlap and conflicts during the life of the agreement.
The analysis of contracts assisted with providing insight to the disposition of the
contractual parties and if it caused overlap and conflicts from the start of the agreement
between the boards of directors and the full-service, for-profit private management
companies.
The results from the mixed methodology approach enabled a cross-reference of
findings gathered from three separate methods of data gathering; survey questionnaires,
interviews, and contract analysis.
Sample Size and Composition
The perspectives of board members were obtained from a survey questionnaire
provided directly to active and former board members who met the candidate criteria. A
sample size of forty to fifty board members was targeted for charter schools working with
full-service, for-profit private management companies (EMOs). The definition of
acceptable candidates for both populations (1 and 2 as defined below) were individuals
who served on a charter school board, either currently or within the last five years: survey
candidates for a minimum of one or more years and interview candidates for a minimum
period of five years (preferably ten to fifteen years). Candidates were also required to
have contracted with a full-service, for-profit private management company operating in
the state of Michigan.
Population 1 is composed of survey participants whose charter school boards
contracted with an EMO for comprehensive management services. The sample size and
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composition of the perception survey candidates were as follows: forty to fifty completed
surveys from board members preferably with at least one or more years of appointed
service regardless of their role on the board, gender, race, and ethnicity; and regardless of
geographic boundaries (urban, suburban, and rural).
Population 2 was defined as interview participants who met the criteria for
eligible charter school board members and contracted with an EMO for comprehensive
management services. A total of seven interviews were conducted to obtain their
subjective governance experiences and perceptions in regards to both contracting and
working with EMOs. These board members preferably had at least five years (preferably
ten to fifteen years) of appointed service regardless of their role on the board, gender,
race, and ethnicity; and regardless of geographic boundaries (urban, suburban, and rural).
Proposed Analysis of Data
An analysis was done through comparing the findings of the survey responses.
The surveys were formatted in a Likert Scale providing numerical statistical
representations of the perspectives of the various board members who contracted with
EMOs. The statistical results provided quantitative metrics with a given rating for each
survey question.
Respondents were provided their responses on two Likert Scales, part one with
ranges of responsibility polarized by full-service, for-profit private management
companies’ responsibility (Option 1) to the boards of directors’ responsibility (Option 5):
1 – Management companies’ responsibility
2 - Mostly the management companies’ responsibility and some of the boards of
directors
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3 – Share responsibility equally between the management companies and the
boards of directors
4 – Mostly the boards of directors’ responsibility and some of the management
companies
5 – The boards of directors’ responsibility
And part two, a Likert Scale ranging from 1 to 5 with the following designations:
1 – Strongly Disagree
2 – Disagree
3 – Neutral
4 – Agree
5 – Strongly Agree
The results were aggregated to determine the quantitative ratings per question and
aggregated for each participant and as a group. The data gathered from the qualitative
interviews was transcribed, analyzed, and decoded to search for threads of common
themes. The survey results and interview findings were cross-referenced and analyzed for
patterns, commonalities, and themes.
Measures to Ensure Safety, Confidentiality, and Anonymity for Human Subjects
The quantitative surveys were sent directly to board presidents to facilitate with
their members. If the routine board meeting schedule for the charter schools participating
was timely, then the time frames were leveraged accordingly. The board presidents (or
designees) were asked to disseminate the surveys to each of their fellow board members.
The returned anonymous surveys were numbered, coded, and secured.
In terms of the qualitative interviews, the participants were asked where they were
most comfortable meeting to which accommodations were made accordingly. The
interviews were recorded via an audio device and later transcribed. Notes and their
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recordings were electronically stored in a laptop with a pass code for access. (See
Appendix C and D for the IRB Letter of Approval and for Human Subjects Review
Board (CITI) training and certification)
Timeline
The following timeline illustrated the cadence of research activities:
Step 1: Submit appropriate information and documentation to the Human Subjects
Review Committee for their review and approval.
Step 2: Implement a query of the research instruments, quantitative surveys, and
qualitative questions with a selected board for testing.
Step 3: Upon the Human Research Review Committee’s approval, contact the
board presidents of the sample charter schools to ask if they are willing to
participate in a study on board leadership and governance.
Step 4: Identify and contact potential candidates for qualitative interviews.
Step 5: Distribute surveys to board presidents with directions to implement
surveys and later collect for pick up.
Step 6: Conduct qualitative interviews.
Step 7: Synthesize data for analysis.
Step 8: Draw conclusions of the collected data from both surveys and interviews.
Decode interviews and search for common themes within the data.
Step 9: Cross analyzing (triangulation) of the results from all methods of research
and data collection.

CONFLICTS	
  IN	
  THE	
  GOVERNANCE	
  OF	
  MICHIGAN	
  CHARTER	
  SCHOOLS	
  	
  

62	
  
	
  

Summary
Chapter 3 provided the cadence for the research design and methodology to
explore the phenomenon around governance conflicts when charter school boards of
directors contract with full-service, for-profit private management companies in the state
of Michigan. The research was a mixed methodology inclusive of quantitative and
qualitative designs. The dual approach was selected to provide a wealth of findings to
subsequently enable data convergence and triangulation. A general contract analysis was
also implemented to provide insight for the development of survey questions and
interview questions. Subsequently, a more in-depth contract analysis was completed to
provide qualitative data around the similarities and differences of contract agreements
and its implications on the relationship between the charter schools' boards of directors
and the chosen for-profit management company. The findings provided an opportunity
for analysis and set the stage for conclusions presented in Chapter 7.
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Chapter 4: Presentation and Analysis of Data
Introduction
Three questions provided the framework for this mixed methodology study and
were specific to charter school governance in the state of Michigan and the role conflicts
that often occur between charter school boards of directors and the full-service, for-profit
private management companies selected to comprehensively manage the operations of
their school. The three research questions that guided this examination were as follows:
1.) Do the contractual relationships between Michigan charter school boards of
directors and full service, for-profit management companies contribute to conflict
in governance?
2.) Assuming that parallel governance systems created in charter schools whose
boards of directors contract with for-profit management companies contribute to
governance conflict, what are the factors in the relationship that contribute to
conflict in governance?
3.) Are accountability and transparency of public funds affected when Michigan
charter schools boards of directors contract with full-service, for-profit
management companies?
The data is first presented in a quantitative format followed by an illustration of
data findings with a subsequent analysis. The second part of the data presentation is a
qualitative format inclusive of summaries of transcripts from interview participants and
codification of data to generate patterns and themes for subsequent analysis. The
quantitative and qualitative analysis was converged and triangulated with the data from
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an analysis of contracts between charter school boards of directors and for-profit private
management companies.
Quantitative Methodology
The quantitative surveys were obtained in two ways. First, board presidents were
provided with hard copy surveys to distribute to their board members who met the
criterion of having served on a charter school board for at least one to two years. In some
instances, the researcher attended board meetings to clarify the research requests and
respond to participants’ questions. Secondly, an electronic version of the survey was
provided with a link that enabled board presidents and their members to access,
participate, and submit their responses at their convenience. The survey is comprised of
two parts both in Likert Scales; Part 1 contained twelve questions seeking to obtain the
charter school board respondents perspective as to whether the board of directors or the
for-profit management company is responsible for certain duties related to the operations
of charter schools. Part 2 contained four questions which gauges the board respondents’
level of agreement or disagreement to questions regarding the impact of managing state
funds, accountability, transparency, and the boards’ understanding of their contract with
for-profit private management companies.
The goal for the number of survey responses was 40, which was exceeded by 15
for a total of 55 surveys responses. Of those 55 surveys that were submitted, 48 were
complete and 7 were incomplete. The total number of surveys sent out to eligible board
members was 130 with 48 completed, which resulted in a completed response rate of
37% for the quantitative research.
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Qualitative Methodology
The rationale for using the qualitative design included purposefully selected
participants from a pool of potential candidates based on the criterion of having fifteen
years of experience of contracting with a full-service, for-profit private management
company; in addition, the potential participants will have served most of their time in key
board member positions such as president, vice-president, or treasurer. The participants
were selected from the pool of candidates who were recommended by various sources.
The researcher knew three of the participants by professional affiliations and some
authorizers and management companies recommended others. The researcher also
wanted to consciously mix the boards, management companies, and authorizers in order
to have a wide span of different experiences.
Contacting potential interview candidates based on specified criteria facilitated
the qualitative interviews. Candidates were selected based on the following criteria:
having charter school board experience; contracting with a for-profit private management
company; having served in significant board positions such as president, vice president,
and treasurer; and having a minimum of five years, and preferably ten to fifteen years of
service, as a charter school board member. Table 2 illustrates the board member
participants’ profiles that met the candidate criteria and includes their gender, race, years
on the board, and profession.
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Table 2
Demographics of Charter School Board Members Participation in the Qualitative
Interviews
Participant
Gender
Race
Years on
Profession
Board
Participant A

Male

African American

17

Manager MIS

Participant B

Male

African American

18

Finance Director

Participant C

Female

White

13

Health Care

Participant D

Female

African American

6

Retired

Participant E

Female

African American

13

Medical Research

Participant F

Male

White

19

Lawyer

Participant G

Male

White

12

Entrepreneur

Years on Board

Mean: 14

Median: 13

Mode: 13

Range: 13

The qualitative interview subjects consisted of a demographic mix of charter
school board member participants who had an average of 14 years of experience serving
on a charter school board in the state of Michigan. The least number of years of
experience was six and the most years of experience was 19. The group consisted of four
males and three females and consisted of four African Americans and three White
participants. The group also represented varied professional and education profiles.
The researcher analyzed the interview responses by identifying common phrases
that appeared frequently in the individual respondent’s transcripts. Descriptors is the term
used in the study to describe words and phrases that were frequently found in the
transcripts and were a common topic of discussion, even if they were not explicitly
stated. These identified descriptors were indexed and then compared in order to
determine summative common themes among all of the interviews.

CONFLICTS	
  IN	
  THE	
  GOVERNANCE	
  OF	
  MICHIGAN	
  CHARTER	
  SCHOOLS	
  	
  

67	
  
	
  

Supplemental Comparative Contractual Analysis
The contractual analysis explored five contracts between charter school boards of
directors and for-profit private management companies. The contracts were analyzed to
provide data on possible patterns related to content, terms, obligations, and conditions
that may potentially cause role confusion and conflict between the two parties during the
life of the agreement.
The results from the three methodologies enables a triangulation of data to
supplement findings and strengthen the analysis of potential role confusion and conflicts
as it relates to charter school boards of directors contracting with for-profit private
management companies.
Quantitative Findings: Analysis of Part 1 Survey Questions
The quantitative findings that came from the results of the survey responses are as
follows and are organized by their alignment to one of the three research questions. The
survey questions will not be sequential; however, they are a part of the item analysis with
the survey questions in part one germane to the three research questions. Survey
Questions 1, 3, 4, 7 and 11 relate to Research Question 1. Survey Questions 5, 8, 9, and
10 relate to Research Question 2. Survey Questions 2, 6, and 12 relate to Research
Question 3. The analysis of part two of the survey is organized in the same manner.
Research Question 1: Do the contractual relationships between Michigan charter
school boards of directors and full-service for-profit management companies
contribute to conflict in governance?
Part 1 Survey Question 1: The responsibility for hiring key personnel such as,
superintendent, principals and teachers should be…
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Figure 2. Percentages of responses to Part 1 Survey Question 1.
As the results of each group are shown in Figure 2, nearly 40% of the board
members responded that hiring school personnel is the responsibility of the management
company, while 29% responded that it is mostly the management company’s
responsibility. Nearly one quarter of the respondents believed that the responsibility is
equally shared, and a little over 10% responded that it is mostly or all of the board of
director’s responsibility.
There is clearly role confusion as to who has the responsibility for this function.
This is a potential source of conflict because more than half of the board respondents did
not think that the management company had sole responsibility for hiring school staff.
Other responses ranged from the board having sole responsibility for hiring to the
responsibility being equally shared with the management company. These findings are
contrary to the contract analysis, which clearly states that the management company has
complete responsibility for the employment of personnel working at the school and for all
human resource functions.
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Part 1 Survey Question 3: The responsibility for managing the day-to-day
operations of the school should be…

Board"of"Directors"

Mostly"Board"of"Directors"

Shared"between"both"

Mostly"Management"Co."

Management"Company"

0"

10"

20"

30"

40"

50"

60"

70"

80"

Figure 3. Percentages of responses to Part 1 Survey Question 3.
Although nearly three quarters of the respondents indicated that it is the
management company’s responsibility to manage the day-to-day operations of the charter
school, nearly 30% think the responsibility for the day-to-day should be shared to some
degree with the board of directors. (See Figure 3)
The responsibility for managing the day-to-day operations of the school is a
source of role confusion given that more than a quarter of the board respondents chose
survey options that indicate a level of management responsibility other than solely the
management company. This is a source of conflict because consensus is not reached for
what entity is responsible for the day-to-day operations. Although board governance
contractually does not include managing daily operations, some board members still
indicated that managing the day-to-day operations is solely the responsibility of the board
of directors. The daily operations is not typically in the realm of responsibility for charter
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boards who have chosen to contract with full-service, for-profit private management
companies and is contrary to the rationale of hiring such services.
Part 1 Survey question 4: The responsibility for awarding contracts should be…

Board of Directors

Mostly Board of Directors

Shared between both

Mostly Management Co.

Management Company

0"

5"

10"

15"

20"

25"

30"

35"

40"

Figure 4. Percentage of responses to Part 1 Survey Question 4.
As shown in Figure 4, approximately 37% of board respondents indicated that the
responsibility of awarding contracts should solely rest with the board of directors.
Exactly one-third, however, responded that it should be a shared responsibility between
the board of directors and the management company. A minimal percent of respondents
(2%) agreed that awarding contracts should be solely the responsibility of the
management company.
The previous data indicated that there is not consensus on what entity should
award contracts for various services required by the school. Also, exactly one-third of the
survey respondents selected the option that awarding contracts should be a shared
responsibility between the boards of directors and the for-profit private management
companies. The lack of consensus and commensurate spread of responses indicates a
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presence of confusion and resulting propensity for conflicts. Awarding contracts to
vendors and suppliers is an important component to operating a successful charter school
program. The systems for awarding contracts may yield returns, positive or negative,
based on the processes implemented and how procedurally the board of directors and the
management company are involved. It needs to be clear to all stakeholders who is
responsible for awarding contracts or if there is a range to where the management can
handle smaller contracts and at what dollar amount the board has responsibility. It is also
important for the contractors to know to whom they are accountable. Any confusion in
this critical area to the charter school’s operations may generate conflicts between the
board of directors and the for-profit management company in addition to the conflict
implicated with the vendors and suppliers that awarded the contracts from the charter
schools.
Part 1 Survey Question 7: The responsibility for determining curriculum and academic
programs should be…
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Figure 5. Percentages of responses to Part 1 Survey Question 7.
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As illustrated in Figure 5, nearly one-third of the survey respondents indicated
that the curriculum and academic program responsibility should be solely with the
management company. The mix of responses varied by choice with 6% indicating that
the board of directors should be responsible for curriculum and academics, 6% also for
mostly the board, 19% indicated it should be shared equally between the two parties. The
balance of the responses show 38% thinks it should be mostly the management company,
and 31% indicated that the management company should solely determine the curriculum
and academic programs.
The responses indicated confusion on who has the responsibility for determining
curriculum and academic programs in charter schools and are a source of conflict, given
the difference of opinion of respondents regarding the survey question. Sixty-nine percent
of the respondents selected responses not inclusive of the board of directors. The core
service of every school, whether a traditional public school or charter, provides an
academic program that effectively serves its community. Decisions about curriculum and
academic programs impact every aspect of a school’s success. The contract analysis also
indicates, in the section of obligations for the management company, that the charter
school’s boards of directors adopt the curriculum and academic programs of the
management company. These findings suggest yet another example where specific
provisions in the management contracts are not well understood by the boards of
directors.
Part 1 Survey Question 11: The development of the contractual agreement
between the board and the management company should be…
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Figure 6. Percentages of responses to Part 1 Survey Question 11.
As illustrated in Figure 6, the responses for the development of the contractual
agreement showed 56% think the responsibility should be shared equally between the
board of directors and the management company; the remaining 44% was distributed
among the other possible survey responses, inclusive of 23% who chose the
responsibility is solely the board of directors, and 15% who chose mostly the board of
directors. Less than 7% chose the option of the management company developing the
contractual agreement, while 2% responded that it should be solely the management
company.
The responsibility for the development of the contractual agreement between the
board and the management company is contested and is a source of conflict given the
range of responses to the survey question. Contracts are typically at the heart of any
business arrangement. It sets the parameters for interactions, recourse, and most of all
expectations of the parties who enter into contractual agreements. As previously referred
to in the literature review, the state of Michigan has approximately 82% of their charter
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schools that are managed by full-service for-profit private management companies.
Figure 6 illustrated the levels of responsibility for the development of the contract from
the perspective of boards of directors. This also provided insight into how the board of
directors perceived the management company. It brings to mind the question of do they
see the management company as the superior partner, an equal partner, or as a contractor
similar to food services, auditors, consultants, and other significant vendors. The board of
director’s perspective of the management company impacts how the board will approach
contract development and negotiations for the contractual agreement. The development
of the contract between the two parties has significant implications on the interactions
and restrictions of each party. A board’s lack of understanding the contract will result in
role confusion and conflicts regarding operating the charter school that could last for the
duration of the agreement.
Research Question 2: The second research question states: Assuming that parallel
governance systems created in charter schools whose boards of directors contract
with for-profit management companies contribute to governance conflicts, what are
the factors in the relationship that contribute to conflicts in governance?
Part 1 Survey Question 5: The responsibility for recommending board
candidates should be…
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Figure 7. Percentages of responses to Part 1 Survey Question 5.
The graph of Survey Question 5 as illustrated in Figure 7, the results show that
65% of board respondents think that board members should solely recommend board
candidates. The other 35% was composed of 23% mostly selected the board of directors,
10% selected equally shared between the two parties, and 2% think mostly the
management company. None of the survey respondents think that the management
company should have sole responsibility for recommending board members.
The responsibility for recommending board candidates is a source of conflict
given the percentage of survey respondents who indicated some level of shared
responsibility between the charter school board of directors and the management
company. The lack of consensus in this critical area of governance is pertinent because it
is not clear to these board members who has responsibility for recommending board
candidates. The literature review provided various sources for recommending board
candidates inclusive of other board members, the management company, the charter
school office (CSO), vendors, community groups, community businesses, and parents.
Even though these are voluntary appointed positions, the impact and importance of
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selecting effective board members has significant implications on the charter school,
students, parents, community, and all of the school’s stakeholders. Board candidates
sourced from any entity other than the board of directors lends itself to role conflicts
between the board of directors and the full-service for-profit management company
leading to conflicts of interest.
Part 1 Survey Question 8: The responsibility for conducting student expulsion
hearings should be…
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Figure 8. Percentages of responses to Part 1 Survey Question 8.
As shown in Figure 8, nearly 44% of surveyed board members selected that it is the
board of directors who is solely responsible for conducting student expulsion hearings.
While nearly half of the survey respondents indicated that student expulsion
responsibility should be shared to varying degrees between the board of directors and the
management company, 6% selected that the responsibility should be solely with the
management company.
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The responsibility for recommending student expulsions is a source of conflict
given the percentage of survey respondents who indicated some level of shared
responsibility between the charter school board of directors and the management
company, as well as the polarized responses that indicated that it should be solely the
board or solely the management company. Consensus is not even close and therefore is
an indication of potential conflict, which is exacerbated by role ambiguity in terms of
student expulsions.
Areas around student discipline are very sensitive. This is partly because it
involves discussions about children and the decisions that tremendously impact their
future; expulsions are included in this category. There was ambivalence as to who is
responsible for conducting expulsion hearings that has procedural and legal implications
that further exacerbates potential role conflicts regarding student expulsions.
Part 1 Survey Question 9: The responsibility for special education policies of the
school should be…
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Figure 9. Percentages of responses to Part 1 Survey Question 9.
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As illustrates in Figure 9, the special education question showed double-digit
percentages for all of the survey responses. The polarized responses for solely the board
being responsible was 12.5%, and for solely the management company was 29%; the
three possible shared responses totaled approximately 59% inclusive of 10% selecting
mostly the board’s responsibility, 23% selecting equally shared, and 25% thinks mostly
the management company. All possible responses received double-digit percentages.
The responsibility for special education policies is a source of role confusion and
conflict given the double-digit percentages for all five of the survey options. The role
confusion begins with the comprehensive contracts between the board of directors and
the management company. It is typically in the third article of most contracts and it states
that the services for students with disabilities are under the obligations of the
management company. It also shows a significant lack of consensus indicated by the
spread in percentages across the survey responses. The complexities of special education
have legal, social, and medical implications that are difficult to comprehend. Special
education is also an area that requires high levels of experience, knowledge, expertise,
and certification.
Special education generally is an area of contention in education, partly because
of all of the laws that seek to protect the rights of families and their children with special
needs. These laws have proliferated as the growing needs of the collective special
education cases have increased, such as an increase in diagnoses of attention deficit
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), autism spectrum disorder, and oppositional defiant
disorder (ODD) to name a few. This complex area of education in the charter school
world has strong probability for role conflicts given the lack of understanding by most
boards of directors and the intense level of learning required to become knowledgeable in
the complexities and legalities of special education.
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Part 1 Survey Question 10: The responsibility for developing board meeting
agendas and board minutes should be…
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Figure 10. Percentages of responses to Part 1 Survey Question 10.
As referenced in Figure 10, more than one-third of those surveyed selected the
board of directors as solely responsible for the board meeting agendas and board meeting
minutes. More than 60% think the responsibility should be shared to varying degrees
inclusive of 27% indicated that mostly the board is responsible for board meeting
agendas and minutes, 15% selected shared equally between the two, and 19% selected
mostly the management companies’ responsibility. Four percent think it is solely the
management companies’ responsibility.
There is not consensus for who is responsible for developing board agendas and
minutes. This perpetuates role confusion and conflict because it is the boards’ public
meeting and all other attendees are guests or participants. The responsibility for
developing the board meeting agendas and minutes is often overlooked as simply a
necessary task. However, the relevance and repercussions of the board agendas and its
complementary board minutes are extremely important. It is a legal document that may
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be used to clarify positions, policies, resolutions, budget decisions, attendance, and
contracts. If the management company takes charge of developing the agenda and doing
the minutes of the board meeting, they may see the agenda through the lens of the
management company and not the perspective of the board of directors. The board
meetings may be generally only month-to-month; however, the implications of the
agenda and minutes are far reaching given their importance as public documents
summarizing a public meeting. Given the level of importance of agendas and minutes,
and varied responses of the survey respondents, this is an area with governance conflicts
where negative implications could have major impact on the charter school and its
governing body.
Research Question 3: Are accountability and transparency of public funds affected
when Michigan charter schools’ boards of directors contract with full-service, forprofit management companies?
Part 1 Survey Question 2: The responsibility for managing finance and budget
matters should
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Figure 11. Percentages of responses to Part 1 Survey Question 2.
As shown in Figure 11, approximately 90% of the board respondents indicated
that the responsibility of managing budgets and finances should be shared to some degree
between the board of directors and the for-profit management company. The 90% is
inclusive of 48% chose equally shared, 10% chose mostly the board, and 31% thinks
mostly the management company. The polarized options make up 6% for those who
selected solely the board of directors, and 4% who chose solely the management
company.
The responsibility of managing budgets and finances does not have consensus and
is a source of role confusion and conflicts given the importance of financial functions.
The role confusion begins with the comprehensive contracts, which explains that finances
and budget management falls under the responsibility of the management company and
not the boards of directors. The finances and management of the budget typically falls
under Article III of most contracts, under educational and administrative services which
says, “All aspects of the school’s accounting operations, including general ledger
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management, financial reporting, payroll, employee benefits, and payroll tax compliance”
are under the obligations of the management company. In examining the contracts, there
should be no confusion as to who holds the responsibility for managing finances. The
management of the budget and allocation of resources is significant for any entity
regardless of industry. The budget is central to the operations of the school. The
appropriate allocation of resources is critical to the school’s delivery of its mission and
vision. When the management company and the board are not aligned with budgetary and
financial management, in addition to board members not fully understanding their
fiduciary responsibility for the charter school, these circumstances perpetuate role
confusion and conflict.
Part 1 Survey Question 6: The responsibility for state and federal compliance
should be…	
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Figure 12. Percentages of responses to Part 1 Survey Question 6.
The range of survey responses shown in Figure 12 indicates a lack of consensus
regarding who is responsible for state and federal compliance and is therefore a potential
for role confusion and conflicts. Nearly one-third of the board member respondents’
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chose the survey option of an equally shared responsibility between the board of directors
and the management company. More than 60% indicated some level of equally shared
responsibility between the two parties, and nearly 40% indicated the polarized options of
11% choosing solely the board of directors and 28% choosing solely the management
company.
Boards of directors are held accountable by their authorizers for three areas,
which include fiscal accountability, outcome accountability, and compliance
accountability. The last accountability factor includes making sure the charter school
meets the requirements of federal and state regulations. Charter school compliance
includes a myriad of tasks that if not met results in financial penalties and fines. This is
due to the fact that they are public entities and the primary sources of funding come from
the state and federal governments. The receipt of funding has compliance requirements
related to a wide range of operational demands inclusive of, but not limited to academic
reporting, expulsions, attendance, audits, asbestos, staffing credentials, health
inspections, fire drills, board meeting minutes and agendas, school calendars, and annual
reports. These components are part of school operations, which come under the
obligations of the management company; however, it is the board that is held responsible.
Such matters perpetuate role confusion and conflict between the charter school boards of
directors and the for-profit management companies because much of the facilitation of
the requirements is day-to-day, which is under the management company; however it is
the boards of directors who are held accountable by the state and federal governments.
Part 1 Survey Question 12: The acquisition of real estate, facilities, and capital
projects for the school should be…	
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Figure 13. Percentages of responses to Part 1 Survey Question 12.
As illustrated in Figure 13, close to two-thirds of the survey respondents indicated
that the responsibility for capital expenditures should be shared at various levels between
the board of directors and the for-profit management company inclusive of 33% selecting
mostly the board of directors’ responsibility, 17% selecting equally shared responsibility,
and 13% selecting mostly the management company. The polarized responses indicated
33% for solely the board of directors, and 4% felt the management company should
solely manage the acquisition of capital expenditures and projects.
There is not consensus regarding the acquisition of real estate, facilities, and
capital projects for the charter school and therefore resulting in role confusion and
conflicts. The state of Michigan provides provisions regarding expenditures that exceed
approximately $20,000.00. These expenditures usually require some kind of bid process
to promote transparency and cost efficiency. These include transactions for assets such as
buildings, property/real estate, technology, major renovations and repairs. Role confusion
and conflict persists given that the comprehensive contracts do not specify limits to
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transactions without board approval and clauses included that allude to the management
companies’ obligations with reasonable effort to provide or secure facilities on behalf of
the board of directors. When for-profit management companies provide the facilities for
the charter schools it manages, it places the board in a vulnerable position with weak
leverage when it comes to contract negotiations. These circumstances add to role
confusion and increase the probability of role conflicts between the board of directors and
the full-service, for-profit private management company.
Quantitative Findings: Analysis of Part 2 Survey Questions
The questions in the second section of the survey will also not be sequential;
however, they are a part of an item analysis with the survey questions germane to one of
the three research questions. In part two of the survey, Survey Question 1 relates to
Research Question 1. Survey Questions 2, 3, 4 relate to Research Question 3. There are
no questions in part two of the survey that directly relate to Research Question 2.
Research Question 1: Do the contractual relationships between Michigan charter
school boards of directors and full-service for-profit management companies
contribute to conflict in governance?
Part 2 Survey Question 1: The management of funds and resources is affected
when boards of directors contract with full-service for-profit management
companies…
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Figure 14. Percentages of responses to Part 2 Survey Question 1.
Figure 14 illustrates the responses to Part 2 Survey Question 1, which asks if the
management of funds and resources are affected when boards of directors contract with
full-service for-profit management companies. The majority of respondents (55%) chose
either strongly agree (21%) and agree (34%), and comparatively, 4% chose strongly
disagree, while 21% selected disagree, and 19% were uncertain.
The responses for the question, if the management of funds and resources are
affected when boards contract with management companies, indicated a lack of
consensus given the distribution of the responses. The survey respondents who chose
strongly agree or agree think that funds and resources are impacted. Those who disagree
and strongly disagree believe that funds and resources are not impacted by the
management companies’ skills and knowledge to effectively manage the assets of charter
schools. The balance of respondents is uncertain (19%), which is an indication that they
are unsure that the funds and resources are affected either way when boards contract with
a for-profit private management company.

CONFLICTS	
  IN	
  THE	
  GOVERNANCE	
  OF	
  MICHIGAN	
  CHARTER	
  SCHOOLS	
  	
  

87	
  
	
  

The results indicated a lack of consensus and therefore role conflicts emerged as it
relates to the effect of the management of funds and resources when boards contract with
a for-profit private management company. The variability of responses is not an
indication of the boards’ positive or negative feelings of the management company,
however, it is an indication that board members have varying perceptions related to how
and if the funds and resources of the charter school are affected when boards of directors
contract with full-service, for-profit private management companies. The management of
public funds is more complex given the management and handling of taxpayers’ dollars
by for-profit private management companies.
Research Question 3: Are accountability and transparency of public funds
affected when Michigan charter schools’ boards of directors contract with fullservice for-profit management companies?
Part 2 Survey Question 2: Accounting of Public Funds is Affected When
Boards Contract with Full-Service For-Profit Management Companies…
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Figure 15. Percentages of responses to Part 2 Survey Question 2.
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Figure 15 illustrated the responses to the question about the perception of the
board members on if the accounting of public funds is affected when contracting with
full-service, for-profit private management companies. The distribution of the selected
responses yielded double digits for each possible answer; 19% agreed that the accounting
of public funds are affected when boards contract with for-profit management companies,
and 31% strongly agreed. This combined for 50% of the responses agreeing to some
degree that accountability of public funds is affected. Ten percent of the respondents
strongly disagreed, 25% disagreed, and 15% were uncertain to this statement.
The results indicated a lack of consensus, given the varied distribution of
responses, therefore causes role confusion that leads to conflicts between the board of
directors and the for-profit management company. The variability in responses is in
double-digits, including those that chose uncertain as a response. This level of variability
in responses displays a lack of consensus, which is an indicator of board confusion that
leads to conflict in the accounting of public funds. This ambiguity is increased given the
management companies’ private status, which gives the option of not having to report on
the accounting of funds that originated from public tax dollars. These dynamics add
further to role confusion and conflicts given the lack of accountability and transparency
under the guise that management companies have the designation of a private company.
Part 2 Survey Question 3: Transparency of public funds is affected when
boards of directors contract with full-service for-profit management companies…
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Figure 16. Percentages of responses to Part 2 Survey Question 3.
Figure 16 demonstrated that the majority of respondents believed that the
transparency of public funds is affected when boards of directors contract with fullservice, for-profit private management companies with 27% selected agreed and 19%
strongly agreed, combining for 46%. The responses for not agreeing that transparency is
affected indicated 15% strongly disagreed, 27% disagreed, and 12% were uncertain
regarding the transparency of public funds.
The lack of consensus indicated role confusion and conflicts given the distribution
of responses to the survey question on transparency. The transparency of public funds is
just as complex as accountability, if not more complex, given the management and
handling of taxpayer’s dollars by for-profit private management companies. Also,
whereas accountability is generally on the back end of financial and audit-related
processes, transparency spans the full spectrum of processes such as bidding, capital
acquisitions, and routine purchases. Role confusion and potential conflicts may also
surface given the opportunities of for-profit management companies to legally not
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disclose information once monies are transferred to their stewardship. The opportunities
for non-disclosure by private management companies magnify with various operational
functions such as budgeting, hiring and compensation practices including bonus pay,
leasing facilities to the boards of directors, and administrating federal and state grants.
Part 2 Survey Question 4. The board of directors understands the articles,
terms, and content of the management contract between the board of directors and the
management company…
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Figure 17. Percentages of responses to Part 2 Survey Question 4.
As shown in Figure 17, more than two-thirds of the board member respondents
indicated that they understand the articles, terms, and content of the contract between the
board of directors and the management company; this consisted of 42% indicated that
they strongly agree, and 29% indicated agree, which combined for 71%. On the contrary,
10% selected disagree, and 4% indicated strongly disagree, while 15% selected uncertain
regarding understanding the articles, terms and content of the contract.
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The distribution of responses and the lack of consensus provided impetus for role
confusion and resulting conflicts given the disparity. The contract is the foundation of the
relationships between the boards of directors and the for-profit private management
companies. Understanding the contract as board members is imperative, individually and
collectively, to effectively govern. The varied distribution of responses shows various
board members’ understanding of the contract, which ultimately reflects their perception
of both their roles and the role of the management company. The degree of the boards’
understanding of the contract, sets the dynamics for role insight or confusion, which the
latter adds to conflicts due to lack of contractual awareness and understanding.
Summary of Presentation and Analysis of Data
Table 3a and 3b summarize the results of the survey responses from charter
school board members who met the criterion for participation. The data collection
element was a key component of the quantitative portion of the mixed methodology
study.
The summary illustrates the responses to the survey questions and provides data
that reinforces the multiple degrees of discrepancy and lack of consensus for all of the
survey questions. The lack of consensus is an indication of confusion and implicates
potential conflicts in board governance when they contract with full-service for-profit
private management services.
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Table 3a.
Summary Table of Percentages of Responses to Survey Questions Part 1
Questions

1. The responsibility for
hiring key personnel
such as superintendent,
principal and teachers
should be…
2.The responsibility for
managing finance and
budget matters should
be…
3.The responsibility for
managing the day-today operations of the
school should be…
4. The responsibility for
awarding contracts
should be…
5. The responsibility for
recommending board
candidates should be…
6.The responsibility for
state and federal
compliance should be…
7. The responsibility for
determining curriculum
and academic programs
should be…
8. The responsibility for
conducting student
expulsion hearings
should be…
9. The responsibility for
special education
policies of the school
should be…
10. The responsibility
for developing board
meeting agendas and
board meeting minutes
should be…

11.The development of
the contractual
agreement between the
board and the
management company
should be…
12. The acquisition of
real estate, facilities and
capital projects should
be…

Range of response polarity and applied percentages based on quantitative survey
responses.
Management
Mostly the
Shared
Mostly board
Board of
company’s
management
responsibility
of directors’
Directors’
responsibility
company’s
equal between responsibility
responsibility
responsibility
the board of
and some of
and some of
directors and
the
the board of
the
management
directors.
management
company
company.
37.50%

29.17%

22.92%

6.25%

4.17%

18

14

11

3

2

4.17%

31.25%

47.92%

10.42%

6.25%

2

15

23

5

3

72.92%

16.67%

0.00%

2.08%

8.33%

35

8

0

1

2.08%

12.50%

33.33%

1
0.00%

6
2.08%

0
27.66%

Total and
Weighted Average
Total
Weighted
Average

48

2.10

48

2.83

4

48

1.56

14.58%

37.50%

48

3.73

16
10.42%

7
22.92%

18
64.58%

48

4.50

1
19.15%

5
31.91%

11
10.64%

31
10.64%

47

2.57

13
31.25%

9
37.50%

15
18.75%

5
6.25%

5
6.25%

48

2.19

15
6.25%

18
12.50%

9
20.83%

3
16.67%

3
43.75%

48

3.79

3

6

10

8

21

29.17%

25.00%

22.92%

10.42%

12.50%

48

2.52

14

12

11

5

6

4.17%

18.75%

14.58%

27.08%

35.42%

48

3.71

2

9

17

13

17

2.08%

4.17%

56.25%

14.58%

22.92%

48

3.52

1

2

27

7

11

4.17%

12.50%

16.67%

33.33%

33.33%

48

3.79

2

6

8

16

16
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Table 3b.
Summary Table of Percentages of Responses to Survey Questions Part 2
Questions

1. The management of
funds and resources is
when boards of
directors contract with
full service for-profit
management
companies.
2.Accountability of
public funds is affected
when boards of
directors contract with
full service for-profit
management
companies.
3. Transparency of
funds is affected when
boards of directors
contract with fullservice for-profit
management
companies.
4. The board of
directors understands
the articles, terms and
content of the
management contract
between the board of
directors and the fullservice management
company.

Range of response polarity and applied percentages based on quantitative
survey responses.
Strongly
Disagree
Uncertain
Agree
Strongly Agree
Disagree
4.26%
21.28%
19.15%
34.04%
21.28%

Total and Weighted
Average
Total
Weighted
Average

2

10

9

16

10

47

3.47

10.42%

25.00%

14.58%

31.25%

18.75%

5

12

7

15

9

48

3.23

14.58%

27.08%

12.50%

27.08%

18.75%

7

13

6

13

9

48

3.08

4.17%

10.42%

14.58%

41.67%

29.17%

2

5

7

20

14

48

3.81

The findings and subsequent analysis of the 16 survey questions were consistent
in presenting a lack of consensus in terms of the responsibilities around charter school
functions and operations. The first 12 questions provided a variety of options from the
polarized choices of solely the responsibility of the management company to solely the
responsibility of the board of directors along with intermediate ranges of shared
responsibilities between the two parties. The second part of the survey consisted of four
questions ranging from polarized opposite responses of strongly agree to strongly
disagree, and intermediate ranges inclusive of uncertain. Both parts were formatted in
Likert Scales that were provided to board presidents in hard and electronic formats for
distribution to board members who met the criterion for survey respondents.
The data illustrated a wide spread of responses indicating that different boards
have different perspectives regarding their responsibilities and the responsibilities of the
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full-service, for-profit private management companies they chose to contract with to
manage their charter school. The survey results portrayed a lack of consensus and a
commensurate wide range of perspectives, which indicates that boards of directors are
confused and not aware of the provisional elements of their contract. The contract with
full-service, for-profit private management companies sets the foundation of the board of
directors’ ability to govern their charter school and guide their management company,
which impacts their ability to provide effective governance.
The collective responses indicate a lack of consensus regarding board members’
perspective on what the responsibilities are between themselves and their contracted fullservice for-profit private management company. The lack of consensus from the surveys
presents issues with understanding the contract and shows strong possibilities for
confusion and resulting potential conflicts in governance.
Qualitative Findings
The qualitative participants were board members who served in the capacity of an
officer of a charter school board in the state of Michigan. The participants included seven
people who have served most of their time in the office of board president, vice president,
treasurer, or a combination of the previous roles. The required aggregate time as a board
member was a preferred minimum service length of fifteen years. The demographics of
the participants in the interviews were diverse in terms of race and gender with three
women and four men. The race of the women included two African Americans and one
White with the average age of the women being 53. The qualitative portion of the study
also included two African American and two White men. All of the participants have
college degrees. The interview participants also represented a strong variety of for-profit,
full-service management companies, and authorizers (charter school offices - CSO).
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The three research questions in this study are specific to charter school
governance and the role conflicts that occur between charter school boards of directors
and the for-profit, full-service private management companies. The research questions are
as follows:
1.) Do the contractual relationships between Michigan charter school boards of
directors and full service, for-profit management companies contribute to conflict
in governance?
2.) Assuming that parallel governance systems created in charter schools whose
boards of directors contract with for-profit management companies contribute to
governance conflicts, what are the factors in the relationship that contribute to
conflicts in governance?
3.) Are accountability and transparency of public funds affected when Michigan
charter school boards of directors contract with full-service, for-profit
management companies?
In the qualitative component of the study, the sources of data included seven
charter school board members who served in officer roles. The board members had an
average of fourteen years of serving on a charter school board. The longest serving board
member had nineteen years and the least had six. Combined years of service was 98 years
with nearly a century of experience working with full-service for-profit private
management companies.
The participants represented diversity in race, gender, and professions. Every
participant had a minimum of a college degree. The participants provided responses to
open-ended survey questions during an interview. The responses were based on their
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board experiences of working with full-service for-profit private management companies.
The following is a list of the interview questions:
1. From your perspective as a long serving member of a charter school board of
directors, what are the pros and cons relative to governing the school that occur as
a result of contracting with a full-service management company?
2. Reflecting upon your board member experience in contracting with a for-profit
management company, how would you describe the specific contractual
relationship between the board and the management company?
3. Considering that the relationship between the board of directors and the
management company is a critical element in the successful operation of the
school, what do you think are factors that might contribute to tension in
governance as a result of this relationship?
4. Do you believe that accountability and transparency of public funds may have
changed when contracting with a for-profit private management company, or do
you believe this is not an issue?
5. Given what you know about leadership and school governance, are there things
that could be done contractually or legislatively to improve the governance of
Michigan charter schools?
The qualitative data is organized by the descriptors that emerge from the
individual board participants' responses to the qualitative interview questions. A
descriptor is a word or phrase that gives meaning to the disposition, perceptions, or
perspective of an interview respondent. A descriptor may become a theme depending on
the discovery of similar dispositions from other interview participants. Many of the

CONFLICTS	
  IN	
  THE	
  GOVERNANCE	
  OF	
  MICHIGAN	
  CHARTER	
  SCHOOLS	
  	
  

97	
  
	
  

descriptors are similar amongst the board participants, which exemplified
response commonality. Some of the descriptors are different to acknowledge the integrity
and uniqueness of the experiences of each board participants' responses to the interview
questions.
Interview Participant A
Background and Rationale for Being a Board Member
Participant A has served on the same charter school board for seventeen years in
multiple roles. His most recent role for the last four years has been as board president and
prior to that he served as vice president. He has been on this charter school board since
1998 and was one of the original board members of the public school academy.
Participant A is an African American male in his mid-fifties and is a college
graduate who currently works in management information systems as an executive in a
Fortune 500 company. He has a strong appreciation and understanding of technology and
its application to education and the work force. He stated,
So, when I was asked to participate with the board about 16 years ago, I thought it
was intriguing and I thought it was something with my background and skills set
that I could help them with technology and things like that and help the overall
education process.
Participant A’s rationale for joining a charter school board was so that he could
give back to the community and help urban children who may not have access to a
quality education:
The reason I actually started working with the board initially is because of the
disparity in our community and to make sure that we have viability around
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assuring that kids and parents in the community have an option to Detroit Public
Schools that will give them the education they need to be ready for college.
Pros and Cons of Contracting with a Full-Service Management Company
In Participant A’s responses to the first interview question relative to the pros and
cons of governing when contracting with a full-service, for-profit private management
company, he indicated how important it is to select a management company that is well
versed in handling the day-to-day operations of the charter school in a manner, which the
board cannot. He explained:
I think bringing the right ESP [education service provider] to the table that will
help with the day-to-day operations is key. From my perspective and a
governance perspective, you [the management company] can be there every day
to ensure that the education is disseminated in classrooms.
Participant A acknowledged the benefits of having an entity that can manage
operations in a manner that alleviated pressures from the board of directors to be involved
in routine affairs and focused on the broader based concerns of the charter school. He
stated:
So a lot of ESPs and ESPs that we have worked with handle all of the day-to-day
operations from soups to nuts; they handle education, they handle the lunch
program, they handle hiring and firing of teachers, they handle the whole
educational process
So is that a good thing? I think it is a good thing in a lot of ways in that
you have single “one-stop shopping” to make sure that things are handled in a
similar manner; this keeps the board away from issues of hiring and firing
teachers.
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Participant A also shared the cons of the circumstances of having a full-service
management company handle all aspects of the charter schools operations. He indicated
that it becomes a paradox when the board has the management company take full control
of operations and yet the board still has ultimate responsibility inclusive of fiduciary,
compliance, and academic outcomes. He expounded:
Let’s talk about a few of the cons that kind of pop up around understanding a full
service entity that has full control around how education is disseminated and how
it works. So what I have experienced over the years is that allowing an entity to
have full operational control is good but when the board is ultimately responsible
for the academic outcomes of what actually occurs and you only meet once or
twice a month to actually see how the progress is going and looking at the pre and
post test scores just is not enough.
He continued to elaborate on the paradoxical disposition of the board having
ultimate responsibility and added the specific element of student performance. He
continued:
The other con around that is the board itself is ultimately responsible from a
fiduciary perspective and academically responsible to make sure students reach
grade level; they must get the academic nurturing they need in order to move
forward; it becomes really tough because you do not see what is going on a dayto-day basis; so I think those are some of the primary pros and cons around the
contractual piece.
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Contractual Relationship
Participant A’s response to the second interview question reinforced his
perspective of the contractual obligations of the management company. He indicated the
scope of work around the management company’s obligation to manage sub-contracts
such as snow removal, landscaping, and grounds maintenance to larger tasks such as
payroll management, health care, insurance, budgeting, accounting, and food services
management. He explained:
So a board will hire an ESP [education service provider] to conduct the daily
business. The board will hire the ESP to manage its finances from a day-to-day
perspective, i.e., ensuring the bills are paid, ensuring that the maintenance
company is paid, that the grounds are clean, snow is removed on time, making
sure that vendors are around for lunch and breakfast catering so that children have
a good hot and healthy meal every day. Contractually, we asked the ESP to handle
those things for us, but we the board are ultimately responsible for all milestones
every month.
Participant A’s examples explained his perspective that the daily operations of the
school are the management company’s obligation due to the contractual agreement.
When asked to describe the routine of activities in terms of the contractual
relationship between the board and the management company, he continued:
So the other things that come to mind is making sure that state funds are allocated
and spent appropriately, because the board has the responsibility to make sure that
state funds are spent appropriately. So when you look at it again, a 30-day period
is a financial snapshot we take a look at. We look at the ledger, we look at the
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transactions that occur every month to make sure that nothing is out-of-bounds,
and we ensure that the principles are aligned to the financial processes. And avoid
moneys being spent that are not aligned.
The comment above appears to demonstrate that Participant A viewed the board
as the party that monitors the fiscal responsibilities.
Factors Contributing to Tension in Governance
In response to question three of the qualitative interview, Participant A indicated
that one of the greatest sources of tension is when students’ academic growth is not
realized in terms of metrics based on mandatory state and authorizer standardized testing.
He felt that the management company should be held directly accountable for student
achievement and specifically achievement tied to the goals aligned with the state
requirements. There also seemed to be frustration tied to having to wait for student
achievement results monthly, quarterly, semi-annually, and in some cases annually. He
explained:
The ultimate thing that would…have caused tension is when you do not see the
student growth that has been identified in the contract or the student growth that
needs to be aligned to the state. So we have state and other accountability to our
authorizer to ensure that we are academically sound in the academic goals. If the
academic goals are not met, there is a lot of tension around; do we have the right
ESP in place? What is going on in that 30-day period that we don’t know about?
What is happening between testing that we do not know about? What’s happening
day-to-day in advisory roles that will help students reach their academic goals?
Ultimately, it is the board that is responsible and the board is responsible to the
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students and the community to make sure they have a voice and a system in place
to help them meet and exceed the academic goals of the state and the contract.
In his comments concerning tensions, it is likely that there are concerns around
communication and who is ultimately responsible for certain factors at the school level.
A reoccurring observation from Participant A was the board’s ultimate
responsibility regarding all aspects of the charter school’s operations. There is reiteration
of the board’s responsibility and the sense of commitment to the students and community.
When asked if there are any non-academic factors that contribute to tension, he
mentioned the challenges around contracts with vendors and how important it is to have
the management company with the skills to choose quality vendors who will provide high
levels of service to the school, and if not the management company must be held
accountable. He stated:
Yes, of course. Look at the ability of the ESP to look at different contracts. We
want to ensure that those contracts are going to be the best for the school. So if
you look at contracts that you put in place around vendors and lunch providers
and look at how we disposition those contracts to make sure that students have a
good hot and healthy meal; there may be tension around getting a low level
provider and not using the provider that might give the best quality meal to the
kids. Based on demographics, the school meal may be the best meal they receive.
Some vendors do not understand these dynamics. Therefore it is important that
the board understands that the provider understands the school community. Again,
a lot of kids don’t eat except for the school’s food program.
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Accountability and Transparency
In terms of how these tensions are managed, Participant A indicated that the
tensions are addressed at the board meetings. However, he also indicated a level of
frustration, which happened when meetings are only once a month and he introduced the
importance of transparency and trust between the board and the management company.
He stated:
It is really hard. I think when we look at having someone work on your behalf and
not getting full disclosure of all of the elements [that] happen within a 30 day
period; it is sometimes disconcerting, and not to be petty, sometimes there are
little things like fights that actually occur within the school itself and the board
does not find out until later… they are actually in the meetings, everything in the
meeting is public record. When we look at the budget, the spending on a monthly
basis, we want everything to follow a process, so having an overall level of trust
with the ESP is critically important to make sure that they are spending resources
in alignment.
Participant A substantiated the tensions around transparency and full disclosure as
it related to the sensitive and complex issue of student expulsions. He portrayed a sense
of discomfort regarding disclosure of how and why students are expelled and why some
opt to transition from his public school academy to another district. He said:
We allow the ESP to make the recommendations around expulsions; we require
from them proper documentation. Expulsion hearings are brought to the board for
final disposition because the board is the only entity that may expel a student. We
at times see that this is not taking place…and expulsions may occur unknown to

CONFLICTS	
  IN	
  THE	
  GOVERNANCE	
  OF	
  MICHIGAN	
  CHARTER	
  SCHOOLS	
  	
  

104	
  
	
  

us, which is a problem, or kids leaving and the board has not had full disclosure of
the circumstances of how and why they left. We want to make sure the right level
of service is provided for the students, academically and socially in that
community.
The role of the board appeared from Participant A’s perspective to be about oversight of
the school and making sure that there is alignment between what is implemented at the
school and the policies set by the board.
Participant A reinforced that the ultimate responsibilities lie with the board and
that they must hold the management company accountable for the financial status of the
school and the management of public funds. In the same respect, he talked about
transparency of procurements and making sure the spending is aligned to the plans. He
explained:
So because the ultimate fiduciary responsibility lies with the board, we need to
make sure that the right level of accountability is being disseminated at the board
meeting. That is why our treasurer works with the financial entity to make sure
that these monies are being spent accordingly and the financial report is being
read to the board every month. We want to make sure that the accounting of the
funds in that 30-day cycle has the right oversight and visibility to it. These are
public funds and the board meetings are public meetings.
He continued about the importance of accountability regardless of the type of
contractual agreement between the board of directors and the management company. He
stated an importance of increasing rigor in accountability if the contractual relationship
requires such adjustments. He stated:
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Reporting and analytics are very important in determining accountability. So we
can have accountability regardless of what services the board decided upon; even
a la carte would have accountability. Because the treasurer and the board would
make sure we had the right processes in place to make sure that we are meeting
our fiduciary responsibility. In the case of the management company, you are just
hiring an entity to manage that function on the board’s behalf. Is there more rigors
needed to ensure accountability? I think there is a little more rigor needed to make
sure accountability is strong.
Participant A concluded by reiterating that accountability emanates from the
board of directors regardless of hiring a full-service, for-profit management company or
not. He specifically said, “Accountability is there because it is the board’s responsibility.
Accountability is not on the ESP; it is on the board. So whether it be hiring the ESP or the
board handles it, accountability is on the board.” The ultimate responsibility, according to
these comments, appears to fall under the board’s jurisdiction according to Participant A.
In terms of transparency, he believed visibility is critical in addition to having
agreed upon deliverables between the board of directors and the management company.
He explained:
Transparency is definitely an issue if you do not have the pre-determined
deliverables in place to make sure that you have the right information at the right
time; to make sure you understand what is going on during that 30-day cycle. If
spending were occurring outside of the process, it should be in the report, which is
why it is important to understand the deliverables and visibility. There seems to
be issues that right, wrong or indifferent because you hire an ESP there are
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different levels of visibility. The management company may try [to] glaze over (I
am trying to use a different word than hide) but in certain scenarios there are
certain elements that would occur like; what is going on at the school? Do we
have the right level of climate and culture in the school? Do we have the right
level of data teams engaged to provide information to the teachers, and are
students getting what they need? It is really easy to disseminate that into data and
say everything is good, but when you dig a little deeper and pull back the layers
of the onion you find out in many cases that no, the right level of visibility is not
always disseminated to the board of directors and that things are being swept
under the rug or hidden to make the overall picture look better than what it
actually is.
These comments clearly present that a lack of transparency could be the source of
conflict between the board of directors and the management company.
He closed his response to these questions by indicating the importance of timely
and accurate data. He also reinforced why the board exists, which is to advocate for the
interest of the student and community. Participant A stated:
When we have some of those issues occur, we try to make sure we have access to
data to make sure we know what to look for to get issues resolved. We all can
improve if we have the right process. We have to ultimately be mindful of why
are we here? And we are here for these students and the community. And if we
work together as a collective entity with the kids in mind and give the best
services for these students, with the best talent we can secure, I think if we
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continue on that path and have a collaborative view; that is how we reach our
goals.
Contractual and Legislative Suggestions
The final question asked if there were things that could be done contractually or
legislatively to improve the governance of Michigan charter schools. Participant A
responded to both areas. First, legislatively he believed more could be done to balance the
disparity of resources in terms of poorer school districts. He exclaimed:
So let’s start with the legislative piece of this one key component around the
legislative piece, is that wherever kids are, whatever the zip code we need to make
sure that there are congruent amounts of money being spent on each kid to give
them the resources they need to meet the metric set by the state; the zip codes
such as Northville, West Bloomfield, Farmington; they get more money per
student than the inner city zip codes do…that is a huge disparity, because the
more resources you have, the ability to obtain other resources for teaching,
technology, and more that enables you to develop a stronger student, better results
because of the resources in place for the students to meet the state metrics.
He ended his response with the belief that with commensurate financial resources, poorer
school districts could close the disparity between them and wealthier school districts:
If schools were given congruent or equal resources, or even close to it, they could
perform better. So much of the resources are based on where you live; financial
equity is important and we need to find a way to provide equitable resources
regardless of zip code; for all kids in Michigan.
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The Importance of Understanding the Roles of Key Players
Participant A also mentioned the importance of understanding the roles,
responsibilities, and dynamics of all key players in the charter world, such as charter
school boards, authorizers, and the management companies. He felt the need for a
consistent definition of what the entities do: what are their roles and expectations in the
state of Michigan. He briefly mentioned the Michigan Department of Education and their
effort to define these roles in the state. He explained:
One thing I found to be good and maybe it is not legislative, maybe it is; the roles
and responsibilities around the ESP, the board of directors, and the authorizer are
critical and people need to understand that. I think the MDE [Michigan
Department of Education] has done a really good job of trying to define those
roles and responsibilities, lots of folks for whatever reason do not really
understand what those roles are.
He elaborated on how the Michigan Department of Education has provided a level
of consistency in defining the roles and expectations of Michigan charter school boards,
the management company, and the authorizer. Part of the consistency is the MDE website
which provides written information about these three stakeholders. He explained:
There are sets of documents on the MDE website that give you a clear view and
definition. It helps identify who is responsible for the school, how the ESP role is
to be played, and what the role is of the authorizer. Looking at and just reading
what the roles are helps to provide a clear perspective of the entities. Over the
years we have had different interpretations of roles and responsibilities because
we did not have common sources of information and understanding or a good
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understanding of how your role should be operationalized or how the role should
be on a daily basis. Everyone must understand the roles they play.
He closed this section again alluding to the disposition that the board of directors
is ultimately responsible for their training and understanding their individual and
collective roles as board members. He stated:
It is the board’s task to understand their roles and responsibilities. I do not expect
the authorizer or the ESP to tell the board what their role is. I say that because if
you are ultimately responsible for something, then you should know what that
responsibility entails. You should really know what your job is and how to do that
job with fidelity and performance on a daily basis. The board itself, from the
president all the way down, should have a clear understanding as to what their
role is and their responsibilities to the school.
In terms of how to make sure that new board members are prepared and
appropriately trained for their roles on a charter school board, he indicated that much of
the responsibility is on the charter school board and that it is important to be consistent
and sourced from a credible entity such as the MDE. He explained:
Education, as you get new board members in, I try to point them to documentation
and elements that they can learn what their role is, so they can understand what is
expected from them. There’s lots of information out there that is inconsistent with
what the roles are from MDE’s perspective. We need to make sure we go back
and make sure the roles as defined are grounded and consistent.
He ends the question regarding what could be done legislatively by providing his
thoughts on where the inconsistencies are derived. He responded, “They come from the
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authorizer, and the ESP at times because the board is ultimately responsible for
everything that occurs with the PSA. We need to make sure that we know our role and
those [sic.] we are governing correctly.” The need for strong communication and
alignment between all of the stakeholders was very important for resolving these
inconsistencies according to Participant A’s responses.
The final part of the last question was in regard to what could be done
contractually to improve governance in Michigan Charter Schools. His response may be
summarized as understanding the roles and dynamics of the industry and holding all
stakeholders accountable. Participant A stated:
Governance ensures that the desired outcomes happen. Outcomes are going to be
the academic outcomes. [In order] to ensure that the contracts we have in place
with vendors are appropriate, we must understand relationships. The metrics must
be placed in the contract to understand what are the targets for everyone including
the ESP, identify in the contract either hit these marks or reap the consequences.
There must be visibility and accountability around everything we do. Incentives
can even be in place to achieve the metrics and corrective action if progress is not
being realized.
In the previous quote, he illustrated the importance of governance and how it must
be included in the metrics of the contractual agreement between the board of directors
and the management company. He emphasized that consequences for the management
company must come along with falling short of contractual metrics. In respect to how to
measure and monitor performance outcomes, Participant A replied:
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I think that is a good question. And I think what we need to do is make sure that
we understand what those state targets are around Explorer, Plan, ACT, SAT, and
NWEA/MAP. Look at those and how much growth towards those metrics can be
achieved collaboratively with the board and management company; document the
information in the ESP contract to ensure that they know what the goals are and
have the right level of accountability. We can provide bonuses if metrics are
exceeded; we must make sure that we hit the metrics based on the contract and
responding accordingly based on if the metrics are exceeded, met, or not hit.
Participant A closed his responses with the consistency of making sure that state
targets and other forms of metrics regarding student performance and outcomes are tied
directly to the contract between the board of directors and the management company. He
believes effective governance, which includes accountability and understanding the roles
of the charter school stakeholders, can impact the gap in education.
Summary of Results and Analysis
Participant A’s interview responses brought out some common areas of discussion
that lend themselves to an analysis based on the likelihood of these areas being the source
of role confusion and potential conflict. Table 4 shows descriptors that were presented in
Participant A’s interview, which provided qualitative data from his responses.
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Table 4
Identification of Descriptors from Participant A’s Interview Transcript
_____________________________________________________________________
! Board training

common and tailored training

! Board of directors is ultimately responsible
! Universal role definition
! Community oriented/volunteerism

student advocacy

! Contract implications – performance, sub-contracts
! Management company is responsible for day-to-day
! Overlap of academic responsibility
! Board accountability vs. management autonomy
! Role responsibility for student discipline

He reiterated his disposition, which the researcher has transformed into
descriptors inclusive of the board of directors is ultimately responsible; board training;
universal role definition and community orientation/volunteerism; contract implications;
and the management companies are responsible for the day-to-day. Other descriptors
included an overlap of academic responsibility, board accountability versus management
autonomy, and role responsibility for student discipline.
Participant A repeatedly expressed that the ultimate responsibility lies with the
board of directors. Despite the contracts with management companies, vendors, and
suppliers; the charter school board of directors is ultimately responsible and accountable
to all stakeholders including students, parents, authorizer, Michigan Department of
Education, and the community. He established that the responsibility of the board
permeates every aspect of the charter school’s operation despite having a contract with a
full-service, for-profit management company. He indicated that board training is needed
from a general and tailored perspective. Generally, he said that all members need training
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on the board’s roles and terminology, so they may navigate prudently and knowledgeably
through the challenges of charter school leadership and governance.
Participant A’s rationale for being on a board is based on volunteerism and
community service. He wanted to make a difference and provide opportunities for urban
city children. He indicated that he wants to use his technological skills and management
information career to help students with their overall educational development.
The qualitative data from the interview of Participant A illustrated potentials for
conflicts given the confusion of responsibilities between the board of directors and the
for-profit private management company lack of defined roles, the management
company’s responsibility for the day-to-day, accountability and transparency, and the
confusion of role responsibility for student discipline.
The first descriptor that exemplifies confusion is the board president’s likely
disposition that the board is ultimately responsible for all aspects of the charter school’s
operations. Whereas the board has ultimate governance from a macro perspective, the
operational components are transferred immediately when the boards of directors sign the
contract with a full-service, for-profit private management company. Any perspective
other than clear lines of delineation will produce confusion and perpetuate conflict
between the two contracted parties.
The second descriptor that exemplified confusion is linked to the previous: the
universal role definition of what boards do as a collective body in terms of governance
and operational responsibilities. This included a clear definition of what are the
implications of contracting for comprehensive management services with a for-profit
private management company versus other models of contractual agreements that are not
full-service. The various opportunities for boards to select different models did not
include guidelines on what happens if a particular alternative is selected. This exacerbates
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confusion, which results in conflicts if the board does not understand the dynamics of
their choices and more importantly the implications of the contractual agreements.
The third descriptor tied in with the first two because the management of the dayto-day becomes confusing when parties do not understand the juxtaposition of their roles
and if both parties feel they have sole ultimate responsibility of day-to-day activities,
which impacts the operations of the charter school. Day-to-day confusion will lead to
problems that perpetuate conflicts in operations and governance.
The final descriptor that emerges from Participant A’s interview is the confusion
around the role responsibility for student discipline. He mentioned a few examples of the
management company not disclosing matters related to student expulsions and the board
of directors finding out after the fact. The interview participant also vehemently
mentioned that expulsions are solely the responsibility of the board of directors. Any
other entity, specifically the management company, carrying out suspensions is contrary
to board members’ understanding and is a source of confusion resulting in conflicts.
The four descriptors from the interview of Participant A illustrated confusion in key
areas of operations that perpetuated conflicts in responsibility, operations, management,
and most of all governance.
Interview Participant B
Background and Rationale for Being a Board Member
Participant B is an African American male in his late-fifties and is a college
graduate who works in management in the banking industry. He appears to have strong
analytical skills and a great understanding of financial and economic principles, which
are of great assistance given the financial challenges in charter schools.
Participant B has served on the same charter school board for eighteen years in
the role of the public school academy’s board president. He accepted the request to serve
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on the board from the school’s founding principal. He has been on the charter school
board since 1998 and is one of the school’s original board members. Participant B’s
rationale for joining a charter school board was so that he could give back to the
community and assist a colleague with their attempts to improve the education status of
children in the city of Detroit.
Pros and Cons of Contracting with a Full-Service Management Company
When asked of the pros and cons of contracting with a full-service management
company, Participant B provided the benefits of not having to worry about day-to-day
matters such as the maintenance, payroll, and other very important tedious functions and
activities required to operate a charter school. He stated:
Ok, the pros were the ability of the management company to run the day-to-day
operations: that was the pros. We were not involved specifically with the HR
components like who is off this week and things of that nature, and that was kind
of nice. Also the pros were they would handle the maintenance, back room
security, things of that nature, and keep us posted on updated compliance issues
within the charter school world; any Department of Education updates,
newsletters, and publications, that was one of the pros of having a management
company.
In response to the cons of contracting with a full-service, for-profit management
company, Participant B mentioned the challenge of not having any input into hiring the
key leadership positions such as the superintendent and principal. He explained:
The downside of it as we have come to find is the contract that we had engaged in
was a long-term 7-year contract, our most recent contract. And as part of the
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contract, was the fact we had no input in terms of who could be hired into key
personnel positions. For example, the school leader, the assistant school leaders,
any of the support staff, that [sic.] was all the responsibility of the management
company. We could talk to them about whom [sic.] they chose, but it was totally
their selection and that is what was built into that 7-year contract. We have found
that sometimes that is not necessarily the best way. We did not have any input in
terms of the selection.
Participant B’s disposition of working with the management company was very
positive in most aspects except for the critical area of hiring leadership, which is a key
factor in determining the success of the charter school. He explained:
No, actually we had a very fluid and fulfilling relationship until recently. And it
was built around the selection of their team that would lead and manage the
school. We were very happy with everything they had done. We had a good fund
balance and [sic.] they managed the funds closely. The school was always well
kept. We were always abreast of any changes. Updates in legislation and things of
that nature, I mean they brought a lot of things to the table. The only problem was
the changing in the staffing, which was considerable at the top. School leaders in
particular for one reason or another. We experienced a lot of turnover at the top,
especially in the role of the principal and other administrators.
Given the challenges experienced by Participant B’s board, if he had the
opportunity to change the original contract it would likely include provisions to allow
board input into the selection of the principal. This would be in hopes to impact
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leadership and prevent excessive changes and turnover at the whim of the management
company. In terms of restructuring the contract, he said:
We would have placed a clause in the contract saying that we would have the
final decision on the selection of the leadership team…I think that would have
made a difference in how things would have progressed. We had a situation where
the management company actually promoted our school leader and made them a
senior person in their company and moved people around internally that
eventually did not work out. So had we had the ability to make the determination
to select the next and upcoming school leader, the outcome may have been
different.
The previous clause may prevent such key decisions being made exclusive of and
without any input from the board. In regards to specific instances of leadership changes,
Participant B said, “The decision was made exclusive of the board. We were not
informed that the decision was coming, but here’s the change; but please embrace it.”
Upon being asked how this type of provision would manifest into operations, he
explained that they would form an executive committee that would be empowered to
make decisions on behalf of the board of directors. He explained:
We have an executive committee, which comprises of the board president, vice
president, and treasurer in our case. And they act on behalf of the board and
anything they determine is recorded and ratified at the board meeting. If the
executive committee had the opportunity to vet a potential candidate provided to
us by the management company, we may have had a better understanding of what
to anticipate in terms of their leadership capabilities…I think that may have
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helped us in the long run and we would have put a clause in the contract where by
either the board or a component of the board has the ability to make the final
decision on the selection of the leadership of that school.
Contractual Relationship
Despite the issues regarding the hiring of school leadership, the contractual
relationship was viewed as positive and functional. Participant B described the
contractual relationship as follows:
Contractually, it was effective and efficient. It was very well described in terms of
responsibilities. We had our attorney that had been with us since day one review
the contract and actually negotiate fine points in the contract. One of the things
we already talked about was I wish we had included the ability to select the
leadership person. But, in terms of reviewing the contract, structuring the
contract, it went fairly well. We missed a couple of things, but it went very well.
Overall, Participant B’s board was pleased with the contractual relationship. He
did indicate the importance of having routine monitoring through reports on staffing
levels, the budget process, and academic performance. In regards to the latter, he stated,
“We would have had the leadership team have to provide information in terms of grades
and performance on the academic side.” More monitoring of academic performance and
a stake in hiring decisions appeared to be the main issues that Participant B had with the
contractual relationship.
Factors Contributing to Tension in Governance
When asked about what factors might contribute to tension in governance,
Participant B continued the theme of the selection of leadership. The leadership sets the
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tone for the school and when turnover is frequent, he felt that stability is at risk. He felt
that the primary source of tension came from turnover at the leadership level. He said,
When you have a lack of stability for various reasons, you can look to the
management company and ask why is this changing like this and why do you
have so much turnover in specific areas, and can’t you find a stable person to
come in with us and get the job done. That is where the tension actually comes
in.
Accountability and Transparency
When asked about accountability and transparency, Participant B indicated a high
level of confidence in the tools that assist with monitoring and analyzing monthly
operations and functions. He stated,
In our case historically, I don’t think it has been an issue. Our reports are provided
monthly. A couple of things that we did were to put us in charge of the
checkbook, so we had a chance to see what is paid on a regular basis. We get a
check register and then we will transfer the funds to cover a specific bill.
Anything we are uncertain of; we ask questions. We do audits once a year, which
have been clean.
There appears to be a significant level of comfort in terms of the transparency of
reporting of financial and operational matters. Participant B stated, “In terms of
transparency and accuracy, it has been good for over 15 years. There are always
questions about some of the detail in some of the categories but for the most part, all has
been very transparent.”
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Even with this comfort level, the board still had provisions including checks and
balances to ensure transparency with requiring reports for any budget transfers more than
$1,000.00. Regarding budget transfers, Participant B stated, “We would ask them to
provide us with what was transferred over and why. We’d want to know what got
transferred and why.”
Contractual and Legislative Suggestions
In terms of what could be done contractually or legislatively, Participant B
believed that monitoring charter school growth and expansion was important given the
challenge of limited resources and lack of qualified instructional staff. He stated the
following:
Let’s take legislative and this is for selfish reasons more than anything…I think
the lift on the cap of charters schools was detrimental to what the charter schools
movement could do. It expanded our presence but it also depleted our resources.
When I say resources, I am referring to our instructional staff. I think we would
have been able to maintain a better instructional staff and higher quality of
instructional staff. One of the things legislatively that can be done is that more
incentives can be put in place for teachers. Not sure exactly what that would look
like, but I think the state can do a better job in trying to attract and promote
teaching.
In closing out the concerns legislatively for charter schools in Michigan, he
reiterated, “There is a shortage of qualified teachers and lifting the cap provided more
schools for less teachers. It spreads negativity across charter schools. I do not think it
was done in the best interest of charter schools, or public schools in general.” There
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seemed to be concern from Participant B’s perspective on the negative effects that more
charter schools can bring, especially in terms of hiring and retaining instructional staff.
The other part of question five asked what could be done contractually to improve
governance of Michigan charter schools. Participant B’s response was based upon nearly
twenty years of charter school experience. He felt that charter schools are at a
disadvantage because they are limited in regards to accessing alternative authorization or
sponsorship of their charter. Most public school academies officially begin with the
awarding of their charter, which contains their vision, mission, and reason for being.
Very seldom have boards been able to transition from one authorizer to another.
Participant B appeared to view this as a negative and therefore it disadvantaged board
members and their charter schools to the sovereignty of the originating charter school
authorizer. He stated:
I have always had…we have one authorizer, and the contract/charter is with one
authorizer, I am going to go that route. And the best way to say it, it is like a good
ole boys network…I don’t know if you want to put the tape off on that one…but
contractually if you are with one authorizer and if you have issues some issues
with that one authorizer, for whatever the reason…they have meetings, and if
your name comes up in terms of what is going on at that school, does that limit
your ability to go or get contracted with another authorizer going forward; I think
it might. It would taint any changes you want to do at the school [such as] if you
wanted to move to a more vocational program. Could you contract with another
authorizer to maybe just do that component or have the authorizer do the whole

CONFLICTS	
  IN	
  THE	
  GOVERNANCE	
  OF	
  MICHIGAN	
  CHARTER	
  SCHOOLS	
  	
  

122	
  
	
  

thing? Contractually, I think that is something that would be looked at. That has
always been a concern of mine anyway.
There are two contracts that are of significance to the board of directors. The first
was previously discussed, which is the charter contract between the board of directors
and the charter school office. That charter was most likely granted from a public state
university or other state entity empowered to give a charter. The second significant
contract was that between the board of directors and the management company. This
contract entailed the rules of engagement and interaction between the board of directors
and the management company. The way the contract was formulated impacted the
board’s ability to manage the operations of the charter school. Participant B indicated the
following regarding their contract with their management company,
The way that we were structured with our prior management company, it actually
worked very well with exception to the educational component. My thought is if
we had the foresight to change or put something in the contract so that we had
some latitude in terms of the educational component, then I think it would have
been a better contract.
Participant B continued to discuss elements that, if restructured, would be placed
in the contract. For example, provisions to have educational goals and performance
incentives. He stated,
I know that some schools in their foresight had some educational goals in their
contract so if you hit educational hurdles and grades you could be paid your full
contractual amount. If you did not hit that hurdle, your fee, or your management
fee would be reduced by a certain amount.

CONFLICTS	
  IN	
  THE	
  GOVERNANCE	
  OF	
  MICHIGAN	
  CHARTER	
  SCHOOLS	
  	
  

123	
  
	
  

The metrics would allow for the measurement of the management company’s
performance. He continued, “Those kinds of things could have been in place, or included
as well, which would have provided more incentive for the management company to do a
better job in terms of instruction.” Participant B clearly indicated the impact the contract
had on the power and authority of the board. If specific provisions are not placed in the
contract in terms of consciously managing full-service management companies, boards
may end up in positions where they feel a lack of authority and ownership.
Participant B acknowledged the importance of leadership and governance in
charter schools. He believes both can be improved with proper training and networks that
allow sharing of insight, knowledge, experiences, and best practices. He supported policy
groups such as MAPSA (Michigan Association of Public School Academies) and their
mission of advocating for charter schools. He continued:
It would be nice to hear from the source in person about what some of the changes
are legislatively and how the charter school movement is doing as a whole; how
regions are doing as a whole, what works, what is not working, and you can only
get that through face-to-face. Also a best practice is to meet with other boards [in
order] to hear what is working and not working. What works for you may not
work for me, and what works for me may not work for you, but at least it is a
means of sharing information.
In terms of sharing information and developing networks for improvement,
Participant B stated, “Actually it is more of a networking. Training is always good, but it
is more of a networking function. Because you can always learn from someone who is
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doing well.” He continued by stating that the authorizer is the entity to create such
networks and forums.
Participant B ended with what he would like to see more of in the future of charter
schools. He indicated the need for alternate sources of funding charter schools and the
importance of continued growth accompanied by stabilization and managing cost.
Five years out...in terms of governance…I would like to see a forum where
charter schools would have the capability of obtaining alternate sources of
funding either bonding or some mechanism, not necessarily bonding. How do you
control the growth and finances of your structures because basically if you don’t
continue to grow, your expenses will escalate beyond your revenue sources? So, if
you are stagnant in number and a capacity at your particular facility it is what it is;
and you give increases to your staff every year, and if it is a stable staff, if you
provide increases to a stable staff, you will bump against a ceiling eventually.
How do you change that dynamic? That is a five-year issue for a school that is
growing and doing well. If you don’t continue to expand your facilities, you are
going to hit that ceiling: is there another source that we can possibly find to
support our stability?
Participant B mentioned numerous times the importance of placing provisions in
the contract so that input could be provided from the board in terms of the selection of the
superintendent and the principal. This would also be an effort to eliminate turnover of
school leadership. He also reiterated the importance that leadership selection has on
governance.
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Summary of Results and Analysis
Participant B’s interview responses discovered some areas of discussion that lend
themselves to further analysis of the likelihood of being the source of role confusion and
potential conflicts. Significant descriptors emerged from Participant B’s interview
responses as seen in Table 5.
Table 5
Identification of Descriptors from Participant B’s Interview Transcript
_____________________________________________________________________
! Joint responsibility for hiring key leadership
! Contract implications

hiring and performance incentives

! Board training and networking
! Community oriented/volunteerism
! Assumptions of mgt. contract

best practices and communications
performance, sub-contracts

! Management company is responsible for day-to-day
! Monitoring of contract

tied to student performance

! Legal guidance on contract
! Board charter recourse in terms of authorization
! Role responsibility for student discipline

He provided experiences that formulate his disposition, which the researcher has
transformed such as joint responsibility for hiring key leadership, contract implications,
board training and networking, community orientation, assumptions of the management
contract, monitoring of the contract, and the management company being responsible for
the day-to-day. Other descriptors also came out of the interview, such as legal guidance
on the contract, board of director’s recourse in terms of authorization, and role
responsibility for student discipline.
Participant B strongly emphasized the retrospect of wishing the board of directors
would have designed a contract giving them shared input for the selection of key
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leadership roles in the school. He added that their situation was exacerbated due to the
longevity of the contract with the management company and the high turnover of the
principal’s position, which the board had no recourse. He also focused on the importance
of contractual implications regarding hiring and performance incentives for the
management company. In terms of board training and networking, he appeared to have
embraced board training, especially from credentialed sources. He also encouraged
networking amongst boards of directors inclusive of sharing best practices. He mentioned
his desire to contribute to the education objectives of the founder of his charter school.
Participant B shared the challenges resulting from frequent turn over in the
school’s leadership roles. He discussed the changes made and how the board could do
nothing about it because the contract provided sole authority for hiring and firing to the
management company. He also provided an example of how the management company
displaced one of their leaders and brought them into the management company’s
headquarters. He then elaborated on the contractual elements and how it affects hiring
and performance incentives, which were lacking. He later turned his attention to training
and the importance of networking with other charter school boards to share best practices.
He suggested that the networking take place in more face-to-face forums. Other
descriptors resonated; these descriptors are significant to the perspective of Participant
B’s overall disposition regarding contracts and its impact on governance and leadership
in Michigan charter schools when contracting with for-profit private management
companies.
Participant B’s rationale for joining a charter school board of directors was very
similar to most highly educated board members. He believed that it provided a venue to
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give back to the community and help improve educational opportunities for young
people.
The qualitative data from the interview of Participant B illustrated potential for
conflicts given the role confusion of responsibilities between the board of directors and
the for-profit private management company in the areas of the inability to affect hiring of
key leadership roles, and understanding the impact of the contractual agreement.
The first descriptor that exemplified confusion was the board president and other
board members’ perspectives that they would have input into the hiring process. They
experienced high turnover in the key roles of leadership and even had one principal
promoted from the school into the executive level of the for-profit management
company. In an instance where the board of directors expressed concern for a specific
decision regarding a change of the principal’s office, they were told by the management
company to “Embrace it!” The board of directors’ realization that they could not affect
hiring in any aspect appears to have devastated them given their inability to impact hiring
practices to even the slightest degree. Once the board signed the contract for full-services,
which included all responsibility for employment, their ability to impact any decisions
regarding staffing were null and void.
The second descriptor that indicated role confusion was what appeared to be a
hope of renegotiating an addendum or clause into the contract between the board of
directors and the full-service management company. This clause would have enabled the
board to have a voice in the hiring of key leadership roles. However, they signed into a
seven-year agreement where the primary source of confusion and conflict centered on the
contract, which was locked for seven years without contractual recourse unless there was
some kind of material breach. The lack of contractual awareness inflates confusion,
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which resulted in conflicts given the board’s lack of understanding of the contract’s
dynamics and the far-reaching implications of signing agreements for multiple years.
The two descriptors from the interview of Participant B illustrated confusion in key
areas of hiring key personnel and understanding the implications of the dynamics of the
contract between the board of directors and the for-profit private management company.
The ambiguity resulted in confusion and caused conflict, which impacted the governance
of the charter school.
Interview Participant C
Background and Rationale for Being a Board Member
Participant C is a white female in her late forties with a college degree who has
served on her charter school board for more than thirteen years. She has been on the
charter school board since 2002 and plans to continue being a board member for years to
come. She works in the field of health care and has managed a non-profit organization as
well as her own business. She brings a variety of administrative and managerial skills to
the board of directors as well as the experience of being a parent on the board of her
children’s school.
The impetus of her becoming a charter school board member was so that she
could impact the education of her children and the lives of children in the community:
I started as a board member of my school board when my children were young. I
had one in kindergarten and one in second grade, and I wanted to be involved in
their school experience. After being involved in the first year, I was approached
about six months later after being involved in the school and asked if I would
consider being a board member. That was over 13 years ago.
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Pros and Cons of Contracting with a Full-Service Management Company
She strongly believed that contracting with a full-service management company
mitigates the responsibilities of the board and diminishes the board’s accountability. She
stated, “With the full service, we as board members did not have as much responsibility.
There was less accountability (that could go pro or con) from the board, and less
responsibility for the school leaders as well. That is the one thing that would free school
leaders to lead the school and focus on the kids.”
The contract with a full-service management company allowed the board to not
have to be involved in routine affairs. It also enabled the principal to focus on instruction
and not have to bother with activities such as hiring staff. She explained,
The hiring of employees did not have to be done by the school leader. The school
leader would not have to go through the full process of hiring teachers: same for
counselors and things of that nature. When you divert that to a management
company that will take care of that. The management company took care of it,
which also takes away the power of the school leader to be able to say this is who
I want or who I would like. Day-to-day issues would not be the top priority of the
board of directors. The management company’s full service role enabled
administrators to better focus on students and families.
Participant C often mentioned that the comprehensive management status gave
the management company the ability to do what they wanted to in regards to budgeting,
financial, and programmatic types of activities. She stated, "Some of the cons; funds were
allocated to where the management company wanted them to be. We did not have the
accountability. They were able to do what they wanted to with the funds.” The latitude
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enabled the management company to have full control over budget development. She
continued, “The management company pretty much set the budgets for board approval.
Having that particular scenario, it really took control away from the boards.” It was not
until program evaluations gave an indication of ineffectiveness that the board began to
wonder if more programs were effectively being implemented or wasted school
resources. She stated, “I found over the years that as monies were paying for ineffective
programs (and we started pulling data) and seeing the effects of some of these programs,
that the budget had to be redone and funds had to be allocated to different places.”
Contractual Relationship
In terms of question two regarding the contractual relationship between the board
of directors and the management company, Participant C indicated a fairly one-sided
relationship. The one-sidedness was exacerbated by the inexperience at that time of the
board members. She stated,
The contracts were made by the management company and expected to be signed
by the board. So it was very one-sided at that point…so the finances and contracts
were already set ahead of time and we were not fully grasping what we were
doing at that time as board members.
Participant C also gave indication that despite the fact that the management
company made decisions regarding budgets and contracts, the board of directors was still
the one responsible. She stated:
I would say, in our experience, we had contracts that were made and it was
between the management company and our vendor. There were some legal things
(which I cannot go into detail), which put our school liable, which resulted in a
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lawsuit, which resulted in things in which the school was still liable. The board
was still liable for it at the end, even though it was management’s issue and their
responsibility. It was still put on the board. We still had to pay fees; we had to pay
lawyers out of our school’s budget.
In the experience of Participant C, the management company was making
decisions and the board was held accountable. Also, it appeared that the management had
the disposition that the board would sign off on whatever they put in front of them: “Yes,
the management company were less accountable to the boards because they made all of
the decisions. They prepared everything ahead of time and expected the board to just
approve it.”
Participant C gave an indication that there was a concern with giving an entity
comprehensive control over the operations of the charter school:
I just think the fact of having so much responsibility on one company, which are
not as invested as the members of the boards that have seen these kids for so
many years; that have grown up with these kids, they don’t have the same
vestment as the board members or school leaders.
Factors Contributing to Tension in Governance
Participant C indicated that tensions often came from the disposition of the
management company that the board would approve anything the management company
placed in front of them. Especially in the beginning years, when the board was less
experienced. She stated,
In the fact that all of the contracts would be prepared, even the contracts for
venders, they would go out and put out the RFP (Request for Proposal), but still

CONFLICTS	
  IN	
  THE	
  GOVERNANCE	
  OF	
  MICHIGAN	
  CHARTER	
  SCHOOLS	
  	
  

132	
  
	
  

go ahead and bring to the table and say this is the one we would like to go with
and the one we will go with, instead of putting it in front of the board and letting
us make the decision.
Accountability and Transparency
In terms of accountability and transparency, Participant C feels that issues exist
related to the time board members have to thoroughly review important documents and
data such as budgets, audits, and contracts. She stated,
Yes I do, I believe that [by] having a for-profit entity, they already have their set
out budgets in place and agendas set in advance. Going back to the fact that a
board is there just once a month and their expectation is that you will go ahead
and pass everything they put in front of you.
Participant C elaborated on the issues of the board being expected to sign
whatever the management company placed in front of them. She provided the following
examples:
The budgets, and the budget changes, revised budgets. I have seen revised
budgets come in with cuts in certain funds by as much as 20 to 30k for one year.
How can you cut that kind of budget without having discussions or providing
reasoning behind it? When you have a board that is more involved in such areas
then you will have more transparency and accountability. Or an advisory board
reviewing and providing input, tearing it apart and asking questions.
In regards to question four on accountability and transparency, Participant C
indicated that when a board hired a full-service management company, it needed to be
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even more involved given the breadth and scope of their involvement to the operations of
the school. She stated:
Other than the fact I believe board members need to be more involved (if they are
going to have a full-service management company that takes care of everything
from budgets, to purchases, contracts, hiring, firing etc.), their bottom line is,
what is going to make them money. They are going to do what will more
favorably impact their bottom line. What is first and foremost is their profit
margin. They will always think of their profit margin first versus a volunteer
position of a board member who is involved because of the kindness of their heart
and are there because they want to be and not someone is forcing them there or
giving them a big salary, because none of us are getting paid.
Participant C provided a strong contrast of the sense of purpose between the volunteer
board and the for-profit private management company.
Contractual and Legislative Suggestions
In terms of what could be done contractually or legislatively to improve
governance in Michigan charter schools, Participant C suggested exploring other models
of management that do not completely hand over all operations. She included some
hybrid forms of management and self-management models. She stated:
Contractually, there could be considerations on subcontracting certain entities.
Our particular model has gone to more of a self-managed model where the board
has given the responsibility back to the school leaders. The school leaders are the
ones that put the budgets together and the finances are done by administrators;
with teacher input. We contract background checks, payroll and things like that
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for our management company that we currently have. We have now just minimal
responsibility at the contract level. Our contracts are laid out with what is
specifically laid out for us. However, if we were able to bring it legislatively, to
pass laws across the board that would hold schools to the same standard across the
board...many, many charters are run very differently, each one has their own
accountability and each one has their own contractual agreements. Some have full
service; some have no service. Some have sub contracts with many companies.
Participant C indicated a legislative need for consistency in terms of how charter
schools in Michigan are managed and operated. She also introduced the concept of a nonprofit management model she believed might better fit the needs of Michigan charter
school boards of directors. She elaborated:
If we were looking at it legislatively, it would be looking for a model across the
board…legislature should press for more consistency. In my experience, I believe
that having a non-profit management company would be a better model and
option…it would be a different understanding to have a non-profit come in and
work on behalf of a school…better to have a non-profit partner with a school to
find resources through federal resources that are out there.
Participant C further explained the legislative implications on governance
regarding effective training for board members to understand their roles. She also
indicated training should come from entities other than the authorizer. She stated,
“Training, for the boards that are out there, not necessarily from the authorizers of the
schools but more training to have board members understand their roles.” She continued
to discuss the need for training beyond the general basics currently provided and
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promoted tailored training to enhance knowledge and skills with the intent to impact
board governance. She continued, “Specifically understanding contract negotiations,
understanding budgeting; I believe breakout sessions on how to pick apart budgets,
looking at school calendars, placing board members into sub categories to work with
finances, discipline, etc. and forming different sub-committees from the board.”
Participant C indicated that the training for Michigan charter school boards should
be centralized as much as possible and come from the state level to ensure consistency
and accountability. She stated, “It really should be brought at a legislative level, at a
much larger level that is going to have accountability. It should be training brought by a
nonprofit that has trained and understands what are the responsibilities of charter school
boards.”
In conclusion, in regards to legislative implications on governance in Michigan
charter schools, Participant C suggested a look at community partnering and non-profits
as a viable model for the operations of the schools. She indicated a concern for charters in
the future and making sure that school choice is in the hands of parents. She explained:
Personally, I would like to see non-profits come together to offer services to the
schools [and] partnering with the schools. Being able to be a part of making sure
that schools have their own mission, and goals so that they can accomplish those
things. Community partnering is still going to be key in the charter schools going
forward. Legislatively, we are in a difficult place right now because we don’t
know what is going to happen for charter schools. We could be in a very
dangerous place, by not having the freedom of choice. There are bills that could
mandate every child going to their local school, and district…regardless of suburb

CONFLICTS	
  IN	
  THE	
  GOVERNANCE	
  OF	
  MICHIGAN	
  CHARTER	
  SCHOOLS	
  	
  

136	
  
	
  

or city. We need to make sure that the choice stays with the parents to have their
children in schools.
Summary and Analysis of Results
Participant C’s interview responses brought out some common areas of discussion
that lend themselves to an analysis based on the likelihood of these areas being the source
of role confusion and potential conflict. Significant descriptors emerged from Participant
C’s interview responses as seen in Table 6.
Table 6
Identification of Descriptors from Participant C’s Interview Transcript
_______________________________________________________________________
! Board is ultimately responsible
! Rubber stamp
! Board Training on roles and responsibilities
! Community oriented/volunteerism
! Transparency and accountability

training on contract

! Management company not as vested as the board of directors
! Perceived vs. reality of demand and expectations on charter school board
members
! Profit motive implications
! Management company is responsible for day-to-day
! Board charter recourse in terms of authorization
! Role responsibility for student discipline

Significant descriptors emerged from the qualitative data from Participant C as
illustrated in Table 6. She shared experiences, which conveyed her perspectives inclusive
of the board of directors is ultimately responsible; board viewed as a rubber stamp; board
training on roles, responsibility, and on the contract itself; and her volunteer/community
service based rationale for serving on a charter school board. Other descriptors included
transparency, accountability, board investment, demands of a charter school board
member, and the profit motive.
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Participant C emphasized that the board of directors has the ultimate
responsibility regarding the operations and dynamics of the charter school. She also
discussed the issue of how her board has experienced an expectation from the
management company that the board would sign anything they placed in front of them.
This management position aligned with the next description of her experience, which is
her perception of the board being viewed as a rubber stamp. This metaphor was used by
Participant C to mean that the board is a figurehead to sign and endorse whatever the
management company places in front of them.
She subsequently focused on board training on roles, regarding or inclusive of
responsibility, and nuances of the management contract. The training was highlighted in
her experience where she indicated that she and other board members did not initially
fully understand their board of director roles and positions. Instead, they navigated often
by trial and error and improved their leadership and governance over time. She also
described the profit motive and its implications. Participant C described this as the
management company’s focus of making a profit and everything else is secondary. She
also appeared to focus on transparency, perceived versus reality of demands and
expectations of charter school boards of directors, and the profit motive as previously
mentioned.
She provided rationale similar to other interview candidates in her determination
to impact education for children in under-served communities. She responded to the
request of a friend to join the board and has taken on roles such as vice president and
currently president.
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The qualitative data from the interview of Participant C indicated potential for
conflicts given the confusion of responsibilities between the board of directors and the
for-profit private management company with the descriptors such as ultimate
responsibility of the board, and feeling like a rubber stamp, issues of accountability or of
the board being ultimately responsible and transparent and lack of understanding the
contract between the board of directors and the management company.
The first descriptor that expressed role confusion is the board president’s
disposition of seeing the board as having ultimate responsibility, and simultaneously
feeling like a rubber stamp. This is a state of confusion because the board has the
perception of power, however, they are expected to sign whatever the management
company places before them and is told who will be their vendor for certain services.
This led to the feeling of being a “rubber stamp” as opposed to an actual decision maker.
The confusion as to what is the board’s position and what is the board’s power leads to
conflicts between them and the management company.
The second descriptor that indicated confusion is viewed through the board
president’s perception around issues of accountability and transparency. She expressed
what appeared to be frustration with holding the management company accountable due
to lack of the certainty of the board’s roles. The other part of the confusion was based on
the appearance that the board received reports without explanations on finances that were
expended on programs without subsequent program evaluations. She expressed concerns
of the board formerly not knowing what to do because they did not have the experience.
The final descriptor encompasses the previous two because the interview
participant indicated how more training is needed on the contract upfront to thwart
negative implications from not knowing and understanding the contract. The example for
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this is how the management company took the lead on sub-contracting and provided
subpar information for monitoring and evaluating programs.
The three descriptors from the interview of Participant C illustrated confusion in
areas concerning board roles and responsibilities, which produced the feelings of being a
rubber stamp. In addition, the board operated from a disposition of inexperience and now
suggests that training on the boards’ contracts is implemented upfront for all, and
especially new board members. The issues regarding lack of understanding of the board
roles, feeling like a rubber stamp, accountability and transparency issues, and not
understanding the dynamics of the contract presents confusion and adds to the
governance conflicts between the board of directors and the for-profit private
management company.
Interview Participant D
Background and Rationale of Being a Board Member
Participant D is an educated African American female in her early sixties who had
served on her charter school board for six years prior to resigning. The impetus of her
becoming a charter school board member was so that she could make a difference in the
lives of children and provide an option to urban children who needed an alternative to the
Detroit Public School system. She is a retired professional. Unfortunately, after six years,
she resigned before her term was finished after coming to the realization that what she
envisioned as a charter school board member was drastically different from her reality
and experience.
Participant D was the vice president on the board of a Michigan charter school.
She joined the board of directors with positive visions of what a charter school could be.
She remained positive despite hearing mixed reviews on charter schools in the state of
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Michigan and the nation. Despite the mixed reviews, she decided to give it a chance and
became the vice president of the board of directors. She stated:
Ok, why did I join the board? Basically, at that particular time, my grandchildren
were coming of age where they would be attending school, at a Detroit school.
And at that time, like everyone else, I was looking for alternatives other than
Detroit Public Schools for them. I had heard a lot of good things about the charter
school movement, and I heard a lot of bad things. But I wanted to take a chance
for them and on their behalf; that is how I got involved.
Participant D’s experience was soon shattered as her first term awakened her to
some of the challenging aspects of governance that may occur as a charter school board
member. She said,
Basically, where do I start, when I first joined the board I never was really
educated or trained, so to speak, on what my position would be as a governor of
that particular entity. I came in with all of these expectations of being part of a
movement and I was excited about doing great things for the children. However,
after being in my second term, I realized that I was a rubber stamp.
Pros and Cons of Contracting with a Full-Service Management Company
In regards to the first qualitative question regarding the pros and cons of
contracting with a full-service private management company, Participant D referred to a
con as the lack of understanding the roles that her board experienced. The lack of
understanding created doubt in what their purpose was as a board, which she explained:
We started to question what our responsibility was. Then I started to notice more
of the financials, and I was asked to sign checks and different things. And we
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were not given line-by-line. As I began to ask questions, I was never given direct
answers. So I began to ask more questions by email, and I would get a little bit
more but still not really answers. They would give me answers they thought I
would want to hear, but at least they responded.
Contractual Relationship
In describing the specific contractual relationship between the board and the
management company, Participant D simply stated, “That is the only reason they needed
a board and that was because they had to have a board. A dictatorship and a rubber
stamp.”
Factors Contributing to Tension in Governance
In terms of what factors contribute to tension in governance, Participant D
provided examples of frustrations caused by the lack of understanding of roles, input
from board members seemingly not welcomed, and the difficulty she and board members
experienced when asking questions regarding the operations of the school. She stated:
One particular instance when we, the board of directors, were supposed to have
say for the handbook and there was a confrontation, verbal, back and forth
between the management company and myself and my board members; because
they went on and did the handbook without any of our input. And that was the
beginning of not only my distaste, but many of the board members at that time
that were actively on the board.
Such frustrations became fairly routinized as small issues came up, such as a
discrepancy over the student handbook. Issues continued to mount as the board felt the
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need to contract legal services to help navigate communications between the board of
directors and the management company. Participant D stated,
At that point, the board decided to hire another attorney because they realized at
some point in time, when the board first began, it came with a ready-made lawyer;
the attorney did not represent the board. We made the decision to start there; to
hire another attorney.
More tensions mounted as the board felt that the management company had
selected the attorney for the charter school. Participant D articulated:
I did my research and the management company had handpicked attorneys. They
picked and assigned [attorneys] to these schools and if you [do] research, you will
see that the same attorneys represent different schools. So when we really got into
looking for an attorney, I started to get negative calls and negative emails from
the management company. They asked to meet with me, myself and the president.
I would never meet with them alone, and they asked us to back off with the hiring
of a new attorney. When that did not happen, I knew by the next term I would be
terminated so I got busy trying to do as much as I could before my term was up.
Further tension came when the board did not receive feedback to questions asked.
It appeared as though the management company did not feel compelled to give direct
answers. Participant D stated, “Well the bottom line is, and they love to use the term, they
are a for-profit and they don’t have to tell you anything.”
Accountability and Transparency
In terms of question four, Participant D emphatically believed accountability and
transparency was an issue. She referred to questioning where the money was being spent
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and why it was not clear in terms of rent, contracts, and other significant expenditures.
She said:
Who is getting these contracts? Are you putting the bids out there like you are
supposed to and sharing it with the board? You tell me that you are spending
millions of dollars on the school, but I don’t see what you did. The children do not
have a lunchroom; they are eating in their rooms. They have no gymnasium; we
are totally in the dark.
The issues of accountability and transparency are in part because of the challenges
Participant D depicted her board faced when asking for financial and budget related
information. As previously indicated, she felt the management company’s disposition
was due to being a for-profit private company and therefore not compelled to share their
information. She stated:
Well, my question at the end of the day is, how much profit are you making? You
don’t want to show me that. And if you don’t want to show me how much profit
you are making, then I am not quite sure that the children are getting what they
are supposed to get. You can tell me anything, but I need to see the figures. I need
to see the numbers. I need to see where the money is going.”
The tensions continued all the way to the end of Participant D’s last day and
resignation. She had asked that the board’s lawyer attend their public meeting and that
specific documents be provided from the management company. She indicated:
On the night I resigned, I invited the company they used to do their financials.
They came in with some actual documents because they had sent us blacked out
documents…their explanation was that something happened to the copier. But in
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actuality, I had asked for the original documents so that was not true…they
obviously sent us blacked out documents because it was something in it they did
not want us to see.
The tensions were obviously very high between the board and the for-profit
management company as indicated by Participant D. Unfortunately, she did not have any
pros to speak of given her and other fellow board members’ experiences with their
contracted for-profit private management company.
Contractual and Legislative Suggestions
When asked what could be done contractually and legislatively to improve
governance in Michigan charter schools, she indicated that there should not be a forprofit entity running a public school academy that receives tax payers’ dollars. She stated,
“Let’s start with legislatively because if you start legislatively, then the contractual will
fall into place. They need to stop passing laws that gives these guys the opportunity to do
what they are doing legally. That is the bottom line.” She continued to specifically state,
“Well, I personally believe there should not be a for-profit running any public school.
Because it is all about profit! And if they don’t have the children’s best interest at heart
then it is a no brainer. They should not be in the business.”
In terms of contractually, Participant D took the disposition that boards of
directors should have their own contracted legal counsel. She explained, “Well, if, when
the board comes in play, they should have their own attorney. Someone they trust who is
looking out for their best interest and not the management company’s best interests. If it
starts there, I think the rest will follow.”
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Participant D reinforced the lack of empowerment saying that boards’ hands are
tied and she alluded to a “rubber stamp.” When asked if anything could be done to
improve the board’s ability to govern, she responded,
No, because if the contract is tying the board’s hands behind their back, which is
what these contracts are doing, basically you are a rubber stamp. And not only are
you a rubber stamp, there is not transparency and no accountability, so other than
that the contract is basically just paper.
Despite the negative experience as a board member, Participant D says that she
can live with charter schools as long as they are held accountable and their activities
monitored. She said:
I can live with charter schools. Because if someone is watching our money; then
someone is watching the children. I am not against per se charter schools…I am
against how they are being run and not servicing the children they say they are
servicing. For example, the school that I was on the board for, there were a lot of
social issues in that area…when you move in there you should know that…You
should move there with a plan to include that whole child not just to make a
profit.
Participant D also suggested making sure that new and current board members are
aware of the details of the contract between the charter school board of directors and the
for-profit private management company. She stated, “Well, once again we are going back
to the contract. When you sit on one of these boards, make sure you know what you can
and cannot do.”
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She also suggested that training occur from the first day of a person becoming a
charter school board member. She said that roles are not clear from the beginning and she
came in with a very naïve perspective. She stated, “No, it is not clear from the start. You
would have to be there wide-eyed and bushy-tailed for a couple of years to really know
what was going on unless you already had board experience.” She gave an example of
how board minutes should be managed by the board of directors and not the management
company. She also believed that people should be made aware of the demands of board
roles so there are no misconceptions. She stated, “For novices like myself who just want
to do something good…it took me a while to realize that this is not good…I am really not
making a difference here.” In closing, Participant D stated,
When I think back and I say why it took me so long, you know, could I have done
more? Those questions will always remain with me. But I do hope that I did make
a difference…I did go and say this is not right.
She also stated that the contract was a critical piece and should be revisited
routinely by the board and that opportunities to renegotiate should be seized to reflect the
boards’ requirements. She appeared to believe that leverage and a position of strength for
the board is in the contract. The contract should be reviewed as she stated:
Yes, starting there...line-by-line…precept-by-precept…Bring in the attorney,
allowing the attorney to educate that board member as to what the contract is
about. Not one of the authorizer’s; not one of the management company’s… it
should be a one-to-one relationship between the attorney and the board and make
sure that attorney indeed works for the board.
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Summary and Analysis of Results
Participant D’s experience as a board member appeared to encompass frustrations
that manifested into a sense of distrust for the management company. Her responses,
which abated her focus on the need for the board to have independent legal council, were
illustrated in terms of focusing on revising the contract. (See Table 7)
Table 7
Identification of Descriptors from Participant D’s Interview Transcript
______________________________________________________________________
! Transparency and full disclosure
! Rubber stamp
! Board training on roles and responsibilities
! Community oriented/volunteerism

student advocacy

! Profit motive implications
! Confusion of overlap of academic responsibilities
! Tension due to contract negotiations with management company
! No recourse for board of directors when in disagreement with the mgt. company
! Management of sub-contractors
! Role responsibility for student discipline

The qualitative data from the interview of Participant D indicated potential areas
for conflicts given the confusion of responsibilities between the board of directors and the
for-profit private management company. Multiple descriptors emerged from the
qualitative data from Participant D as illustrated in Table 7. She shared her experiences,
which conveyed perspectives inclusive of: issues of transparency and full disclosure,
feeling like a rubber stamp, lack of board training, and overlap of academic
responsibilities between the board of directors and the for-profit private management
company. Other pertinent descriptors also emerged but were less direct sources of
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confusion and role conflicts. These included; community orientation/volunteerism, profit
motive implications, and tensions due to contract negotiations.
The first descriptor that emerged from Participant D reiterated a sense of
skepticism due to the ambiguity that the board of directors felt regarding transactions,
budget reporting, and responses (or lack of responses) to the questions from the board of
directors to the management company. The skepticism increased, as interactions over
time seemed to not improve. These interactions led to issues involving the descriptors of
accountability and transparency. Participant D expressed a sense of bewilderment
regarding the reporting of public funds, and the seemingly evasiveness of the for-profit
management company when it came to reporting and accountability to the board of
directors. The confusion of the board of directors led to conflicts between the two parties.
The second descriptor that emerged from Participant D is the feeling of being a
rubber stamp. She indicated feelings of disorientation because the board seemed to not be
able to govern from a position of strength. On the contrary, it seemed to have weaknesses
in terms of obtaining basic information from its management company. This metaphor
was introduced to this study by the data gathered from interview Participant C. In similar
fashion, it describes the board’s feeling of just being a figurehead for parallel governance
where they are just in board roles for the sake of meeting state requirements. The
example provided by Participant D was the issue of the handbook where she stated that
the board of directors was not allowed to provide input despite their request to preview
and edit. She stated that these actions caused the board to question their purpose and if
they were truly empowered. These experiences led to confusion and resulted in conflicts
in the relationship between the board of directors and the for-profit private management
company.
The third descriptor is relative to the lack of board training, which she stated
needs to be initiated as soon as a person becomes a board member. She stressed the
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importance of understanding roles and understanding what the board of directors can and
cannot do. The lack of role understanding led to confusion as to the board’s sense of
purpose and commensurately contributed to conflicts in their ability to govern.
The three descriptors from the interview of Participant D illustrated confusion in
areas concerning issues of accountability and transparency, the feeling of being a rubber
stamp, the lack of understanding their board roles, and the contractual elements between
the board of directors and the for-profit private management company individually and
collectively contributed to confusion and added to the governance conflicts between the
board of directors and the for-profit private management company.
Interview Participant E
Background and Rationale for Being a Board Member
Participant E is an African American female with a college degree in her late
forties who has served on her charter school board for approximately eleven years. She
has served in multiple roles for the past five years including vice president and currently
she is the board president. She is a medical researcher for a local hospital. Her primary
reason for becoming a board member is to help urban city children have access to
educational opportunities. She stated:
.

Ok, I have been serving on my current board for about 11 years. I was invited to
be a board member by a good friend of mine of this particular board and I was
intrigued with the idea of helping children. Also, seeing that I had a few of my
own children that were school aged. We had been through several types of school
systems with my children: Private schools, public schools, so I thought I would
give it a try and see how much of an impact I could make with the board. I did not
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know anything about being a board member for a charter school, so it was new to
me.
Participant E is one of the few charter school board presidents to lead her program
through the challenging process of transitioning from one authorizer to another. She
indicated, throughout her interview, how demanding the roles of charter school board
members have become in terms of time and preparation. Often, she said it was like a
second job.
She distinguished the differences in the role of general board members from those
board members who hold specific roles such as treasurer, vice president, or president.
The amount of time for preparation is essential for board members to add value to
meetings inclusive of fruitful discussions and prudent decision-making. She talked of
supporting the community and student advocacy.
She mentioned the importance of the board and the management company
working together to meet the challenges of public education. She discussed the
importance of leveraging the authorizer and the community to maximize the resources of
the school. She emphasized the importance of board training and supported the idea of
the board having input into selecting the leadership of the school.
Pros and Cons of Contracting with a Full-Service, For-Profit Management
Company
In Participant E’s response to the first interview question regarding the pros and
cons relative to governance when contracting with a full-service management company,
she indicated how it is a voluntary position based on the premise of being an advocate for
the community. She reiterated how demanding it is to be a contributing board member
and how much support is needed to govern effectively. She stated:
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I would say the pros, partly, when you are a board member for a charter school, it
is voluntary. There is no monetary compensation for being a member, you don’t
get any financial perks, per say, there is no financial gain from being a member.
So your time is all relative to you giving back to the community. With that being
said, being a board member of a charter school could almost be like a full time
job. And you need a lot of assistance to help manage and maintain the school that
you govern. And the pro, I would say, is if you have a very astute, professional,
experienced management group you could accomplish a lot of that and maintain
some type of trust that they are doing the day-to-day stuff that needs to be done;
relevant to providing a good education to the students of your school. So I would
say that is a pro because it takes a lot to run a school.
In acknowledging the challenges of what it takes to run a charter school, she
included the fact that a board requires a lot of support if it is to provide an opportunity for
a good education. In the same respect, she recognizes that a balance is needed to govern
from a macro perspective and not micro-manage the day-to-day, which is the
responsibility of the management company. However, giving space to the management
company requires a lot of trust that they will be transparent and vigilant in managing the
resources of the school. She articulated this in the following:
One of the cons I would say is although you do not want to micromanage, as a
voluntary board member you do not have the means to be involved in the day-today minutia of running the school…you can often allow too much leeway for the
management company to manage the school and often you allow them to make
decisions that should be made by the board. So you have to strike a delicate
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balance between governing and then overseeing the activities and make sure there
is transparency between you and the management group, so you can trust what
they are doing and allow them to do it as a board. Yet that everything is
transparent; that there is nothing going on that the board is not aware of.
The demands on all public schools are tremendous and require training and
insight if a board member is to be effective and not just present. She contrasted the
difference between being a regular board member and one that holds an officer’s role:
I would say, me on a personal basis, that being a board president for the last few
years, the contrast between when I first became a regular board member, and the
last three to four years as president. The climate of accountability changed a lot in
the state of Michigan. Accountability to standardized testing, and holding the
board and school accountable for how well their children performed. It became a
lot more laborious for the board members to be aware of how academically astute
our children are based on the standards put in place and then have to account for
any shortfalls. Either we have to do a lot of the research ourselves or put onus on
our management group to provide us with the proper resources to keep us aware
of where we are as far as the standards are concerned, and where we should
be…so it became a situation where having a full time job makes it difficult for me
to give the attention needed to be effective.
As Participant E substantiated the complexities of standardized testing and other
federal and state requirements, she elaborated on the demands that she stated are much
greater than a two-hour per month meeting. She explained:
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I thought about the activities and welfare of our children and it became a second
job. It was not just a once a month activity for me. It was becoming more of a
weekly assessment of what I need to be doing; how we need to be preparing for
our kids so they could perform at their greatest ability. Also, we need to make
sure that we have the proper resources in place to do that. That is what I would
say in terms of it becoming a job more so than a 1 or 2 hours a month situation.
She further elaborated on the importance of understanding board roles, especially
when one holds an officer’s position:
I would say yes, it depends on the role you have. Of course, if I were just a
regular board member, I would not have as much responsibility like that as
president. I have been a board president for about 4 years now and I would say
over the last two years or so I have become more integrally involved in the
welfare of the school and our relationship with our new authorizer. And also, the
accountability of our management group because we had some new personnel
changes. I just want to make sure that the level of service we receive from our
management group does not go down, that it still continues to be quality service.
And with that being said, I find myself thinking more about my responsibilities as
a board member and providing more action outside of those meetings that we
have once a month and little committee meetings we may have periodically. I take
my role more seriously because I know there are little lives dependent on us to
advocate on their behalf for them to get a good education. So my volunteer job as
a board member; sometimes it could be a part time job for me, not 40 hours a
week, but it is definitely not just meeting on one Tuesday out of the month for a
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few hours. I take it very seriously what I do, and regretfully so, I wish I could do
more…but I have a family and I work full time. But I do the best I can.
Participant E mentioned multiple times that despite the demands and requirements
from the state and federal government; and despite contracting with a full-service
management company, the responsibility primarily was on the charter school’s board of
directors. She articulated this disposition as follows:
Ultimately, it is the board of directors’ responsibility to see that we put in place,
what needs to be implemented utilizing our management company; needs to be
implemented in terms of getting the proper instruction in place, data management
and utilizing the data to better equip our teachers and looking at the performances
of the students. So, ultimately I would say it is the board of directors’
responsibility for that.
Participant E articulated the specific demands on the person who assumes the role
of board president. She expounded:
Yes the responsibility and onus of a regular board member is not as heavy. The
board chair, of course, because whatever goes wrong, the buck stops with you. So
I have to sign off on contracts, I have to sign off on bids, and different things that
I have to have my name on…If I am not aware of what is going on and it goes
awry, my name is on it...so I have to make sure that I understand what I am
getting myself into as a board president for the school and individually. Whereas a
regular member, I did not have that level of accountability per se. So it is a
heavier role to assume and I kind of assumed this role by default, but I am glad to
be the board president for this school.
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Given the board of directors’ position of ultimate responsibility, she made it clear
that if the management company is not meeting the requirements of making students
successful, then their performance must come under question and scrutiny. She
exemplified this with the following:
And then if the management group are not doing what they need to be doing in
terms of equipping the staff with what they need in order to educate the students
and teach them in terms of where they can perform at an acceptable level. Or even
see some gains overall as we assess our core groups of students, our cohorts, and
compare them to other districts and things like that. So, if they are not doing what
they need to do, the board is ultimately responsible to assess what we see and then
see what we need to do in terms of that particular management group.
Participant E acknowledged the challenges of changing management companies
and therefore reiterated the importance of trust and working together. Given the
challenges of working together, there are areas with great concerns. One of those
concerns was the appointment of school leadership. In the following, she discussed the
importance of hiring leadership and staff:
In terms of hiring, for example, we give at my particular school; we give our
management company leeway on hiring teachers, instructional coaches, and the
like. We think they have enough experience to do that…there are situations where
we may feel like we want some input. For instance, a school leader, we want to
have some input as the board as to who is hired for that particular position. But
for the most part, we give our management group leeway in that respect and trust
they choose the right people for the position.
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Participant E was comfortable as long as the trust is present to allow the
management company the lead role in hiring all staff. However, there was some
hesitancy to give them full autonomy in hiring the principal or superintendent roles. She
acquiesced to the experience of the management company while maintaining a level of
input into that particular decision. She stated,
I personally am not an educator and as a board member I would not know what to
look for. I can look at generalities and credentials and say this person’s credentials
are more conducive to this role than another person, but it is not my area of
expertise. And therefore, we can leave it to the experts.
Participant E indicated that regardless of who does the hiring and at what level,
the board is still responsible for all of the school’s outcomes and that included the
allocation of resources. She said:
Overall it is the board, as far as the governance of the funding, we are responsible
for that. We should know, and we do as far as budgetary needs, what our needs
are, what our student count should be; maintaining a healthy fund balance in case
we need to move some monies around for instructional people in place to help the
instruction of the students; the adjunct personnel that could help with our students
getting up to par. We know, most importantly, we make sure that resources go
toward student needs.
She exemplified the breadth and scope of the board’s responsibilities by
mentioning many of the resources required to operate a school, while keeping students’
needs in perspective. Next, she indicated the importance of selecting the appropriate
human resources while balancing funds. She continued to reiterate that, regardless of how
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the school is managed, it is ultimately the responsibility of the board of directors. She
explained:
We want to make sure that we take care of our teachers and the Para pros in the
classroom and that we provide them with the resources they need. It is a challenge
because you have to balance the student count right; that impacts what you are
able to do; the cuts in state funding; it is a delicate balance, but we know that we
are ultimately responsible for that and we leave our management group the
leeway to make sure that they get the proper pieces or parties in place, so we can
do what we need to do to maintain or help to improve the academic success of our
students.
Contractual Relationship
The second qualitative interview question asked for a description of the
contractual relationship between the board of directors and the management company.
Participant E referred to the board’s awareness of the contract; however, she admitted
that the contract is not always at the forefront of their minds because of the longevity of
the relationship with the current management company. She stated:
I would say we are very much aware that there is a contract between the
management and the board of directors. But because, as with my particular
school, there is such a long history with this management group that sometimes
the fact that there is a contract kind of gets lost because of the long relationship.
And there is always this assumption that sometimes you have to shake things up a
little bit, so that we are not taken for granted; that because you have been with us
all these years that we won’t make any changes.
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There are benefits and drawbacks to having a long contractual relationship with a
management company. The benefit is familiarity with the drawback being that the
management company may take their client for granted. Participant E’s board appeared to
be aware of the issue of contractual longevity. She said:
So we have to periodically let them know that we hold them accountable for
making sure our children get what they need. So you have to maintain a
professional relationship, but yet because you work with someone, people or an
entity, it can become personal and you have to make sure to let them know we
may be like a family, but you still need to do what you need to do and fulfill the
contract obligation.
Participant E alluded to the importance of the contractual agreements that the
board has with the management company. She explained that if the relationship is strong,
it could weather challenges that would typically threaten it. Given the challenges of
standardized testing and mandates from the federal government, authorizers feel the
pressure of having solid portfolios of the schools that they create. These pressures trickle
down to boards and management companies. In most instances, the authorizer will
remain the constant, and the board of directors or the management company will change.
In very few instances, an anomaly will occur and it is the authorizer that is out of the
relationship. She gave the following iteration:
There were some changes that came and affected the schools in the state in
general and how authorizers were accountable to the state for the schools they
authorized. And a lot of it had to do with standardized testing and it put a strain on
the relationship between the authorizer and our management group. And we were
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kind of the “middle guy”…we were placed in the middle and kind of in between,
and the authorizer put pressure on us to maybe dissolve our relationship with the
management group. And we took a stance in that we needed to look at what is
best for the children first and look at our longevity of the school and not so much
give-in to the pressure from the authorizer, from what they were under from the
state, so with that it did make the management company nervous; and we did let
them know under no certain terms no one was indispensable [sic.] and we would
look at considering another option. So we were able to weather the storm.
Actually, it turned out that we ended up with another authorizer and we are still
with the same management group.
Participant E’s board seemed to have found a balance in managing the benefits
and drawbacks of a long-term contractual relationship and they have leveraged it to make
changes by transitioning from one authorizer to another. At the same time, she reiterated
the value of a long contractual relationship, but also making sure the management
company does not take them for granted. Her board seemed to have found equilibrium
between the three entities of the board of directors, the management company, and the
authorizer.
Despite the synergy, everyone is held accountable. When asked about what needs
to be prioritized to maintain a contractual agreement, Participant E indicated that student
performance is the main element and if it is not meeting the requirements through the
management company’s evaluation, then the board of directors would look to make a
change. She stated:
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I would say because there is so much focus on the standardized testing, but our
overall goal is to provide an education that will allow our children to excel to the
next level and beyond. So we know that standardized testing is part of it, a small
part of it and we know that our children have to walk against, run against, and
usually lag behind some of our suburban counterparts. They have so many issues
they have to deal with to even get them to a place where they can excel
academically. But with that being said, we know that as a board, if our
management group loses focus, students are not first and we do not see the
progression with our students’ growth, then it is time to evaluate whether we need
to stay with this management group or not.
Factors Contributing to Tension in Governance
The contract is one of many matters that may cause tension in the governance of
charter schools. However, there are many other factors that may potentially cause
tension. This interview entailed that question and how the relationship between the board
of directors and the management company may contribute to tension as it relates to
governance.
Participant E’s initial response included making the decision on the leadership of
the school. Her response reinforced how important the school leader is regarding the
success of the school. She responded:
Well, I have a perfect example. A few years ago we had a wonderful school
leader, who has tried to retire and after several attempts finally made that leap to
retire. We had to get a new school leader to replace this person. And we chose a
particular person and this was the board of governance and the management group
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both selected this person. And the management group found the candidates and
we interviewed them collectively. After they got to a certain point, the board of
governance came into the process of the interview and between the two
candidates we selected the person. This particular person came in as a school
leader and because there was such a transition, our previous school leader was
such an important part of our school culture; it was going to be a big adjustment
anyway.
The previous response indicated tension as it relates to hiring school leadership.
Other tensions followed such as those stemming from academic performance and
specifically as it is measured by state standardized testing. Other sources of tension
affecting governance included fiscal and resource management. She stated:
Yes, academic standardized testing, making sure you have the right people in
place to get our students’ gains where they need to be. Financial resources, there
are always struggles as to how we are going to use these little bitty funds that we
have and how we are going to distribute them. And is it going to go to more
teachers or getting school buses; so we may bring more students in from outlying
areas into our school district. And so it is a delicate line on how to manage the
finances so we can ultimately help our children be successful academically. So
there is always that struggle there.
Accountability and Transparency
The next interview question asked if the board member believed that accountability
and transparency of public funds changed when contracting with a for-profit company.
Participant E responded:
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As a volunteer board member, when I look at how much charter schools are
scrutinized over their funding, and then you read stuff about what is going on in
Detroit Public Schools, I am like we must not be dealing with the same level of
accountability because there is no way in the world I could run my school like a
Detroit Public School and we would not be shut down. So in terms of the
management group, I think our board in general is just very conscientious about
knowing where the funds are and how they are dispersed because we do not want
to get in trouble and more we want to make sure that students are getting what
they need with limited funds. I think our charter school does a good job in terms
of transparency and managing the funds that we have.
Contractual and Legislative Suggestions
Participant E was then asked if there was anything contractually or legislatively
that could be done to improve governance. She responded:
I think legislatively we do not play with a level playing field. We should be able
to get the same amount of dollars per pupil that public schools get. It should be an
even playing field for every district, public and charter in the state. So we know
that is not fair. It should be done legislatively to make sure that every pupil gets a
fair share and amount of dollars so we can help our children get to where they
need to be. You have to have the financial resources for that. Contractually, of
course, in your contract you hold the management group accountable for
maintaining certain academic milestones and goals and growth…and that ties to
your authorizer [charter] contract as well. Just making sure all parties are aware of
what the agreed upon contracts are, making sure that they can be attainable, and
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that we strive towards obtaining those goals. At least we want to see growth and
we don’t want to see that students are going backwards.
She expressed her belief that the field is not level between urban and suburban
schools. Her legislative desire is that it will be addressed one day. In terms of the
contract, she shared the concept of fortifying the contract between the board of directors
and the management company with performance metrics that reward results and
scrutinizes when falling short of the performance metrics. She responded:
Well, they get a percentage. Contracts are usually written [that] if our
management company meets a certain milestone, they get a certain percentage per
pupil. If you do not meet that milestone then you do not get that increased
percentage: or whatever. We have to reassess if they are not reaching
expectations. Then we have to reassess if we need to decrease the amount of
money you are getting per pupil or even …or even consider bidding out …so
there is that contractual obligation that the management group has…and we have
to make sure that as governance we hold them accountable to that and if they do
not hit those milestones; [we] do not just ignore it, but address that issue and
decide what we are going to do moving forward.
In terms of the contract and spelling out the roles between the board of directors
and the management company, Participant E believed more direct training is needed and
that the board needs to do more in terms of training. She stated the following:
I believe it is, it may not be directly written out, what the board as a whole or as
individual parties, but it is implied that we govern the school and that we employ
our management group to help us to do the day-to-day operations. And I think we
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probably as a board, because we are a small board and have some turnover, I
mean you are asking people to volunteer and it is demanding and people work. It
is a commitment and it is something to be taken seriously, so I think we, as a
board, need to do a better job at even educating our board members of their roles.
A lot of times it is “on the job” training. You learn as you go [about] what your
role is as a volunteer board member for a public charter school…but it is more
probably implied than implicit of the roles in the contract.
Participant E mentioned that training from the former and current authorizers has
been well received, especially given the turnover of members on her board. She argued
that it is imperative that board members know their role: “Our authorizer and past
authorizer did a really good job trying to orientate and provide governance seminars for
their various boards. And so it is a contingent that it should happen, so that board
members understand their roles in governance.” She continued that it is important to have
a working knowledge of charter schools and the key entities in the charter school
industry. She concluded:
Just to understand what it means to be a board member of a charter school. Even
just understanding what a charter school is…and how the authorizer is and what
role they play…if you use a management group and how they help in that
scenario; understanding all of the stakeholders and how they are involved in the
continuum of relationships from the authorizer to the management group, to the
board, to parents, the community, and the management group employing the
teachers, and understanding all of these relationships; that is important that the
authorizer helps as well.
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This final response by Participant E demonstrated her perspective on the role of
the authorizer in the relationship between the management company and the board of
directors, which was unique to her interview.
Summary and Analysis of Results
Participant E’s experience as a board member appears to entail perceptions that
the board provides leeway to the management company for hiring and that the longevity
has both pluses and minuses when it comes to the relationship between the board of
directors and the for-profit private management company. She mentions that the
management company must be held accountable for student achievement and growth.
She expresses the need for board training for all members, and special training for
members that are new and novice to the charter world. She values the relationship
between the two parties and feels a synergistic relationship is a must in order to produce
positive results. Participant E believes that the board of directors is ultimately responsible
for all aspects of the charter school.	
  
Table 8
Identification of Descriptors from Participant E’s Interview Transcript
_____________________________________________________________
! Shared responsibility for hiring key leadership
! Board ultimately responsible
! Board training on roles and responsibilities
! Community oriented/volunteerism

student advocacy

! Contract with incentives for student performance
! Confusion of overlap of academic responsibilities
! Giving mgt. company leeway
not micro managing
! Perceived vs. reality of demand and expectations of charter school board members
! Contract based on performance metrics and not history
! Transparency and accountability of financial resources
! Role responsibility for student discipline
! Management company is responsible for day-to-day
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The qualitative data from the interview of Participant E indicated potential areas

for conflicts given the confusion of responsibilities between the board of directors and the
for-profit private management company. Multiple descriptors emerged from the
qualitative data from Participant E as illustrated in Table 8. She expressed experiences,
which conveyed perspectives inclusive of: issues of shared responsibility for hiring key
leadership positions, the board being ultimately responsible, board training and
responsibility, volunteerism/community orientation (student advocacy), giving the
management company leeway for hiring, and the perceived versus reality of the demands
and expectations of charter school boards of directors. Other pertinent descriptors also
emerged, but were less direct sources of confusion and role conflicts. These included;
roles and responsibility for student discipline, contract based on performance metrics and
not history, and the management company is responsible for the day-to-day.
The first descriptor that emerged from Participant E’s interview is the confusion
of having shared responsibility for hiring key leadership positions in the charter school.
The allowed input of the board is not formal and not inclusive of the contractual
agreement between the board of directors and the for-profit private management
company. The potential for conflict is the perception of the board members impact on
hiring roles, such as the principal. There is not a formal clause in the contract, which
gives the board input into the hiring of administrative roles. As a matter of fact, the
contract indicates that the management company has sole responsibility for hiring the
administration and all positions in the charter school.
The second descriptor that emerged is the perception that the board is ultimately
responsible for all aspects of the charter school including operations. Even though there is
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a feeling that the board of directors is responsible for all aspects of the operations of the
school, they are not. It is more accurate to say the board is accountable for all aspects of
the charter school dependent upon their contract with the management company.
However, once they sign a contract for full-services with a management company, the
responsibility is contractually transferred to the management company. The potential for
confusion increases, which leads to great potential for conflicts in these circumstances
because with the transfer of responsibility comes the commensurate transfer of power and
authority and the board’s ability to influence the operations of the school is diminished.

The third descriptor from the interview is board training on roles and
responsibilities. The board president acknowledged the need for training, which
precipitated from a significant level of board member turnover. This change in board
membership, in many instances, leads to novice replacements. The replacements are
sometimes not oriented prior to their start and are not aware of the elements of the
contract, which impacts the ability of the board. Some may even not understand the
dynamics of charter schools and the environment within which they operate. These
situations perpetuate confusion from the start and sets high probability for confusion and
conflict given the ambiguity of board members’ roles and responsibilities.
The fourth descriptor is that of community orientation/volunteerism and student
advocacy, which is often the premise for people joining charter school boards. The
volunteer mindset may not be aligned to the profit-centric position of the management
company and collides when activities, policies, and objectives are not agreed upon or fall
into dispute. Participant E joined the board after being asked by a friend if she would
consider being on a charter school board. Having children of her own and experimenting
with trying to find the best locations for them, she accepted becoming a board member.
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The fifth descriptor is the concept of the perception of the board of directors
giving leeway to the management company to hiring staff. This is accompanied by a false
impression that boards have any say in the hiring practices of the management company.
The hiring practice is clearly stated in the contractual agreement between the board of
directors and the management company that the latter has full and complete control over
who is hired and terminated. This misperception is a precursor of confusion and potential
conflict given the likelihood of disagreement on hiring at any point in time.
The sixth descriptor is the perceived versus reality of the demands and
expectations of charter school board members. Interview Participant E articulated that her
perceptions of what was entailed with being a board member far exceeded the reality of
being a board member. She indicated numerous times that it is like a part-time and fulltime job; and that the preparation and follow-through is tremendous, especially for those
who hold positions such as president, vice president, and treasurer. When a volunteer
position entails such demands, it is a possibility for potential conflicts given the rationale
for contracting a full-service private management company includes alleviating board
members from having to manage the detailed operations of the charter school.
The previous descriptors from Participant E’s interview illustrated confusion in
areas of shared responsibility for hiring key leadership, perception of the board being
ultimately responsible, board training and responsibility, the concept of volunteerism, and
the perception of giving leeway for staff hiring by the management company. These
descriptors are part of multiple factors that contributed to confusion and added to the
potential governance conflicts between the board of directors and the for-profit private
management company.
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Interview Participant F
Background and Rationale for Being a Charter School Board Member
Participant F is a white male in his mid-fifties and is a college graduate. He is an
attorney who works heavily in civil rights. He is also a former teacher. He has a strong
knowledge of contracts and values all aspects of community development and relations.
He has been on the board and president of a charter school since its inception in 1996.
Participant F has been an active board president since 1997. He assisted with the
beginning phases of the school as they originally operated from a former catholic high
school. He guided the program through a series of financial challenges and navigated
multiple moves to different facilities while he worked with two for-profit private
management companies during his tenure.
He received six renewals to serve in his board role all with one authorizer and two
full service for-profit private management companies. His experiences in teaching and
civil rights provided a dynamic perspective of charter schools’ evolution and fiscal
operations in terms of how public tax dollars are managed between a non-profit school
and a for-profit private management company.
His rationale for joining a charter school board was linked to his community
development and civil rights background, which provided a brilliant lens to view the
challenges and needs of charter schools. His legal career gave him analytical skills to
better understand the contractual, legal, financial, and political infrastructures that often
challenge less credentialed board presidents. Being on a board provided Participant F
with a means of helping the community and simultaneously impacting education in urban
areas lacking the resources of most traditional public schools. He was contentious about
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how for-profit private management companies are able to receive taxpayers’ dollars so
easily when they are allocated to Michigan charter schools, which are non-profit entities.
He mentioned that not many industries allow such transactions.
Pros and Cons of Contracting with a For-Profit Private Management Company
Participant F believed the main positive aspect of contracting with a for-profit
management company for educational services is that you may be working with
professional people who are well trained in functional areas. He stated:
Let’s start with the pros; you are dealing with, you can be dealing with business
people. Not always, but you can be dealing with business people. And as an
organization, they can manage contracts. Ideally, they should manage contractors
well. They should be fully up to speed on payroll, personnel, and compliance
issues. They, I would say from the business end of it, should be credible.
Participant F’s list of pros ended at the business aspect of what for-profit private
management companies bring into practice. After the initial pro, he went said, “I would
say I should have a longer list of pros. Unfortunately, but I probably don’t.”
He then listed out his perspective of cons tempered with a lot of phrases such as,
“things could go well if you have the right people who put the children, families, and the
community first.” As he began to list the cons, he said, “If you have the right people that
are student-child-family oriented: it’s fine. Or just feel in their heart to do the right thing:
full disclosure, honesty, careful with expenditures, and things of that nature. It can work
very, very well.” He elaborated on the previous and began to introduce the profit motive
as a concept of what drives for-profit private management companies. He explained:
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But the profit motive is very, very high. It does dictate and influence a lot of what
occurs that are said that are not for the student or for the welfare of the school and
things of that nature. But at its core: it’s a money-driven process. And that’s really
sad. But I see what they are doing is anything to maintain that contract. The
contract and the money that is generated through it can be enormous. The head of
it, the top people in a for-profit management company, can make more than a
superintendent in a large public school district can make. The contracts are about
a million dollars every 3 years and as far as the expenditures and that, they can
hire staff and things like that, charged back to the school, where the million
dollars every 3 years really almost purely represents profit with very little
overhead actually to be incurred by the management company. That concerns me.
Other cons that were mentioned were related to the management company taking
actions and seemingly expecting the board to be non-resistant. He provided the following
example:
I can give you a very specific example. Our contract provides that our
management company provides bookkeeping fees. With our new management
company, they insisted that, oh, we hire a bookkeeper at all of our schools. They
had a bookkeeper that did it at another school on a part-time basis. The other
school closed and so they made her full time at our school. So we are paying full
time for a bookkeeper that makes as much as our second or third top teacher.
$40,000 a year plus benefits for a bookkeeper even though bookkeeping is
provided for, that is something that the management company, at their expense,
should provide.
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Participant F addressed the concerns as such, “When I approached it with the
management company, during a board meeting, I was told, well, um, we hire
bookkeepers at the school’s expense at all of our schools and this is just something that
we do.” The nature of the previous response from the management company gives a
perception that the management company has the authority to allocate resources without
the approval of the board of directors. He also stated, “If the board doesn’t know, that
doesn’t make it right, and because maybe boards don’t read the contract, they don’t
understand that that is something that’s supposed to occur.”
Participant F also indicated that the relationship between the management
company and the authorizer could be nebulous for board governance given the contract
between the board of directors and the authorizer; and a separate contract between the
board of directors and the management company. He went on to say,
The authorizers’ goal is stability at the school, no change for any reason, and that
they can get their authorizer fee. And so you tend, when you have the for-profit
arrangement you have, you tend to develop that close relationship between the
management company and the authorizer. And to me, the board is kind of
extraneous to the management and governance of the school. And that is a
concern. But I think you would probably have that in any area where they have
high profit margins and I could say the same things as far as the mortgage
industry. I see that kind of excess in the mortgage industry because the
compensation is so high. I see it in my practice when it comes to securities and
investments…the same kind of thing. So I am not saying that this is any different
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than other areas, but I’m saying that it is a problem. It’s a problem as the high
profit model is in other areas, in other kinds of industries.
Coupled with the previous perspective, Participant F felt that the management
company would conduct themselves in a manner to keep the contract. He stated that their
primary objective “Is to preserve the contract at all costs; absolutely.”
When asked to elaborate on one of the earlier statements that positive things may
happen if a management company is student, family, and community oriented, he replied;
“First off, that having a charter school can, in my opinion, be very responsive to the
needs that occur. If something happens, we can change direction midcourse. Its not
bureaucratic…things can happen.” He went on to provide an example, which included
attendance and responsiveness. He explained:
Whether a problem with attendance, or a problem with a particular subject matter
or whatever, charter schools can rapidly change to meet the needs; so that should
result in better academic performance so that’s the value of a charter school.
Where it’s an individual school that is controlled, managed locally, and things can
get done; so that’s the plus side of it.
Participant F expounded on the role of the management company’s liaison to the
board of directors. He stated:
When you have someone, and there are individuals that I can point to… I mean
we have had two management companies, but at times there have been people of
high integrity, high commitment, and high caliber that are honest and trustworthy
and will alert you right up front. Where if they say something, you know it’s the
truth. That is thrilling, that’s refreshing, and I get a sense that is how the other
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board members feel. Their happy, their comfortable, and they feel a big loss
when someone like that leaves; because now we are only going to get filtered
information, and a public relations presentation and things of that nature rather
than just accurate information.
Participant F expressed an appreciation for trust, openness, and disclosure, which
appeared to be based on the character of the board liaison person who is assigned to the
account. However, he said that if the liaison is not of high caliber, then problems emerge.
He stated:
There is nothing wrong with something coming up and saying we need to address
this, we need to address that, no one is going to terminate a management
company. We’re not going to get upset about it, we would like to know because
that enables us as a board to say what can we as a board do to come alongside the
management company or what can we do to reach out to the authorizer. What can
we do to improve the situation and we are supposed to be team players working
towards the same goal; but when that breaks down; then it’s a problem.
Contractual Relationship
In terms of question two regarding the contractual relationship between the boards
of directors and the management company, Participant F clarified the difference in the
school’s two main contracts. He explained, “I know with the management company we
have a management agreement. I know with the authorizer that we have a charter
contract.” He also expressed that board members are probably not aware of the contract
to the degree that they have a full understanding of its dynamics. He stated,
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Well I think first off, I think a lot of the board members aren’t really aware that
the contract governs the relationship. I just don’t think that they quite understand
it. I really don’t think they know what is required and what the management
company is supposed to do.
He subsequently mentioned another dynamic in terms of the disposition of the
management company and their feelings regarding the school. He said, “I think the
management company almost feels as though it is their school, if that makes sense, when
it’s not. It’s the PSA, it’s the Academy’s school.” He then elaborated on the disparity of
responses between the two management companies contracted with over the charter
school’s life cycle. He stated:
In terms of requests for records and information, if I back up with the previous
management company, then a simple phone call was all I needed to get that
information and it was provided. With the current management company, the
simplest of requests takes a series of emails and it’s carefully defined and filtered.
By the time you are done with that process, you are skeptical about what is the big
concern with it. There are times with communications where I will have to
reference paragraphs of the management agreement, which shouldn’t be
necessary. Lip service is given to full disclosure, but there isn’t full disclosure.
And again, because of [the] for-profit motive I am concerned that the email is
being written to me to be phoned into the authorizer, but it’s not really being
written to me. Like I’m just a third party to whatever posturing that the
management company is attempting to do.
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In terms of obtaining information on student performance, it was sometimes
difficult to obtain or receive a prompt response. Participant F said, “If asking for
background information or supporting information, it can be grudgingly provided.” He
continued to explain:
For example, I asked for student performance and achievement data and I was
told that I would have to get it from the building leader, the principal at the
school. I contacted the principal and then from there I was directed to the head of
the management company and then I was directed to the board liaison. I sent a
request to the board liaison that was delayed for quite some time. Finally, he sent
kind of an overview summary of it, but I never got the data. Never got it. And
again it’s important because if you try to set things from a board standpoint like a
budget or some governance you need to know what it is. I just wanted to actually
see the data. Just for my curiosity… I wanted to see it. I am embarrassed if you
ask me specific questions on student performance that I don’t know as much as I
should and that’s not right. Then the next set of data came out and I went through
the same thing and I never got the actual data.
He continues to discuss the challenges of getting data on school performance that
he feels should be readily accessible to board members. However, he further presents a
sense of resistance from the management company and said:
I have gotten summary reports and information on things they wanted to present. I
had found online where they had the different kinds of data and graphs that you
can get, so I made a specific request to get that but you’ve got to independently
search and study on your own or you won’t be educated going to the board. You
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won’t be fully advised going to the board meetings. It just doesn’t happen. I have
to reach out beyond the management company. I try to find other people in the
education field to advise me. I do have to reach out to find people to give me
objective information that I need as a board member. And I would have hoped
that I could turn to an authorizer and get that, but no…they don’t really want to
hear from me. They really don’t. I’m a bother or whatever. Their interaction is
strictly with the management company talking about student performance and this
and that.
Participant F went on to share other areas where information was difficult to
obtain, or where the board of directors did not have adequate information to address
school matters such as the budget and finances. He said, “We are not to touch budget
items. How do you have a board and govern as a board? We can’t even control the
budget? Why I say it’s a concern is because by the time we get budgets proposed and
amended budgets, they’re running deficits and that’s a concern to us; but we are not
empowered to deal with that.”
Factors that Contribute to Tension in Governance
When asked about what factors might contribute to tension in governance,
Participant F talked about board members getting up to speed and valuing the longevity
of experienced board members. He stated:
It creates tension in how to get a board member up to speed and some of it is just
experience. The longer you serve on the board, after you cycle through the first
year, you get a sense of all of the things that occur on an annual basis or on a

CONFLICTS	
  IN	
  THE	
  GOVERNANCE	
  OF	
  MICHIGAN	
  CHARTER	
  SCHOOLS	
  	
  

178	
  
	
  

school year basis and then as you go through a couple of times, 3 or 4 times, you
get more and more familiar with it.
Another source of tension mentioned is when the board is used as a scapegoat and
when staff is discouraged, if not permitted to approach the board with concerns. He said,
Another thing that contributes to the friction is that some management companies
block anybody from approaching the board or they’ll say, well we would like to
do this but the board won’t let you do this or the board won’t let you do that. I
mean so we are kind of scapegoated or kind of used.
He substantiated the previous concern by illustrating how staff (employees of the
for-profit management company) is advised to take their concerns to the human resources
department of the management company, and not to the board of directors. In the same
respect, if the management company wants to push their agenda, they may have the
employees come in full force to a board meeting. Participant F explained:
They were told: if you have comments or concerns you take it to HR, you do not
go to the board. There was one instance where there were letters and things
written and they came before us as the board…we didn’t take action because we
don’t get involved in personnel issues and so we just referred it back to the
management company. But after that it was made clear and communicated to the
staff that they were never to contact the board.
He took exception of the management company’s communication to the staff and stated
that:
We are a public entity. People have a statutory right to contact the board at any
time. There is a complaint procedure in place if they are not satisfied. Same for
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parents, well if they are not satisfied going through the channels with the
management company then they go in front of the board. If they aren’t satisfied
with that then they can go in front of the authorizer. There is a procedure that
people are supposed to go through. Things are not going necessarily through that
process … it’s another way that we can become out of touch with what is going
on at the school… the counteract is that under our policies we are required to have
one board member that is a parent and we are fortunate that we have two and they
are active … so they are enormously helpful to me as a board member to know
what is going on at the school. I cannot begin to tell you how important that is.
Without them, I would not have the parents’ information … it doesn’t mean that it
actually changes anything, but you want to know what are the concerns.
He says that the board would like to hear from staff to help provide a feel for what
they think and how things are going. However, that line of direct communication does not
exist and what the board hears is directly from the management company. Participant F
stated:
I have no interaction with the staff. I don’t know what they think so I’m relying
on the head of the management company and what they think about this, which
may or may not reflect what the teachers says or what the paraprofessionals or the
staff say. That’s the kind of friction that occurs because being a board member
means always receiving partial information. The more information I can get is so
valuable and it is so difficult to obtain.
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Accountability and Transparency
Participant F expressed feelings of frustration as a board president who has a
desire to communicate accurately and consistently with constituents and stakeholders.
Part of the lack of communication between the board of directors and the for-profit
private management company lends itself to issues regarding accountability and
transparency of public funds when contracting with management companies, or does he
believe that it is an issue? He said with heavy emphasis:
Well… I would like you to put this in caps: A public school academy is a nonprofit entity but in reality those funds are passed through to a for-profit entity…to
me that can’t be. You can’t do that. It makes a public school academy simply as a
shell for the for- profit company because the funds, operations and management
are turned over to a for-profit entity. I happen to think from a policy standpoint,
that’s wrong … the whole purpose of setting up a school as a non-profit entity is
for that purpose. It’s not a money-making entity. Profits are not to be derived
from it, but when those funds are passed onto a for-profit entity, we are doing just
that. If you take a step back and just think about it, it makes absolutely no sense to
do that. To have that framework in place...it’s unacceptable. I don’t think that
there, under any stretch of the imagination, there should be a non-profit entity
passing on its funds for its operation to a for-profit entity. I’m trying to think of
an example of where it’s done and it’s not just non-profit passing the funds onto a
for-profit. These are not only non-profit funds but these are government
funds…government funds should not be used.
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Participant F referred to concerns of legitimacy if all of a sudden, rules change
and these for-profit management companies simply switch over to non-profits. He said,
“My concern is you are used to years of running a for-profit organization to just come up
with a name and register it with the state as a non-profit entity raises questions in my
mind to the legitimacy and credibility of your representation that suddenly you are going
to switch and behave as a non-profit: that’s my concern.” He explained the rationale for
his concern as just a cosmetic alteration that will internally be the same as the for-profit
company. He said, “So what I am saying is that if we say all PSAs can only work with
the non-profits, you’ll be getting the same players handling the non-profits that were
handling the for-profits, and so that won’t work.” He concluded this section with a
comparison to traditional public schools and the imbalance of for-profit management
companies managing charter schools in the state of Michigan. He explained:
In terms of a traditional public school, it’s purely non-profit in its governance and
in its organization and a PSA should be the same way. So I don’t think we have
thought long and hard of it. Michigan is way out of whack with the percentages of
for-profit management companies. I did some research on it and I found that our
authorizer is representative of the state numbers in terms of being wildly disparate
between for-profit and non-profit management companies.
Contractual and Legislative Suggestions
The previous observations of Participant F led well into the next qualitative
question asking what could be done contractually or legislatively to improve governance
in the state of Michigan. He began with the contractual element of adding provisions to
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have the charter school’s leadership (superintendent/principal) report to the board of
directors. He said:
The first thing I would like … the critical component of the school is the
leader…the studies go all over the place. I read that its 60% (that the principal) is
the main factor of the success of the school…their leadership over time impacts
every aspect of the school. I would like the board to have more of a say…in some
schools it’s actually written into the management agreement. I would say the right
to refusal…that the building leader serves with the consent of the board. That if
the board is unsatisfied, it can dismiss the leader right there.
Participant F presented concerns that all staff reports to the management company
and this limits the ability of the board to receive direct and objective feedback. He voiced
his concerns by saying,
My concern is that the board, in implementing things; the board goes to the
management company or deals with the staff members. But the staff members,
principal, AP, everybody answers to the management company. They serve at the
will of the management company. You don’t get direct, accurate info from the
building leader because the building leader is saying what the management
company wants him or her to say. And so that’s a real concern.
Participant F continued to build on the contractual possibilities and moves to a
complimentary legislative action that would strengthen and further empower the board.
He said,
That’s a contractual one. You could write it into state law, obviously. For
example, state law says that you can terminate a school administrator with 30
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days’ notice, so the state law has spoken on it legislatively. I know we talked
about it, made mention of it, in a previous answer of taking the profit motive out
of it. I think that would be one.
He provided more suggestions in terms of having more non-profits manage the
charter schools and simplifying the accounting budget codes to be more “user-friendly.”
He said,
Yes. Yes, and making it truly be non-profit, top to bottom. I thought of another
one to say. I am concerned about the budget codes... they are confusing. From a
budget standpoint, a CPA can understand it. Given the way the categories are
grouped and that, the information is not given in a practical way.
He provided an example from the banking industry and how they made
information easier to understand to the novice borrowers and consumers. He stated:
In a lending context, the CPV restructured the good faith estimate of closing costs
to make it understandable to a layperson. I think there needs to be that type of
thing when it comes to the school accounting ...categories are too long, its
confusingly presented, both on the income and the expenses, but they need to take
a step back and say you know what we’re not doing is setting up these codes for
CPAs…we’re setting them up for lay people and the general public to understand
how the funds were spent, where they are going to, like that…we don’t have that.
He continued his concerns by revisiting the profit motive and how the funds may
not get to those closest to the student, but goes to top management. He expressed:
Another concern I have, in getting back to the for-profit motive, at the end of the
day, the money is being given to the senior management and it’s not being given
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to the people delivering instruction … it’s not being given to improve
expenditures or instructional materials, books and things like that that actually
benefits the students or the improvement of the facilities and things of that nature.
So I think if we move the profit motive out [of] there and the profit component,
we can put greater power into improving instruction.
He is basically saying that provisions are needed to help boards better understand
financial documents and budgets reports and that would greatly assist with board
governance. It would also impact transparency with boards being in a position to better
scrutinize reports, ask questions, and better prepare for board meetings. He stated:
These are the major things, so absolutely financial transparency in terms of how
that information is presented and that answer ties into the question you asked
about the board members getting up to speed. If the financial information were
there, in a way that was readily understandable, that would go a long way to
assisting board members and others doing it.
The other element of the report that is mentioned is the reporting of student data
on performance. It is often presented in a way that is not fully understood by board
members. He exclaimed:
I would say this; another one would be reporting student performance data. It’s
not always so clear; I understand what a standard deviation is but I have no idea
what a standard deviation means in terms of the testing.
He felt that the board of directors is limited with resources to navigate the
complexities of financial and budget reports. He explained:
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So I don’t think that’s done and what we do, and here is where the problem comes
in, so what do we do as a board member? Well… If we don’t understand the
financials, we get an opportunity to ask whom: the management company? And
they are the ones making it clear for us. That’s a problem. That’s a real problem.
Or, I want to understand student performance data, so who do I go to? And the
problem is the information is filtered, it is put in such a way. I’m not faulting
management companies; that’s what they are going to do. They are going to make
themselves look good.
Participant F went on to recommend hiring external companies to assess the
budget and assess the educational components inclusive of an explanation of the
academic metrics. He recommended that there would be third-party advisors that would
come in and perform operational and academic assessments. He stated,
So I’m hearing it directly from a third party rather than hearing it from a
management company. And I think we could do the same thing for student
performance. If I had my way, I would think that boards should be encouraged to
get independent assessments.”
He gave the example of having an independent auditor for finances; this would
be an independent auditor for academic metrics and they would not only assess what is
done but what should be done; because even a financial audit only matches expenses to
planned expenditures; it doesn’t tell you how to strategically allocate resources. He
stated,
For example, they make sure that expenditures match up with the budget, but they
don’t address the wisdom of are the monies being spent properly. Auditors don’t
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tell us that. Auditors are not a benefit to us in that sense they may identify if
money is misappropriated, but it doesn’t tell us what we are doing.
Participant F shared that even after being a board president for nearly two decades
that he is still uncomfortable with the schools’ finances. He stated:
I am not comfortable with our finances. And I sit here as a board member up to 19
years and I’m not comfortable. Not saying that money is being pocketed, I’m not
accusing anybody of that, but I would like to know specifically are these
expenditures reasonable. Are salaries in line with what they should be? I need to
know these things: are we being charged for things that under the management
agreement should belong to the management company? There are independent
professionals out there that can advise us on these questions and that would really
improve our comfort level as a board and mine as a board member, and I’m sure
others as well.
Participant F discussed what he believed are the priorities of management
companies based on his experience of contracting with the two that comprehensively
managed their charter school. He said, “The priority of a management company is,
obviously, to preserve the contract. Period. They like student performance. They like
numbers because that’s what someone may look at. It’s a good selling point to get more
contracts: keep and maintain the contracts.” He subsequently indicated that management
companies’ focus on making sure they keep a solid relationship with the authorizer. He
said the following:
They’re very, very careful before anything else to serve the authorizer. They want
a strong relationship with the authorizer. I know full well, if anything, whether it’s
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timely preparing the board minutes and the agenda, they’re doing so to meet the
compliance standard or timeline of the authorizer. From top to bottom, their focus
is on keeping the contract, [and] satisfying the authorizer. That is quite clear.
He also expressed a belief that when authorizers are supportive of boards, it better
positions the board to manage the contract with the for-profit management company. He
said,
If you have the authorizer that is supportive of the board, then you may see the
management company be concerned with serving the board, but otherwise they
are not now. That’s our passion as board members. It never gets far beyond it.
That’s what we want to see, so I get excited when the student performance is
strong.
Participant F articulated his perspective of how the board of directors affects
student performance. He stated,
I think the best thing we can do at the end of the day is to ensure that we as a
board have selected the very best whether it’s a management company, CPA,
board counsel, custodial services, you name it. That we select the best, the best
professionals to assist us.
He substantiated this position with acknowledging that a professional board
should be able to make solid choices. He said:
We as a board, if we have a professional background: We should be able to
identify them. We have to do our homework and make sure that we have the best
people in place. If they are not performing up to par, then make that switch.
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Where my frustration comes in is where I see a weakness here or there and not
being empowered to make that academic change.
Conflicts in Board and Subcontract Relationship
He then shifted to the board’s ability to assess contracts and how difficult it is to
sometimes obtain information about vendors. He also felt that his hands are tied, as
noted:
I would like a list of contractors and see what the compensation is, what the term
is, where they are located, and have that and have it presented to the board. We
should have it on an instant; these are the people that we contract and deal with
and then as we decide to renew these contracts or put a bid out and get the best
rates we need to do that on a regular basis. I have board members I know don’t
know all of the contracts and things that we have.
He continued his discussion on contracts and how vendors have the impression
that they are contracted with the management company. The example he used was the
contract between the board and the food service provider. He stated that the previous
management company said on several occasions, “Those are our contracts.” Participant F
responded that the contracts are with the board of directors. He explained that vendors
have a tendency to erroneously function as if their contract is with the management
company. He said, “They contract with us, but they tend to see it as the management
company. That they are actually contracting with the management company and that’s
just not accurate.” He goes on to talk about the perception of the board and how board
members may not fully understand:

CONFLICTS	
  IN	
  THE	
  GOVERNANCE	
  OF	
  MICHIGAN	
  CHARTER	
  SCHOOLS	
  	
  

189	
  
	
  

But there’s that perception that we are hands-off and in a lot of respects we are,
but I don’t think the board realizes that those are our contracts. Those checks are
coming from the board [and] they aren’t coming from the management company.
But you know… But are we getting the best people at the best rate? I think we
could do a lot better and this is where the incentive comes in. The management
company is not bearing those costs directly.
Agent- to-Client Contractual Relationship
In the discussions of contracts, Participant F provided a perspective of the
relationship between the board and the management company and if it is seen as a client
to vendor relationship. He replied, “Yes and no. Yes, it is clear in my mind ‘who’ works
for who. It’s also clear in my mind ‘who’ works for who. The management company
should be working for the board. I mean we are parties to a contract.” He does indicate
that it is difficult to manage at times given the management company’s attention to the
authorizer. He feels the management company may do what it wants to do unless it falls
out of favor with the authorizer. He says, “Until they are dissatisfied with the
management company, or feel there are some deficiencies with the management
company; it doesn’t come from us. There’s lip service to that the management company
does what it wants because it only answers to the authorizer.”
He indicated that he chooses his battles and that the main purpose is to focus on
student performance. He said, “The greater purpose is the welfare of our students and the
performance of our students. That’s the bottom line. If that means sacrificing something
that I feel I have the right to in the contract, absolutely, it’s about the students.” He stated
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as a final perspective a concern with being viewed as a rubber stamp and not truly
empowered as a board. He concluded,
All you have to do is slap us down on a couple of budget items and at some point
we are like ok fine you don’t want us to do anything, so what do we do: rubber
stamp what the management company gives us; you can get anybody to rubber
stamp it if that’s what you want.
Summary and Analysis of Results
Participant F’s interview responses brought out some common areas of discussion
for analysis based on the likelihood of these areas being the source of role confusion and
potential conflict. He mentioned concerns that the board often feels disempowered
(rubber stamp) to make decisions, and that the management company only honors the
board of directors if the authorizer makes it clear that the board is empowered to govern.
He uniquely voiced concerns regarding how tax dollars are handled and articulated his
concerns that such funds morph from a public taxpayers source to a private destination
often without an ability to be tracked and not required to be disclosed. Participant F
articulated fundamental issues regarding the contract and how it governs the relationship
between the board of directors and the for-profit private management company.
Significant descriptors emerged from Participant F’s interview as listed in Table 9.
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Table 9
Identification of Descriptors from Participant F’s Interview Transcript
__________________________________________________________________
! Shared responsibility for hiring key leadership
! Profit motive very high implications
! Board training on roles and responsibilities
training on contract
! Public funds issue
channeled through a non-profit to a for-profit
disempowered
! Rubber stamp
! Transparency and full disclosure
! Board ultimately responsible
! Community oriented/volunteerism
! Value of charter school is ability to respond
! Transparency and accountability of financial resources
! Support of authorizer is significant
! Management company is responsible for day-to-day

Significant descriptors emerged from the qualitative data from Participant F as
seen in Table 9. He shared approximately 19 years of experiences that helped to develop
his perspective on leadership and governance. The highlights of his experiences included
shared responsibility for key leadership roles, profit motive, board training on roles and
responsibilities with an emphasis on the contract, and public funds going to for-profit
entities. He also mentioned highlights regarding the mindset of being a volunteer:
transparency and full disclosure, and disempowerment expressed in terms of feeling like
a rubber stamp.
Participant F’s experience emphasized the importance of the contract and that
board members should focus their attention to understanding the contract between the
board of directors and the for-profit management company. The understanding of the
contract would eliminate who has the ultimate authority and that the management
company is a contractor and not the main party. He believed the contract should be
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revised to include board input into key leadership roles and that the board should have the
right to revoke any key positions that are not meeting expectations.
He strongly emphasized the profit motive and how powerful it is for the
management company. He indicated that they would do anything to maintain the contract
and also keep the authorizer content. Transparency and full disclosure are of concern
because he believed it would depend on who is the management company liaison that
works with the board of directors. He also described experiences of feeling like a rubber
stamp in that the board was expected to simply agree with the agenda of the management
company. He indicated sometimes experiencing the feeling of being an outsider when the
management company communicated with the authorizer.
Other descriptors resonated and are significant to the disposition of Participant F’s
overall experiences, which shaped his perspective on governance and leadership in
Michigan charter schools when contracting with for-profit private management
companies. Other descriptors included the board is ultimately responsible, the value of a
charter system is the ability to move quickly, and how support from the authorizer is
essential if the board is to be respected.
Participant F’s rationale for being on a board is based on volunteerism and
community service. He wanted to make a difference and provide opportunities for urban
city children. He felt that the charter movement is not of value unless the performance
metrics exceed that of traditional public schools.
The qualitative data from the interview of Participant F indicated potential areas
for conflicts given the confusion of responsibilities and the contractual agreement
between the board of directors and the for-profit private management company. Multiple
descriptors emerged from the qualitative data from Participant F as illustrated in Table 9.
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He conveyed 19 years of board experience in the role of the president. These descriptors
illustrated his board experiences and perceptions inclusive of shared responsibility for
hiring key leadership, profit motive and implications, board training (especially on the
contract), public funds issues, feeling like a rubber stamp (disempowerment),
transparency (full disclosure) and accountability, and the board is ultimately responsible.
These descriptors, separately and collectively, contributes to confusion, which results in
potential conflicts between the board of directors and the for-profit private management
company.
The first descriptor that emerged from Participant F’s interview is the issue of
having shared responsibility for hiring key leadership positions in the charter school. The
board realized after the fact that they did not have any input into the hiring practices. In
retrospect, they would have placed a clause that indicated they have input and the right to
refute any placements. Both positions are contrary to the current practices of the
management company, which advocates for comprehensive management responsibilities
inclusive of sole responsibility for staffing. The potential for conflict increases with such
circumstances given the critical role of school leadership and the implications of
reporting to the management company, reporting to the board of directors, or reporting to
a confusing version of both. The current contract is not inclusive of a formal clause that
gives the board input into the hiring of administrative roles.
The second descriptor that emerged from Participant F’s interview is the
perception that the profit motive of the management company is very strong and has farreaching implications that affects every aspect of the operations of the charter school. The
board of directors is driven by the premise of volunteerism, while the board president
feels that the management company is driven by profit, and as he stated, “[the
management company] will do anything to keep the contract.” He also gave indication
that the contract is stacked against board members and that they should receive training
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specifically on the dynamics of the contract to better understands the expectations of their
roles.
The third descriptor emerged from the need for the board to receive training on
the contract. It appears to be a missed opportunity because of the length of the contract
and the assumption that every management agreement must parallel the length of the
charter, which may be as long as seven years depending on the criteria of their authorizer.
Conflict is inherent in circumstances where board members do not understand the
expectations of both the management company and the governance roles of the board of
directors.
The fourth descriptor entails the issue of public funds as they come in sourced
from public tax dollars with high priorities of transparency and accountability, but later
morphs into the private accounts of the for-profit private management companies where it
becomes void of access, scrutiny, transparency, and accountability. This transformation
of managing funds is prime for potential conflicts given the accountability of the board of
directors and their role as fiduciary stewards of public funds and resources. Conflicts also
arise from the inability of funds to be tracked once they arrive in the possession of the
for-profit management company.
The fifth descriptor is the feeling that the board is disempowered and becomes a
rubber stamp for the will and agenda of the for-profit private management company. This
matter fosters confusion because it is contrary to how board members are recruited and
appointed by authorizers in the state of Michigan. They are presented with a role of
respect, ownership, and authority as volunteer citizens; ready to accept the reigns of
stewardship for responsibility of assets, resources, and funds; not to mention the ability to
impact communities, families, and children. Situations where volunteers feel they are a
rubber stamp creates a feeling of confusion and resulting in potential conflicts impacting
governance.
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The sixth descriptor is transparency, full disclosure, and accountability.
Participant F presented many situations where they were unable to receive answers to
questions regarding the allocation of resources, the tracking of funds, and no urgency to
respond to questions regarding student performance. Most of the matters, if not all, of
charter school academies are subject to public meetings and also accessible by decree of
the freedom of information act. When a board cannot readily obtain responses from its
management company, this creates confusion and generates conflicts between them given
the board requirements to govern, which is predicated on receiving data and information
as needed and when requested. This matter also sets up conflicts in terms of what
recourse boards have when such circumstances are present.
The final descriptor is the common perception that the board of directors is
responsible for all aspects of the operations of the school, which is accurate before a
contract is signed for full-services to manage the operations. Once full-service agreement
contracts are signed, the board’s breadth and scope of authority and responsibility is
drastically reduced and commensurately shifted to the full-service, for-profit private
management company. The contract makes such provisions legal and provides little to no
recourse to the boards of directors. The potential for confusion grows, which leads to
great potential for conflicts in these circumstances because the boards’ power becomes
spurious and their ability to influence the operations of the school reduced.
Participant F’s experience emphasized the importance of the contract and that
board members should channel their energy to understanding the contract. The
understanding of the contract mitigates questions of who has the authority and
responsibility for the charter school and that the management company is a contractor
and not the owner of the charter school.
Interview Participant G
Background and Rationale for Being a Charter School Board Member
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Participant G is a white male in his sixties with a college degree. He is an
entrepreneur working in the horticulture industry. He is currently the vice president of the
charter school’s board of directors. He stated that he has been on the board for more than
12 years and has served every board role possible except for board president. He said,
I am vice president only because I wanted to be in the position to ask questions
rather than be a facilitator and ask for motions and stuff. I would rather be in a
different position where I can have more flexibility, whereas I think a president is
more of a figurehead.
He has held numerous positions on the board such as, board director, general
board member, treasurer, and vice president. All of the roles he has served in have helped
him to build board knowledge and capacity regarding governance. He said, “I have pretty
much enjoyed all of them. I mean you still have your voting privileges and stuff in every
role. You are a part of the decision-making process. I enjoyed them all. I think the vice
president has a little more flexibility than some of the other ones.” His primary reason for
joining a charter school board included a desire to help children and make a difference in
the community. He said:
The primary reason [I like charter schools] was I think the way it was run. Being
involved with the educational system, I have seen a lot of complaints with
teachers through the years and I like the concept of the charter schools being more
of a business operation. There is a lot more accountability to be held. There’s no
running for elections for board members. There is no way to be bribed or coerce
the decision-making process. And I like the concept of how the teachers were
evaluated and the students with a lot of accountability. It was run in the confines
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of a business compared to public schools. I felt that was a better avenue for the
future of the next generation of people to run the country.
Participant G has been affiliated with the charter school board since its inception.
He took a leave of absence for four years for an out of state job opportunity. Upon his
return, he continued his role as a board member.
Participant G made it clear that a trusting relationship has developed between the
management company and the board of directors. One area that was questionable is the
dynamics around selecting top school leadership. The following was in response to
asking if there were situations where the board of directors had concerns or questioned
their management company’s decisions. He said:
Sometimes, and some things that had to be worked out if we had questions in
regards to a principal leaving. As a board, I think we had questions as to why they
left. A new teacher, I should say new principal, was appointed and the board had
very little say so and then we suddenly had another. Basically, we as a board had
questions as to why the change [had occurred]. It affects the board because we are
in there day-in and day-out and we have to work with him. We see the teachers,
we see the students, basically everything on a daily basis. So we felt as a board we
should be included in that process; not that we wanted to hire them ourselves; but
we should know more about their background, what their specialty was, their
concerns, and what their vision is for the future of our students.
After the board approached the management company with their concerns,
changes were made to include the board in the screening process and allow them to
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question and address the appointment of top school leadership before they were offered
employment. Participant G explained:
And now we get invited to more or less a meet and greet where we meet the
potential candidate they plan on hiring. We ask questions of them, and it is not
monitored necessarily by the management company. So of our own freewill, we
can ask whatever questions we want of the principal and the management
company. I think that process is really good and we got no roadblocks when we
requested that. But in the past, we got no say-so, as a governing board. We had no
say-so; the management company made all of the decisions on hiring and firing; it
affected us as a board. So now we have more say-so on the hiring and firing than
we had before.
The board required and negotiated a position of strength that allowed them to
impact one of the primary positions of charter schools. This gave them the opportunity to
better understand the disposition of the people that will lead and respond to the concerns
and governance of the board of directors.
Contractual Relationship
The second qualitative interview question asked for a description of the
contractual relationship between the board of directors and the management company.
Participant G said that everything is in writing and they have an open relationship. He
articulated:
Again everything is in writing. I mean as far as the contract with the management
company. And it is an open relationship. Where we have questions, they will
explain things to us. The management company is forthcoming with any questions
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we may have. And they seem to be able to address all of our questions and
concerns. And so I do not have any problem with the management company.
Participant G reiterated the importance of trust and the basis of the relationship
between the board and the management company. He explained how the management
company responded to inquiries and honored the parameters of the contract. He
explained:
It is a very open relationship and that is something that is needed. I would say
contract-wise, anything we ask for is provided to us. If we get into a shady or gray
area, our attorney advises us. Sometimes even the attorney has a different view
than we have. But again, as a board we make that decision. They have been very
good as far as the contract and following it. We know what is expected of us and
how to function.
When asked to elaborate and describe the term “open relationship,” Participant G
said, “No matter whom you want to speak to. For example, if we have a financial
question, it is not we will get back with you within two to three weeks or to their
convenience. If you have a question, it is handled almost immediately.” He elaborated by
providing an example and more definition of the term “open relationship” with the
following:
I have yet, since working with my management company, had yet to not get an
answer, and if someone was out of town or in a meeting they would get someone
through our board liaison who would get us answers to what we were looking for.
So by open I mean there’s no hesitation, no delay. Whatever you ask, even
something that would be offensive to the management company, they have never
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withheld information. We have always gotten factual information, and have
gotten it backed up with documentation and so I think that is a big plus working
with a management company.
In transition to deeper questions regarding the contract and the board’s
understanding of the contractual relationship, Participant G responded, “I would say yes.
I would say yes because again, through our authorizer, through our management
company, through our legal representation, we have meetings or part of the meeting set
aside so that we are brought through different things step-by-step.” In conclusion to the
questions regarding the contract and asked if he would like to see any contractual
revisions, he said,
No not at this time. If something was handled inappropriately or there were gray
areas that came up, most definitely then. Like I said, everything that may be a
potential problem is handled on a timely basis and it is generally to the
satisfaction of everyone involved.
Factors Contributing to Tension in Governance
In terms of what factors contribute to tension in governance, Participant G feels
there is not any tension beyond the previously mentioned issue with the selection of
school leadership, which was eventually resolved. He says that when problems occur they
are immediately addressed with the management company. He explained:
I am trying to think of an example where there is tension of governance…I don’t
feel there is any tension because I think anything that has come up is always
resolved; nothing lingered, and it is resolved by the entire board; not just one
person. And I can’t really think of any tension. Like I said, the only one that came
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up was the fact of hiring the principal. There was a little bit of tension there
because we felt that we should be more involved but again that was rectified and
it was agreed, and now that is part of our operating procedure.
Participant G provided more examples of what may have caused tension. He
returned to the one example of the management company hiring a principal without their
input. They felt totally out of the process and used the term “disempowered” as follows:
Well, by tension, you sometimes as a board member get the impression they want
more than just a warm body, so they put their principal in as a figurehead to run
things. As a board, we are the ones that have to work with him: we are the ones
that have to make that we as a governing board are making sure they follow
procedures and the outline that has been given to us by the management company
and the authorizer. So back to the tension part, by the [management company] just
putting someone in we felt we were disempowered because we did not have the
opportunity to learn more about this person they were putting in. This is a part of
our leadership team and we need to know more about that person that we are
working with; so that raised a little bit of tension…we were not happy with it, we
felt that we were not in the loop or part of the team; so with that being resolved
with the new system now the tensions have been reduced.
Participant G recalled the point of having input into the selection of school
leadership. Roles other than top leadership are solely the call of the management
company. He believed the principal should be totally empowered to make all the staff
decisions. This kept the board focused on governance, and the management company on
operations. He explained:
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Pretty much the principal because again the principal, she’s in charge of the
teachers, building, and everything else, so we don’t disempower her. We are only
there as a governing board: a monitor. If there is a teacher, and the management
company or authorizer feels a teacher is not doing their job properly, that is up to
them to resolve it. It has nothing to do with us other than a governing board; we
make sure that the processes are done according to the contract set up.
When asked how long it took for the management company to respond, he said:
Almost immediately, the tension came up. It rose, of course, the more we talked
about it the more agitated the board was with our liaison and the management
company. And again when the situation arose and we had to have a new principal,
we were given like a bio on him so we had some background on that person
before we met him and then we had a meet and greet at a local restaurant. So
with the management company, it was not really delayed or dragged out. If we
had any concerns, it was addressed and the compromise was brought into play.
The Importance of Empowerment in Governance
Participant G provided more feedback regarding the management company’s
responsiveness and the importance of working together as a group. His board was
emphatic about their empowerment and ownership of governance. An example was when
the authorizer imposed a board member on their team. The subject board took issue and
conferenced with the authorizer to make sure that the board determined who is brought
on as a candidate and eventual board member. Participant G stated:
Our school liaison told us that we needed a board member and of course everyone
is always looking for one: teachers, staff, everybody else. We try to keep a well-
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mixed board. We try to keep someone that has a business background, someone
that has an education background; someone that is a parent or has a student in the
school… is a parent or grandparent so that we can see more ideas to solutions.
When the board liaison came on, he found a board member somewhere and
somehow and told us this is who we were going to have. And I kind of resented
that because we were getting a board member that we knew nothing about. We
felt they were being put into place because of a time constraint. And you have to
have so many board members so this is who we are going to give you. And I think
we resented that as a board, because again as a board we look for certain qualities
and somebody that has a commitment to the education of the kids and stuff. He is
going to see the education system as we as a group see it and realize that we are
there to govern not to dictate policy but to evaluate the circumstances. So when
the authorizer appointed this particular person, I would say that him and I had
somewhat of an escalated conversation. But it was more to clear the point of
view…anyhow the board member, he felt, as the authorizer this is who he felt we
needed and as a board member we felt we should have the option to review this
person as a member of our team, not his team.
Participant G and his board members wanted to have a voice in all decisions
impacting governance; the leadership of the school and candidates for the board of
directors are two examples where they felt their input was imperative. While demanding
empowerment, they maintained respect for the functions of operations and oversight. An
example below included working with the management company and the authorizer:
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The management company obviously does the hiring and firing, so that’s their
decision. But again back to the board. As a governing board, we are seeing the
total picture so we always ask to be in the loop so if someone is going to be fired
or something like this is going down. We should question this …it’s our team
leader of our building. The person in charge of our school may have a different
change of heart or venue and things are not for the best of the students, then we
may even bring it to the management company and question… this or that. Again,
if everybody is in the same loop and feels the job is not getting done, and like any
other job, that is the whole concept of the charter school. It is simply like a job, if
you cannot do the job to the best of your ability and show accountability that you
are doing it, than you need to be replaced.
Participant G referred to the board’s philosophy by which it governed as “whatever
is best for the students,” determines what decisions are made. He made it clear that it is
all about the students and not the management company. He stated:
I think as a whole it is the board. I can speak for the rest of them, that it is like a
guideline or parameter we use [for] teachers, curriculum, [and the] Management.
A lot of things go on between the management company and the authorizer: the
state rules, regulations, and stuff and I think it is real important the board can look
at all of those things collectively and be able to be involved with them because all
of those decisions are going to [sic.] impact the students. When you come back to
it, what are we talking about here; we are talking about a school; what does a
school do; it educates the mind of the young children so we are looking for the
best education and what is best for the student, not what is best for the
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management company, not what is best for the authorizer, it is what is best for the
student in the long range. So if the authorizer says we need to do this, or if the
management company says we need to do that, we have to take a look at it and go
back to those golden parameters: how does this decision affect the future of our
students? And if we don’t feel that it is in a positive way, we can change it.
Accountability and Transparency
The fourth question asked Participant G if he believed that accountability and
transparency of public funds might have changed when contracting with a for-profit
management company or if there was an issue. He responded by basically saying that
accountability improved with a management company. In addition, transparency
improved given the processes required for procurement. He stated the following:
I think the accountability is better with the management company. Again,
because with the movement of the charter schools there are a lot of eyes on what
is going on and with the accounting staff and with what is required from the state,
auditors, and everything else. I feel more confident about the charter system than I
do the public schools in regards to accountability. I think the transparency is more
open with the for-profit companies than with the public school system, I feel
much more relaxed with the ability of the management company than I do with
the public schools.
There appears to be a strong comfort with transparency and accountability that is
tied to the level of trust in the relationship compounded with the routine reports at board
meetings and procedures and systems tied to annual audits. He stated, “Financial-wise,
we see the report at our meetings and we also obviously see the auditor’s report so the
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transparency and openness is there for us.” He fortified the board’s disposition with the
following statement:
Because of the reports that we receive at every meeting; because of the audit
reports from a reputable audit firm; everything is in writing, and decisions are
made on money pending, money being used. There is a paper trail; the paper trail
is so obvious that you don’t need an accountant to follow it. I mean you can
follow the agenda on what was approved, what was spent and the balances…so I
think the transparency is very good. I would not question it at all.
Contractual and Legislative Suggestions
When asked about what could be done contractually or legislatively, to improve
leadership and governance in Michigan charter schools, Participant G said that it is still
early in the evolution of charter schools and that they were initially not looked upon
favorably. He explained:
I don’t know anything off the top of my head that could be done. It is almost a
retro situation that something has to happen first. For example, the concept of the
charter schools was not looked at favorably. And then as they became more
involved, they started to, for example, remove the caps on the charter schools so
they got more recognition. And as far as legislatively, I said there are ways, it is a
situation where time is going to tell the answers. I think as the movement toward
the charter schools continues, I think those things will have to be addressed as
they arise. And at this point, I can say everything that has been going on, as far as
the cap being removed, we are progressing ahead. You have to be subject to
change, and I think some of the teachers get complacent with the way things have
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always been done. But the way things were always done may fit that era. With
technology and the way the world has changed, it has people who are going to
oversee the next generation of these kids. You have to make those changes to
keep up with the world the way it is.
Participant G believed that it is still too early to place judgment on charter schools.
He does believe that they are progressing constructively and will be the wave of the
future and eventually impact, if not replace, the functions of traditional public schools.
He stated the following:
So I can’t pinpoint anything, there is no golden rule of what needs to be
done…the evolution of the charter schools if it continues to progress, if things
continue the way I have been seeing it, I think that will be a thing of the future.
Public schools will be non-existent…they are set up more efficiently: The
planning that goes into it, the class, the layout, the curriculum, the evaluating the
teachers, the students. I think in the future, it will be the whole concept. All public
schools are either going to adapt to the way charter schools are run for profit and
for education or they are going to fall by the wayside.
Participant G is committed to the charter school model and believed that every
aspect of the charter school model is more proficient than traditional public schools. His
focus was primarily on the students and the effect of governance on performance and
stability. He emphatically stated the following:
Well if I may be blunt, as far as our interview this morning, the questions are
revolved around governance and leadership, transparency and again the focus
seems to be on the charter schools themselves; where again my focus is on the
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kids. I think if you had been asking me more from the kid’s aspect on the kids:
what is good for the kids, what is the future for the kids; I am not much of a
politician, I let the management company work out those problems. In a
governing position, I am more concerned with how it affects our students and
their education; I don’t want to dictate policy. They are the ones that have all of
the data and the research. But I enjoy seeing that data: looking to see if the grades
improve and seeing the attendance records. The end result of all this work and
effort comes down to the students, so that is what I am focused on: not unless they
do something outwardly stupid and it is proven that way…All the decisions, if the
focus is on the students; that’s the end result, that is the report card...that is the
part I watch, the students and the grades.
In terms of Participant G’s final responses to if governance can be affected
through the contract or legislatively; he defied the negative propaganda that highlights the
ills of charter schools. He did not generally believe that charters are all bad. On the
contrary, he felt there is a lot of value when charters are compared to public schools. He
stated:
Probably again, the propaganda when the charter school first started. Being a
board member for so long, you know it was money grabbing. It was companies
out there to make money…education was not a factor...it seems as though the
charter schools were being getting beat up from all sides...from the standpoint of
governance, the other school systems, the public school and everybody seemed to
be dead set against charter schools. I think the perseverance and staying with the
plans and following through on it and now with the changes. And I have been
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involved over the years; I think they are seeing a lot of value in the charter
schools versus the public schools.
In conclusion, Participant G reinforced the student-focused philosophy. He spoke
of some of the entities and rhetoric against charter schools. He provided a very positive
construct in terms of what the future holds for charter schools and the positive impact
they may have on public education.

Summary and Analysis of Results
Participant G’s experience as a board member appears to encompass a positive
perception of the contractual relationship with the for-profit private management
company. The board of directors appeared to have a constructive relationship that is
guided by trust and an understanding of the contract and the roles of both parties. Some
areas did provide areas for potential confusion and resulting conflicts in governance. The
primary sources are related to the hiring of leadership roles, which the board has required
input based on previous issues where they had no input into the hiring of principals. The
other sources include the potential for conflicts in the monitoring of day-to-day activities
where the board is involved. It also includes the placement of board candidates, which
Participant G and his board vociferously supports only the members having the final say
given it is their team and they have to work with them directly.
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Table 10
Identification of Descriptors from Participant G’s Interview Transcript
_____________________________________________________________________
! Shared responsibility for hiring key leadership
! Community oriented/volunteerism
! Transparency

student advocacy

trust/open relationship

! Full-service management company is a plus
! Conscious mix of board/professionalism
! Accountability of finances

related to student performance

! Board recommendations for board candidates
! Charter schools’ ability to give feedback on teacher evaluations
! Charter school’s impact on family
! Charter school’s displacement of traditional public schools
! Management company is responsible for day-to-day

Significant descriptors emerged from the qualitative data from Participant G as
illustrated in Table 10. He expressed appreciation for how charters operate in terms of
functioning like a business. The highlights of his experiences included shared
responsibility for hiring key leadership, transparency and full disclosure (open
relationships and trust), full-service management is viewed as a positive, board
recommendations for board candidates and volunteerism/community oriented (student
advocacy).
Participant G’s experiences included the board’s participation in the selection of
key leadership positions at the school. The board expects to meet, interview, and question
all candidates for school leadership. They also demanded to recruit any and all board
candidates. His board felt they should have a say in any decision that impacted their
leadership and governance.
He indicated how the positive interactions, over time, have developed into an
open relationship between the board of directors and the management company. The
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relationship has fostered a level of trust that has permeated the interactions between the
two parties. This mutual respect enabled the board to work in confidence that the
management company will respond in good faith.
Participant G has served in all board positions except for president, which he
viewed as a figurehead. His experiences in the roles of a general member, treasurer, and
vice president have equipped him with a strong understanding of board roles and
responsibilities. His primary rationale for becoming a board member was to serve his
community and help children to achieve.
The qualitative data from the interview of Participant G indicated potential areas
for conflicts given the confusion of responsibilities between the board of directors and the
for-profit private management company. Two of the multiple descriptors that emerged
from the qualitative data from Participant G have potential for conflict as illustrated in
Table 10. The other descriptors represent a more constructive relationship between the
two parties that appeared to function positively based on his twelve years of experience.
His shared experiences conveyed perspectives inclusive of; issues of hiring key
leadership and having board members sourced by any means void of the board of
directors given they are the ones that must work with new members. The other
descriptors provided insight to the relationship that is effectively working on the grounds
of trust and mutual respect. These descriptors included trust through an open relationship;
and the ability of the management company to provide value-added educational services.
The first descriptor from the interview with Participant G emerged as the ability
of the board to have input into the hiring process. This situation, although seemingly
positive, has great potential for confusion and conflicts. The board has been granted
access to meet the school leadership as chosen by the management company. This gives a
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sense of having their input valued; however, contractually the boards of directors have no
recourse when it comes to selecting the school’s leadership. The management company is
wise in making provisions for the board of directors to have an informal forum in which
to ask questions and discuss the school leader’s philosophies, vision, and experience.
However, again, this is permitted outside the boundaries of the contractual agreement.
The second descriptor that emerged from Participant G is who has the authority
for recommending board candidates. The board took offense to having external sources
provide candidates for the board of directors’ positions given the sensitivity that it is the
members that have to work with the possible appointee. This is problematic and has
potential for confusion and conflict given the multiple sources from which board
candidates are derived. Circumstances where the management company may recommend
a board or board members must come under heavy scrutiny given the need to keep
relationships authentic and void of hidden agendas, favoritism, and subjectivity.
The third descriptor from Participant G is the feeling of having a constructive
open relationship between the board of directors and the for-profit private management
company. He mentioned the importance of having a professional management company
equipped with the ability to prudently manage the business operations of the charter
school. He mentioned their ability to obtain information swiftly and effectively in order
for the board to address issues that improve their governance abilities. Openness is a
positive for any relationship; trust and disclosure allows cooperation so that the school
may prosper.
The final descriptor is related to the management of the day-to-day operations of
the charter school. The board seems to have a hand in the daily operations from a positive
perspective in dealing with teachers, students, families, and the community. Even though
the circumstances that Participant H conveyed in his interview are positive; it is an area
of potential confusion and conflicts given the board’s participation in daily operations
beyond the boundaries of governance.
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Emerging Themes from Qualitative Data
Analysis of the qualitative research provided an opportunity to explore the stories
of experienced board members based on their individual interviews. The verbal
interviews were typed into transcripts, which allowed the researcher to find meaning
from the responses of the seven board member participants. The review of the individual
transcripts enabled the researcher to codify data in a manner to reveal descriptors that
were reoccurring from the interviews. Each board member expressed unique perspectives
based on their board experiences, which illustrated what they believe regarding
governance in their charter schools when contracting with full-service for-profit private
management companies.
The areas of importance based on repetition within individual interviews emerged
as descriptors. Once all transcripts were analyzed, the descriptors were identified so
comparisons could be made to find the common ground from the collective interview
transcripts. What follows is a thematic analysis based on codifying the qualitative data so
themes may emerge from the discovery of similarities and consistencies in the data of the
interview participants.
The themes captured the meaning of what the interview participants expressed in
their respective comments. A summary of themes that emerged collectively from the
interview participants were based on the frequency or repetition of the key words,
phrases, and descriptions in the interviews, are provided in Figure 18. These nine themes
emerged based on the frequency of the descriptors mentioned in the qualitative interviews
and the topic’s relevance as expressed in the participants’ verbal responses.
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Transparency and full
disclosure
26
The profit motive

Emerging Themes from Codifying
Qualitative Data

16

Feeling like a rubber stamp
The board is ultimately
responsible 13

13

Once a month is not enough
10
Input into hiring school leadership

8

Figure 18. Emerging themes from codifying qualitative interview data. This illustration
presents the frequency of times that the subject themes were mentioned in the
qualitative interviews with seven participants.
Community-centered and Volunteerism Theme
The Community-centered and Volunteerism theme emerged on the basis of
repetition and depth of description provided by the participants. All seven of the
qualitative interview participants talked about their rationale for becoming charter school
board members. The underlying theme for each participant was that giving back to the
community and providing opportunities to families and children, who would otherwise
not have a viable alternative to traditional education, was an important part of their
volunteerism. The long-term board members volunteer their time due to the fact that
their reward is helping their community and providing viable education alternatives for
children. The following quotes are directly from the participants’ transcripts. Participant
A stated:
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I have been a board member going on 15 years now. The reason I actually started
working with the board initially is because of the disparity in our communities
around ensuring that we have a congruent academic process and services that
were going to be extended throughout the community in southwest Detroit. So
when I was asked to participate with the board about 15 years ago, I thought it
was intriguing and I thought it was something with my background I could help
them with technology and things like that and help the overall education process.
He conveyed a passion for assisting urban students by giving his time and
technology skills which is a part of his career in management information systems. He
has concerns regarding what he perceives as gapping disparity between wealthy and poor
school districts. He continued:
One thing I would like to reiterate is again, the disparity around and within the zip
codes, it is critical not to discriminate against any of the children just because they
are in a different zip code. I think we need to make sure from a legislative piece
that we put processes in place and the right level of rigor in place so we may take
this to our government and work with our governing bodies so we can fix this.
Some of the communities have a lower set of wage earners; it corresponds to
having less resources in the community overall. I just think it’s the wrong way to
go from where I sit. We need to understand how we can make sure we get that
gap decreased and have some processes in place so we get some congruency in
place because these kids are critically important…
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The impetus of Participant D’s volunteerism is two-fold. First it is a desire to
impact her grandchildren’s education and second was to become part of a movement that
could impact education. She exclaimed:
Ok, why did I join the board? Basically, at that particular time, my grandchildren
were coming of age where they would be attending school, a Detroit school, and
at that time, like everyone else, I was looking for alternatives other than Detroit
Public Schools for them. I had heard a lot of good things about the charter school
movement and I heard a lot of bad things. But I wanted to take a chance for them
and on their behalf; that is how I got involved.
In this final example of the community-centered and volunteerism theme,
Participant F gave another illustration of why board members volunteer. Participant F’s
careers have included teaching and civil rights. He is a lawyer who is determined to help
disadvantaged urban minority children. Similar to Participant A, he wants to close the
gap between wealthy districts and poor districts and he wants to level the education
landscape as much as possible. He exclaimed:
Board members serve because they want to see student performance and our
school is an urban school. I want to see minority students; disadvantaged students;
have the same opportunity for life and careers as others do in other areas. I want
to make the playing field equal. That’s the passion and I want to make sure that
we are offering something that they are not getting at a traditional public school.
If we are not making a difference, if there is not a substantial improvement, then
we are wasting our time with this being the same or being slightly better than
what someone could obtain educationally in a public school is not enough. That’s
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what we need to know. That’s our passion as board members. It never gets far
beyond it.
Analysis of Community-centered and Volunteerism Theme
The interview participants all shared common passions in terms of becoming
members of charter school boards of directors. They all wanted to serve in a capacity to
provide opportunities to children and give back to communities that would benefit from
their volunteerism. The rationale for joining differs between the previously mentioned
volunteers. Some joined because of their own children or grandchildren, seeking
alternatives to traditional public schools. Other participants volunteer in order to
unselfishly share their talents and skills to benefit others. The unanimous desire to serve
on the board of directors is predicated by a paradigm of charity and volunteerism that is
very different from the paradigm of for-profit management companies that is profitdriven. These somewhat opposing paradigms may clash, causing confusion and resulting
in conflicts that manifest in policy and procedural differences between the board and
management company.
Board Training is a Necessity Theme
The board training that is universal and tailored theme emerged on the basis of
multiple mentions of the need for a variety of board trainings that were expressed in the
interviews. Two types of training surfaced in the dialogue of the interviews, which were
general board training and specific or tailored board training. The desire for general board
training emphasized core dynamics of governance that would be applicable to all board
members. Whereas, more specific or tailored board training would be for those board
members who hold or anticipate holding an office such as treasurer, vice president, and

CONFLICTS	
  IN	
  THE	
  GOVERNANCE	
  OF	
  MICHIGAN	
  CHARTER	
  SCHOOLS	
  	
  

218	
  
	
  

president. The participants mentioned a desire to have board training from multiple
sources beyond what is typically provided from the authorizers and the management
companies. The following quotes are directly from the participants’ transcripts.
Participant A stated:
One thing I found to be good and maybe it is not legislative, maybe it is, the roles
and responsibilities around the ESP, the board of directors, and the authorizer are
critical and people need to understand that. I think the MDE has done a really
good job of trying to define those roles and responsibilities; lots of folks for
whatever reason do not really understand what those roles are… we have come a
long way to bridging that gap of understanding the roles and acting within the
roles to ensure that everyone has a clear understanding of what their roles and
responsibilities are around each of these entities to ensure collaborative efforts to
educate these children.
In most instances, the authorizer has provided board training. Participant A
explained,
It is the board’s role to understand their roles and responsibilities. I do not expect
the authorizer or the ESP to tell the board what their role is; I say that because if
you are ultimately responsible for something, then you should know what that
responsibility entails.
The next participant echoed the previous sentiment by reiterating that training
should come from multiple sources. Participant B stated, “Training for the boards that are
out there, not just from the authorizers, but more training to have board members
understand their roles.” She continued by providing areas to train board members such as,
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“Specifically understanding contract negotiations, budgeting, breakout sessions on how
to pick apart budgets, looking at school calendars, placing board members into sub
categories to work with finances, discipline…etc. But different sub groups focus on
different aspects.”
The next participant’s comments illustrated the challenge of decoding and
understanding various financial and accounting budget codes. Participant F admitted, “I
am concerned about the budget codes, they are confusing. From a budget standpoint, it
can be understood by a C.P.A.” He continued expressing his concern in the following:
Well, if we don’t understand the financials, we get an opportunity to ask
who…the management company. And they are the ones making it clear for us.
That’s a problem. That’s a real problem. Or, I want to understand student
performance data, so who do I go to? And the problem is the information is
filtered, it is put in such a way. I’m not faulting management companies; that’s
what they are going to do. They are going to make themselves look good.
Participant F closed with expressing his concerns about the finances of the charter
school: “In the worst, I am not comfortable with our finances. And I sit here as a board
member up to 19 years and I’m not comfortable.”
The next example is provided by Participant E who has the benefit of having
served in multiple roles with the latest being board president. She articulated a significant
difference between the demands of a regular board member versus the demands of
serving in a board officer capacity such as treasurer, vice president, and president. She
explained:
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I would say yes, it depends on the role you have. Of course, if I were just a
regular board member, I would not have as much responsibility like that as
president. I have been a board president for about 4 years now and I would say,
over the last two years or so, I have become more intractably involved in the
welfare of the school and our relationship with our new authorizer and also, the
accountability of our management group.
Participant B discussed training from the perspective of including networking
with other boards and having forums with different policy groups. Participant B stated:
Well, this is my own opinion, and shortcomings; one of the things I think that
could have been improved; with our changes to social media such as Facebook,
and Instagram. We have gone to a process where we don’t necessarily meet with
peers, and or legislative groups, or leadership groups like MAPSA (Michigan
Association of Public School Academies). It would be nice to hear from the
source in person what some of the changes are legislatively and how the charter
school movement is doing as a whole; how regions are doing as a whole, what
works, what is not working, and you can only get that through face-to-face… also
a best practice with other boards to hear what is working and not working.
Analysis of Board Training is a Necessity Theme
The previous board members expressed the need for general and specific kinds of
board trainings. There appears to be a desire for training from multiple sources other than
their authorizer. The general training is for novices and regular board members who do
not hold a specific role as an officer, while tailored training is desired for boards of
directors who hold specific officer roles such as president, vice president, and treasurer.
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The specific training would be designed to enable the officers to better perform
effectively in their roles and responsibilities. What frequently surfaced from the board
member participants’ interviews is the lack of training, which directly correlates to role
confusion that exacerbates conflicts between boards and management companies. These
conflicts have implications on many aspects of charter school operations, policy
development, awarding of sub contracts, handling of discipline matters, deployment of
curriculum and academics, and much more. An additional area mentioned by some of the
interview participants is training specific to becoming aware and understanding the
contracts between boards and their management companies. Some of the interview
participants believe that by becoming aware of and understanding the contract, board
members will better understand their roles and the roles of the for-profit management
company, which implies less confusion and resulting in a reduction of conflicts in
governance.
Transparency and Full Disclosure Theme
The Transparency and Full Disclosure theme emerged on the basis of repetition
and consistency. The board interview participants placed a high value on transparency
and full disclosure as a necessity for having a trusting and an open relationship with the
for-profit private management company. Some participants voiced concerns of the lack of
transparency in terms of not having all pertinent information for decision-making; while
others indicated that boards were being told only what management companies felt was
needed.
Positive expressions were given in the cases of boards having an open
professional relationship with the management companies. Negative expressions were
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given where boards experienced circumstances that information was withheld, partially
provided, or where multiple requests had to be made. The latter circumstances fostered
distrust and a feeling of disrespect for the office of the board of directors.
Participant A led with the description of his experience and disposition on
transparency. His disposition indicated a level of skepticism in terms of the board being
presented with accurate reports if the news is not positive. He explained:
There seem to be issues that, right, wrong or indifferent, because you hire an ESP
[Education Service Provider] there are different levels of visibility. The
management company may try glaze over (I am trying to use a different word
than hide), but in certain scenarios there are certain elements that would occur like
what is going on at the school. Do we have the right level of climate and culture
in the school? Do we have the right level of data teams engaged to provide
information to the teachers, and are students getting what they need? It is really
easy to disseminate that into data and say everything is good, but when you dig a
little deeper and pull back the layers of the onion, you find out in many cases that
the right level of visibility is not always disseminated to the board of directors and
that things are being swept under the rug or hidden to make the overall picture
look better than what it actually is.
Continuing with Participant D, she provided a strong degree of concern regarding
transparency and full disclosure. She indicated a desire in knowing details of how the
money is being expended and what are the monetary [profit] benefits to the for-profit
private management company. She expressed the following:
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Well, my question at the end of the day is, how much profit are you making, you
don’t want to show me that, and if you don’t want to show me how much profit
you are making then I am not quite sure that the children are getting what they are
suppose to get; you can tell me anything, but I need to see the figures, I need to
see the numbers, I need to see where the money is going?
Participant D provided further concerns on transparency and gives examples of specific
areas that increased skepticism around transparency. She continued:
Oh absolutely, and the amount of money we are paying in rent and who is getting
these contracts. Are you putting the bids out there like you are suppose to and
sharing it with the board? You tell me that you are spending millions of dollars on
the school, but I don’t see what you did. The children do not have a lunchroom;
they are eating in their rooms. They have no gymnasium. We are totally in the
dark.
Other participants also experienced issues regarding transparency. Participant F
expressed a concern of not receiving accurate information. He stated,
They would say, no, no, no, we have always given you the information that you
want. What do you mean that we are not giving it to you? And the answer is well,
you’re giving it, but it’s been filtered, censored, and scrubbed up.
Some of the board member participants provided positive responses regarding
transparency in terms of receiving information as requested and having an open
relationship with the for-profit private management company. Participant G stated:
I think the accountability is better with the management company. Again because
with the movement of the charter schools, there are a lot of eyes on what is going
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on and with the accounting staff and with what is required from the state, auditors,
and everything else, I feel more confident about the charter system than I do the
public schools in regards to accountability.
No matter what their viewpoint on transparency and full disclosure, it was clear
that this was a theme that was prevalent in the comments of the interview respondents.
Analysis of Transparency and Full Disclosure Theme
All of the interview participants indicated some kind of concerns regarding
transparency and disclosure. The concerns ranged from areas inclusive of financial and
budget reporting, sharing information regarding student performance, awarding of sub
contracts, allocation of resources, rent, and the transformation of public tax dollars into
the private world of non-disclosure of the for-profit management company. The
implications of issues around transparency and non-disclosure are far reaching and causes
confusion and conflicts in the realms of governance.
The Profit Motive Theme
The Profit Motive theme emerged on the premise of moderate repetition and
depth. The theme was repeated in terms of boards of directors conveying that
management companies’ prime motive for managing charter schools is to make a profit.
The depth of the profit motive was given in regards to placing students and academics as
secondary to the bottom line of management companies. A feeling also surfaced that the
desire for profit influences many of the academic and non-academic challenges facing
charter schools.
In responding to the question of what are the pros and cons of contracting with a
for-profit private management company, Participant F’s response as follows:
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The con, well it’s in your question. It is, if you have the right people that are
student-child-family oriented, its fine. Or just feel in their heart to do the right
thing, full disclosure, honesty, careful with expenditures and things of that nature.
It can work very, very, well. But the profit motive is very, very, high. It does
dictate and influence a lot of what occurs. There may be things that are said that
are for the student or for the welfare of the school and things of that nature. But at
its core, it’s a money driven process. And that’s really sad, but I see what they’re
doing is anything to maintain that contract. The contract and the money that is
generated through it can be enormous.
As Participant F continued, he expressed concerns over how taxpayer
funds pass from a not-for-profit entity to a for-profit entity. He continued:
A public school academy is a non-profit entity but in reality those funds
are passed through to a for-profit entity; to me that can’t be. You can’t do
that. It makes a public school academy simply as a shell for the for-profit
company because the funds, operations, and management are turned over
to a for-profit entity; I happen to think from a policy standpoint, that’s
wrong! The whole purpose of setting up a school as a non-profit entity is
for that purpose. It’s not a moneymaking entity. Profits are not to be
derived from it, but when those funds are passed onto a for profit entity,
we are doing just that. If you take a step back and just think about it, it
makes absolutely no sense to do that. To have that framework in place, it’s
unacceptable. I don’t think that there, under any stretch of the imagination,
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should be a non-profit entity passing on its funds for its operation to a forprofit entity. I have a major problem with that.
Participant F concluded his perspective on the profit motive by stating, “So I think
if we move the profit motive out of there, we can put greater power into improving
instruction.” It was evident from Participant F and others, that they have an awareness of
the profit motive and its role in the relationship with the management companies.
Multiple interview participants provided perspectives that the management
companies primary reason for existence is to generate a profit and that this motive
overshadowed the vision, mission, and values of the charter school and the board of
directors. A significant number also indicated that the for-profit business ideologies were
in contrast to the philosophies which the board members embraced such as volunteerism,
civic mindedness, and building communities by providing better educational
opportunities for families and their children. The potential conflicts for such contrasting
perspectives are far-reaching and extend to issues including operations, academics, bids,
staffing, and cost versus quality related matters where the board may emphasize quality
and the management company cost. The confusion for the board of directors emerged
from their position of hiring a for-profit management company and somewhat
unconsciously passing their power to the management company who is, subsequent to
contract signing, the entity that now decides much of what programs are chosen and
implemented; and what is acceptable from a cost perspective. Another example is the
incentive that management companies have when there is inherently a bigger profit by
cutting programs and their associated cost. For example, in some management contracts,
the management company may legally retain the budget surplus of the charter school.
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Therefore, the less the school spends, the greater the management company’s profit
margin.
Feeling Like a Rubber Stamp Theme
The Feeling Like a Rubber Stamp theme was stated multiple times with the
specific phrase most often quoted verbatim and other moments synonymously stated by
the interview participants. For example, some of the synonymous phrases included using
terminology such as being disempowered or a feeling of being expected to sign off on
whatever was placed in front of the board of directors. In these instances, boards of
directors felt a strong sense of powerlessness. Often times, the participants expressed that
they felt they were without a sense of recourse or true authority, despite having the titles
of being a charter school board member. Participant F provided a disposition, which
included a statement of not being empowered. He stated:
So we don’t get into that kind of detail in the minutes and I don’t think that’s
constructive, but the message was clear …we are not to touch budget items. How
do you have a board and govern as a board? We can’t even control the budget?
Why I say it’s a concern is because by the time we get budgets proposed and
amended budgets, they’re running deficits and that’s a concern to us; but we are
not empowered to deal with that.
In terms of discussing the elements of the contractual agreement between the
board of directors and the for-profit private management company, Participant D
indicated concerns over being a rubber stamp. She explained:
If the contract is tying the board’s hands behind their back, which is what these
contracts are doing, basically you are a rubber stamp. And not only are you a
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rubber stamp; there is not transparency and no accountability. So, other than that,
the contract is basically just paper.
She continued to discuss the issue of just being part of a board because boards are
required for charter schools. She explained:
Basically, where do I start, when I first joined the board I never was really
educated or trained, so to speak, on what my position would be as a governor of
that particular entity. I came in with all of these expectations of being part of a
movement and I was excited about doing great things for the children. However,
after being in my second term I realized that I was a rubber stamp.
This feeling of not truly making the decisions or feeling like a rubber stamp permeated
many of the interviews.
Analysis of Feeling like a Rubber Stamp Theme
A significant percentage of the interview participants articulated concerns of not
having the authority to provide effective governance, if any governance at all. Board
members expressed feelings of disempowerment, having their hands tied behind their
backs, and given things to sign without explanation. These feelings were in opposition to
the reasons why the participants became board members. They wanted to contribute to an
ideology of improving education; instead some of them stated that they felt they were
engaged only because boards of directors are required for charter schools. These feelings
more than likely stem from a lack of understanding of the contract inclusive of the
differing roles and obligations of the board of directors and the for-profit management
company. The lack of understanding of the roles contributes to confusion and conflicts in
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governance. To paraphrase one of the interview participant’s statements, the management
company can only do what the contract allows.
Input into Hiring School Leadership Theme
The theme of input into hiring school leadership emerged to some degree in all of
the interviews. However, it strongly resonated with five of the seven boards of directors.
It was presented in multiple ways that this decision has cascading effects on the entire
school in terms of academic performance to working constructively with the boards of
directors. A consistent disposition was that boards of directors wanted to achieve or
pursue input into the role(s) of school leadership. Some even mentioned a desire to have
input not only in the selection of school leadership, but also input into the leadership’s
evaluation.
Participant B expressed regret that they, the board, did not have terms placed in
the contract that would have enabled the board of director’s executive committee to have
input to the selection of school leadership. He said:
We have an executive committee, which comprises of the board president, vice
president, and treasurer in our case. And they act on behalf of the board and
anything they determine is recorded and ratified at the board meeting. If the
executive committee had the opportunity to vet a potential candidate provided to
us by the management company, we may have had a better understanding of what
to anticipate in terms of their leadership capabilities…I think that may have
helped us in the long run and we would have put a clause in the contract where by
either the board or a component of the board has the ability to make the final
decision on the selection of the leadership of that school.
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Participant E discussed how their board provides the management company with
the discretion to hire constituency roles; however, the leadership roles require board
input. Participant E stated:
In terms of hiring, for example, we give at my particular school, we give our
management company leeway on hiring teachers, instructional coaches, and the
like; we think they have enough experience to do that. There are situations where
we may feel like we want some input, for instance, a school leader we want to
have some input as the board as to who is hired for that particular position.
Participant E provided an example of where the board of directors not only had input but
also selected the person for their school’s leadership. She explained:
We had to get a new school leader to replace this person. And we chose a
particular person. The board of governance and the management group both
selected this person and the management group found the candidates and we
interviewed collectively. After they got to a certain point, the board of governance
came into the process of the interview and between the two candidates we
selected the person.
The Participant F gave an example of how they initially did not have input into
the selection of school leadership, but subsequently poised themselves to change it to
where they do have input to the selection of school leadership. Participant G explained:
So of our own freewill we can ask whatever question we want of the principal and
the management company. I think that process is really good and we got no
roadblocks when we requested that. But in the past we got no say-so, as a
governing board we had no say-so; the management company made all of the
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decisions on hiring and firing; it affected us as a board. So now we have more
say-so on the hiring and firing than we had before.
The final illustration comes from Participant F. He explained how he would go
about addressing the issue of the board of directors having input to the decision of school
leaders within the contract. He explained:
The first thing I would like; the critical component of the school is the leader. I
read that its 60% [that the principal] is the factor of the success of the school; the
leadership over time impacts every aspect of the school. I would like the board to
have more of a say; in some schools its actually written into the management
agreement. I would say the right to refusal; that the building leader serves with the
consent of the board. That if the board is unsatisfied, it can dismiss the leader
right there.
The need to provide input into hiring, though limited to school leadership roles,
was a theme with the majority of the interview respondents.
Analysis of Input into Hiring School Leadership Theme
The majority of the participants articulated a desire to have boards of directors’
provide input into the selection of the charter schools’ administrative leadership. These
positions include the superintendent and principal roles. Many of the interview
participants stated that if they could change anything in the contracts it would be to have
a say in the key leadership roles. Some of the participants indicated an informal say in the
selection of principals; however, there is not official provisions to allow the boards to
have input into the selection of key leadership roles. There is definite confusion here
because even though some boards are allowed to meet with leadership candidates, there
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are not any provisions in the contract between the boards and their management
companies to formally have input or recourse if any disagreements occur. The confusion
creates potential for conflicts in the governance of charter schools.
The Board Is Ultimately Responsible Theme
The Board Is Ultimately Responsible theme emerged from the majority of the
qualitative interview participants. These respondents took an adamant posture that they
are ultimately responsible for every aspect of the school despite having a contract with a
full-service, for-profit private management company. Their responsibility permeated
every aspect of the school’s operations and functions inclusive of student achievement,
finances, budget, facilities, and other areas. Participant A commenced with statements for
the boards’ feeling they have ultimate responsibility. He said, “Because the board is
ultimately responsible for everything that occurs with the PSA. We need to make sure
that we know our role and that we are governing correctly.” Participant A continued:
The board itself is ultimately responsible from a fiduciary perspective and
academic responsibility to make sure students reach grade level. They must get
the academically nurturing they need in order to move forward. It becomes really
tough because you don’t see what is going on day-to-day.
Participant A discussed some of the detailed responsibility of the management
company regarding the day-to-day operation. He then reiterated that the board has
ultimate responsibility. He explained:
So a board will hire an ESP to conduct the daily business. The board will hire the
ESP to manage its finances from a day-to-day perspective, i.e. ensuring the bills
are paid, ensuring that the maintenance company is paid, that the grounds are
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clean, snow is removed on time, making sure that vendors are around for lunch
and breakfast catering so that children have a good hot and healthy meal every
day. Contractually, we asked the ESP to handle those things for us, but, we the
board, are ultimately responsible that all milestones are met every month.
Participant E provided a perspective that the board has ultimate responsibility and
this gives the direction for the management company’s actions in terms of school
operations. She stated:
Ultimately, it is the board of directors’ responsibility to see that we put in place
what needs to be implemented utilizing our management company; needs to be
implemented in terms of getting the proper instruction in place, data management
and utilizing the data to better equip our teachers and looking at the performances
of the students.
These examples typify the ultimate sense of responsibility that the respondents had in
terms of being the governing body.
Analysis of the Board Is Ultimately Responsible Theme
The Board is Ultimately Responsible theme emerged in the majority of the
transcripts of the interview participants. This theme illustrated the disposition and belief
of board members who think that the board is ultimately responsible for everything
involving the charter school, inclusive of, but not limited to functions of: Operations,
hiring, sub contracts, curriculum and academics, expulsions, special education, student
performance, compliance, budgets, and other key aspects of operating charter schools.
The confusion around this topic is that when they sign a contract with a for-profit private
management company, similar to those in the contract analysis, the board transfers
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significant amounts of their responsibilities/functions over to the management company.
The length of the contracts also become an issue because the majority of the contracts, if
not all, encompass clauses that make the term of the contractual agreement parallel to the
length of the charter agreement with the authorizer. The confusion emanates from the
lack of awareness, familiarity, and knowledge of the contract between the board and
management company, which implicates potential conflicts in the boards’ ability to
provide effective governance.
Once a Month Is Not Enough Theme
The Once a Month Is Not Enough theme provided the disposition of board
members feeling that a once a month meeting, for approximately two hours, is not
enough time to effectively deploy governance roles. They exclaimed that there was not
enough time for the due diligence needed to provide not only effective governance, but
also attention to details of common needs such as grading, financial analysis, budgets,
student performance, school culture and climate, facilities, acquisitions, and many other
aspects that are part of operating a school. They also expressed the need and requirement
for preparation and follow-up time required for boards to effectively engage discussions,
analysis, and decision making at the board meetings. In regards to this theme, Participant
A stated:
No, no, once a month is not nearly enough to get a good foothold of what is going
on in the building out of the 30 days; looking at a dash board that looks at things
such as Explorer, PLAN, ACT…looks at NWEA MAP on a daily or monthly
basis does not give you the ability to determine how well those students are doing
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when it comes to the state targets that we are looking at; we do have, it is nowhere
enough to just look at the data from a 30 day window.
Participant E discussed the challenges of becoming a board member with an
officer’s role. She has served in multiple positions and now is the board president. She
says that her board duties are like a second job. She explained:
So it became a situation where having a full time job makes it difficult for me to
give the attention needed to be effective. I thought about the activities and welfare
of our children and it became a second job. It was not just a once a month activity
for me. It was becoming more of a weekly assessment of what I need to be doing,
how we need to be preparing for our kids so they could perform at their greatest
ability.
Part of the challenges that she expressed entailed the activities that require
attention outside of the parameters of the once-a-month board meetings. She continued to
explain:
I find myself thinking more about my responsibilities as a board member and
providing more action outside of those meetings that we have once a month and
little committee meetings we may have periodically. I take my role more seriously
because I know there are little lives dependent on us to advocate on their behalf
for them to get a good education. So my volunteer job as a board member
sometimes it could be a part time job for me, not 40 hours a week, but it is
definitely not just me meeting on one Tuesday out of the month for a few hours; I
take it very seriously what I do and regretfully so I wish I could do more…but I
have a family and I work full time. But I do the best I can.
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There was a strong sense from these and other interview comments that there is
much more time required to implement the tasks of board members. Once a month
meetings, which many came in under the premise that this was the main time
commitment, appeared to not be enough for effective governance.
Analysis of Once a Month Is Not Enough Theme
A significant number of the qualitative interview participants indicated
perspectives that meeting once a month is not enough in terms of board members having
ample time to analyze, contemplate, discuss, and follow up on issues and matters relative
to board agendas and meetings. Most feel that two hours per month is not enough to give
due diligence to matters relating to the operations, budgets, finances, compliances,
awarding of contracts, and performance outcomes pertinent to the charter school. The
circumstances become even more demanding in terms of board members that take on
officer roles such as president, vice president, and treasurer in that these roles require
preparation and analysis so that topics may be discussed from a position of knowledge,
which enables suggestions and recommendations that are valued added; as opposed to
relying solely on perspectives outside of the board of directors. Some of the board
member officers indicated feelings of having a second job given the demands of their
roles. The challenge becomes identifying the lines of demarcation drawn to separate
duties; is it clear that where the board’s responsibility begins and ends in conjunction
with those of the management company. When the roles are not clear, the board may not
spend time on broader policy issues and cross the lines into the day-to-day operations,
which presents great potential for confusion resulting in conflicts between the board of
directors and their selected full-service for-profit private management company. Two
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hours a month, which is equivalent to one day out of the year, is not enough time to
govern an entity of such complexity as a charter school and the millions of taxpayers’
dollars allocated to its operations.
Everything Goes Back to the Contract Theme
The theme of Everything Goes Back to the Contract emerged from the qualitative
interview participants with one exception. They discussed the importance of placing
clauses in the contract between the boards of directors and the management companies to
prudently effect hiring of school leadership, performance measures in the contract, and
having board members trained on the elements and content of the contract. The challenge
included having an active contract that is long-term with an inability to augment until the
term is reached and it is time for renewal or termination of the contractual relationship.
Participant F provided one example inclusive of a concern that his board does not
fully understand the contract between the board of directors and the management
company. He explained:
Well, I think first off, I think a lot of the board members aren’t really aware that
the contract governs the relationship. I just don’t think that they quite understand
it. I really don’t think they know what is required and what the management
company is supposed to do. Where I think the management company almost feels
as though it is their school, if that makes sense, when it’s not, it’s the PSA; it’s the
academy’s school.
Participant G provided a positive perspective of the contractual relationship
between the board of directors and the for-profit private management company. He
stated:
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It is a very open relationship and that is something that is needed. I would say
contract-wise, anything we ask for is provided to us. If we get into a shady or gray
area our attorney advises us. Sometimes, even the attorney has a different view
than we have. But again as a board, we make that decision. They have been very
good as far as the contract and following it. We know what is expected of us and
how to function.
Participate A provided a perspective of how the contract could be structured to
positively impact the governance of charter schools. He elaborated:
I think the things that could be done contractually that will support governance.
Governance ensures that the desired outcomes happen; outcomes are going to be
the academic outcomes; to ensure that the contracts we have in place with vendors
are appropriate; we must understand relationships. The metrics must be placed in
the contract to understand what are the targets for everyone including the
ESP…identify in the contract either hit these marks or reap the consequences.
There must be visibility and accountability around everything we do. Incentives
can even be in place to achieve the metrics and corrective action if progress is not
being realized.
Participant B discussed the component of legal counsel in terms of negotiating
parts of the contract. However, he indicated how crucial it was to miss that element in
former contract formations. He explained:
Contractually, it was effective and efficient. It was very well described in terms of
responsibilities. We had our attorney that had been with us since day 1 review the
contract and actually negotiate fine points in the contract. One of the things we
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already talked about was how I wish we had included the ability to select the
leadership person; but, in terms of reviewing the contract, structuring the contract,
it went fairly well. We missed a couple of things but it went very well.
All of the discussions around the other themes featured a discussion on making sure the
contract had provisions to address that particular issue or concern. In the end, there was a
clear understanding of the participants that the contract was a tool for making sure certain
aspects were addressed.
Analysis of Everything Goes Back to the Contract Theme
Four of the interview participants provided qualitative data with findings that well
represented the feelings of all seven respondents. They all presented a perspective,
whether accurate or not, of how important the contract was in terms of operating and
setting the parameters for the interactions of the board of directors and the for-profit
private management company. The four examples from findings presented strong
indications that these board members realize how critical the contracts are; however, all
are stated in a sense of retrospect. Retrospect meaning their discoveries are after the fact
of the contract being signed and in effect.
In addition, there is an acknowledgement that board members probably do not
fully understand the contract and that legal counsel is beneficial to assist the boards of
directors with navigating the legal complexities of charter school contracts. One of the
board respondents reiterated the benefits of an open relationship. Whereas this appears to
be a positive element in the relationship between the board and the management company
in that the board has an opportunity to give input into the hiring of school leadership; it is
a gesture from the management company to have a positive relationship with the board of
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directors. However, it is not a contractual matter in that if the management company
decided not to allow the board’s input; there would be no recourse for the board given the
elements of the contract which clearly states in the section of personnel, that the
management company is solely responsible for all activities related to hiring and
terminations. The previous are prime examples of confusion regarding the relevance of
the contract and how this results in potential conflicts, which impacts the boards of
directors’ ability to provide effective governance.
Summary of Qualitative Analysis
The qualitative analysis includes an in-depth review of the stories of the interview
participants and their transcripts. A codification process fostered the emergence of
themes from descriptors identified in each individual transcript. A cross-analysis
identified threads of commonality from the codifying process based on frequency. The
themes that emerged from this analysis included community-centered/volunteerism,
board training is a necessity, transparency and full disclosure, the feeling of being a
rubber stamp, the board is ultimately responsible, and input into hiring administrative
leadership of the charter school. The previous themes are all centric to issues within the
relationship between the charter school boards of directors and the full-service for-profit
private management companies. The themes encompassed a myriad of implications
fostered by confusion, which often times included issues of role ambiguity and lack of
contractual awareness and knowledge. These themes illustrated the varied levels of board
confusion, which leads to potential conflicts in the governance of charter schools in the
state of Michigan.
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Chapter 5: Presentation and Analysis of Charter School Contracts and For-Profit
Management Companies
Introduction
The contractual analysis is an element of the qualitative components of the mixed
methodology study of potential inherent conflicts in the governance of Michigan charter
school boards contracting with full-service for-profit private management companies.
The comparative analysis explores the content of five recent contractual agreements
between charter school boards and their chosen full-service for-profit private
management company to manage the operations of the public school academy.
The contract analysis (See Appendix D for contracts used in analysis and
Appendix E for Comparative Contract Analysis Matrix) contains nineteen item
descriptors based on a review of the contracts and listed in a matrix with comments to
explain the contractual phenomena, which takes place as a result of the comparison. The
format allows for designators to be placed in the appropriate cells if the item description
is present in the five management contracts denoted by titled Contract A, Contract B,
Contract C, Contract D, and Contract E, all representing a specific contract between
charter school boards and for-profit management companies.
The comparative analysis matrix contains nineteen descriptors that are part of
eight sections, which are sourced from commonalities in the five contracts. The matrix
illustrates if the specific descriptors are present in each contract designated by a check
mark or if the descriptors are not present, which is designated by a circle.
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Contract Comparison Analysis --- Macro Findings
In the contract analysis, 80% of the five contracts were strongly similar in
presentation, structure, and content. Only one of the contracts (20%) contained a very
different structure from the other four. The latter is probably due to the management
company being based in the state of New York, which may have their own templates for
their charter school industry. None of the contracts were exactly the same but all had
some dominate similarities, which included:
•

All contracts indicated in some manner that they manage the day-to-day
operations of the school.

•

All contracts clearly indicated that the management companies solely have
responsibility for hiring and terminating employees at all levels and positions
whether instructional, operational, and administrative.

•

All contracts indicated a reference to the authorizer.

•

All contracts indicated (to a varying degree) that they have the right to manage
subcontractors.

•

All contracts articulated the fee/compensation structure of each for-profit
management company, which is very different except for two.

•

All of the contracts indicated that the management company is responsible for the
charter schools’ curriculum and academic program.

•

All of the contracts specified the role of the management company and all but one
indicated the obligations of the boards of directors.

•

All contracts, except for one, clearly indicated that the management company has
financial, accounting, and budgetary responsibilities.
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All contracts indicated in some form that the management companies are
responsible for special education.

•

Four of the five contracts used a standard boilerplate template.

All of the contracts were void of the following:
•

None of the contracts indicated who is responsible for student expulsions.

•

None of the contracts indicated who is responsible for managing board agendas
and minutes.

•

None of the contracts indicated who is responsible for capital acquisitions.

The following lists some areas and items that were somewhat unique to some of the
contracts:
•

One of the contracts has a very different fee structure based on various
management tasks and deliverables with associated cost for each.

•

Two of the management companies indicated that part of their fee is to retain the
school’s fund balance.

•

One of the management companies had a partially incentive based strategy, which
provided additional compensation for achieving student performance metrics.

•

One of the management companies had a five-year progressive fee plan which
increases from year 1 to year 5; this same company charged an exorbitant amount
for use of their proprietary curriculum.

•

Two of the management companies provided access to start-up funds for their
clients (charter school boards of directors) and also provided financing
availability where repayment is made through the schools state funding. These
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two companies also indicated a willingness to provide facilities and lease it to the
school.
Summary of Contract Analysis
The contracts are essential to providing the expectations of both the client (charter
school boards of directors) and the agency (for-profit private management companies).
The contracts clearly articulated the responsibilities and expectations of the management
companies. Their roles are clear in terms of having full-service responsibilities for the
operations of their public school academy clients. Whereas the management company has
clear expectations, the boards’ roles are not as specific and are generically ambiguous.
Four of the contracts have a small paragraph; which lists approximately six to eight items
that conveyed the boards’ obligations. These items are fairly generic and basically state
that the boards have governing responsibility, however, governance is not defined and
left to interpretation.
The majorities of the contracts are very similar and seem to originate from the
perspective of the for-profit private management companies given the dominance of
articles pertaining to the management companies’ roles and responsibilities and very little
in terms of the boards of directors.
Boards of directors are also at a significant disadvantage given legal structure and
jargon of the contracts. They will find themselves frustratingly getting in a quagmire of
legalities, complex legislation, and regulations. Unless they have retained legal counsel
who is versed and knowledgeable of charter school laws in the state of Michigan.
Management companies typically have legal counsel that is a part of their executive team
or they have retained a law firm that provides their legal counseling.
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If boards are not conscious of the significance of the contract, they will operate in
a fog of unawareness as to what are their expectations, obligations, and rights. This will
commensurately affect their ability to effectively govern and provide prudency when
imposing governance and developing policies and resolutions for charter schools.
Boards of directors’ awareness and comprehension of the contracts with
management companies are essential to mitigate confusion and overlapping of
responsibilities, which perpetuates conflicts in the governance of charter schools in the
state of Michigan. The complexity of charter school laws and the challenges of
governance permeated the charter school industry. Knowledgeable and informed boards
are required given the challenging dynamics of charter schools’ existence and operations.
This is especially the case in the state of Michigan where for-profit private management
companies manage more than 80% of charter schools.
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Chapter 6: Quantitative and Qualitative Triangulated Convergence
Introduction
The following triangulates the quantitative data, qualitative data, and the
contractual analysis. The quantitative data was obtained through a two-part Likert Scale
survey that was provided to qualified board members. The surveys were provided in two
ways, hard copy and electronic, in order to increase the probability to reach or exceed the
goal of receiving forty completed surveys from eligible Michigan charter school board
members. The qualitative data was obtained by the purposeful selection of seven board
members who had been on charter school boards contracting with for-profit private
management companies. The board members selected for interview participation had a
preferred fifteen years of experience and served in an officer position such as board
president, vice president, and treasurer.
The researcher deployed a parallel mixed method design, which Creswell (2014)
stated,
A researcher collects both quantitative and qualitative data, analyzes them
separately, and then compares the results to see if the findings confirms or
disconfirms each other. The key assumption of this approach is that both the
qualitative and quantitative data provide different types of information –- often
detailed views of participants qualitatively and scores on instruments
quantitatively --- and together yield results that should be the same (p.219).
The triangulation process provided data reiteration and substantiation of the two
different designs. This approach provided an opportunity to merge data for confirmation
or disconfirmation of the phenomenon of conflicts in governance when charter school
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boards in Michigan contract with full-service for-profit private management
companies. The researcher transformed the qualitative data into numeric values by
applying percentages to the responses of each interview participant to the collective
responses of the aggregate group, which consisted of seven board members from seven
different Michigan charter schools. Figure 19 illustrated the conceptual framework for the
conduct of analysis that was used.
Conceptual Framework for Conduct of Analysis

!
Phenomenon of Conflicts In the Governance of Charter School Boards Contracting with For-Profit
Management Companies
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Figure 19. Conceptual framework for conduct of analysis.
The triangulation of the quantitative and qualitative data included the topics of
role confusion and resulting conflicts around the responsibilities for hiring and
terminating key personnel such as superintendents, principals, and teachers; the effect on
transparency and full disclosure of public funds when boards of directors contract with
for-profit private management companies; the realization that everything goes back to the
contract; and the paradoxical challenge of boards of directors feeling they are ultimately
responsible for charter school operations. These topics surged from the quantitative
design and emerged from the qualitative design warranting triangulation inclusive of the
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contractual agreement; which dictates the parameters of the inter-relational dynamics
between the board of directors and the full-service, for-profit private management
company.
The Parallel Convergence and Triangulation of Hiring Charter School Personnel
Introduction
Table 11 illustrated the convergence and triangulation of the quantitative and
qualitative findings, along with the contractual analysis as it relates to the responsibility
of hiring, terminating, and evaluating charter school staff. It aligns to Research Question
1 that addresses the contractual relationships between the boards of directors and the forprofit private management companies and how it contributes to role conflicts in the
governance of charter schools in the state of Michigan.
Table 11
The Parallel Convergence and Triangulation of Hiring Charter School Personnel
Do the Contractual Relationships Between Michigan Charter School Boards of Directors and Full-Service For-Profit Private
Management Companies Contribute to Conflict in Governance
Quantitative:
The responsibility for hiring key personnel such as the
superintendent, principal, and teachers should be:

Qualitative:
1. From your perspective as a long serving member of a charter
school board of directors, what are the pros and cons relative to
governing the school that occur as a result of contracting with a
full-service management company.
3. Considering that the relationship between the board of directors
and the management company is a critical element in the
successful operation of the school, what do you think are factors
that might contribute to tension in governance as a result of this
relationship."
"
"
"

58% of the board survey respondents indicated that the hiring decision
should be shared to varying degrees for hiring key personnel. This
included teachers.

60% of the qualitative data provided the ability of the board to affect
hiring as a major issue; as well as a factor contributing to tension in
governance between the board of directors and the management
company.

Contractual Analysis:
The contractual analysis of five contracts between Michigan boards of directors and management companies all substantiate the contractual
position that the management companies have exclusivity regarding hiring and terminating charter school staff. The verbiage specifically uses
terms/vocabulary such as; the management company has sole responsibility and authority to determine staffing. This responsibility includes;
hiring, terminating, evaluating, disciplining, moving, shifting, and transferring any and all employees of the management company who are
deployed to work at the subject charter school(s).

From a quantitative disposition as explained in Table 10, 4% of survey responses
indicated that hiring should be a function of the board of directors. Thirty-eight percent of
the survey responses indicated that hiring should be a function of the management
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company. Fifty-eight percent indicated that some shared input between the board of
directors and the management company should occur. Qualitatively, six out of seven
interview participants discussed hiring matters, while 60% of the interviews exclaimed
hiring as a factor fostering tension. From the qualitative findings, one of the interview
respondents stated,
The downside [con] of it as we have come to find is the contract that we had
engaged in was a long-term contract. And part of the contract was the fact we had
no input in terms of who could be hired into key personnel positions. We did not
have any input in terms of the selection.
The qualitative and quantitative data provided board perspectives that were
incongruent with the intentions of the contractual agreement. In both research
methodologies, the board members all believed they could or they wanted to impact
hiring of the charter school’s staff. This is in stark contrast to the charter contractual
agreements explored between Michigan charter schools’ boards of directors and their
chosen for-profit private management company. The contracts specifically state, as seen
in the example of Contract D, the following:
15. I Personnel Responsibility. Subject to the limitations of this Agreement, the
Public School Academy Contract, the Code and other applicable laws and
regulations, The correlating management company will have the sole
responsibility and authority to determine staffing levels, and to select, evaluate,
assign, discipline, supervise, manage, transfer and terminate personnel necessary
to carry out the Educational Services, the Administrative Services, the
Supplemental Programs (if any) and all other services provided under this
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Agreement, all within the financial constraints Of the Academy Budget approved
by the Board.
Another example of the contract contrasting the responses of the participants is seen in
Contract B. It stated:
ARTICLE VI.
PERSONNEL AND TRAINING
Subject to Sections I .01 and 1.02 above, the Charter, the Code and other
applicable laws and regulations, The correlating management company will have
the sole responsibility and authority to provide qualified administrative, teaching
and support staff to operate the System within the staffing levels approved by the
Board in its annual budget, and to select, evaluate, assign, discipline, supervise,
manage and transfer personnel necessary to carry out the Educational Services,
the Administrative Services, the Supplemental Programs (if any) and all other
services provided under this Agreement.
A final example was extracted from Contract A that explained that the
management company has the authority to make all hiring decisions. It stated:
ARTICLE Vu
PERSONNEL & TRAINING
A. Personnel. The correlating management company shall select and hire
qualified personnel to perform services at the Academy. The correlating
management company shall have the responsibility and authority, subject to
subparagraphs B, C and D below, to select, hire, evaluate, assign, discipline,
transfer, and terminate personnel consistent with the Budget and applicable
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law. Personnel working at the Academy shall be employees of the correlating
management company unless otherwise agreed by the correlating
Management Company and the Board.
Analysis of Hiring Charter School Personnel Convergence
The data from the quantitative surveys indicated role confusion and conflicts
given the wide variance of responses indicating that the board should have a say in the
hiring of staff including administrators and teachers. Data from the experiences of
interview participants substantiated the quantitative results. The board members all
indicated a desire to impact hiring, especially administrative roles such as
superintendents, principals, and others. This is a particular source of conflict given the
desire of the boards of directors to influence, if not select key positions.
The quantitative and qualitative data regarding the issues of hiring personnel
at Michigan charter schools contracting with full-service for-profit private management
companies displays reinforcing patterns that substantiated the findings of each
methodology. The findings and analysis of both designs illustrated role confusion and
resulting conflicts; given the disparity of responses and lack of consensus in the
quantitative and qualitative findings and analysis that indicated that all the board
respondents believed that the board of directors should have a say in the hiring of staff.
This especially resonated with the hiring of key administrative personnel, such as the
superintendent, principal, and other top-level administrative roles; non-administrative
roles such as teachers, paraprofessionals, etc., did not contribute as much to the hiring
conflicts.
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The subsequent in-depth analysis of the contract overtly indicated that the
management company has sole unequivocal responsibility for hiring all personnel and
employees of the charter school. As a matter of fact, the employees are viewed by the
management company as specifically their employees who may be shifted, moved, and
transferred at the beckoning of their sole employer; the full-service, for-profit private
management company. The confusion manifested with what appears to be the lack of
contractual awareness of the board and accelerated role conflicts when issues surface
where the parties do not agree. The board is at a tremendous disadvantage and the
management company has legal leverage given the content of the contract between the
board of directors and the management company. The boards do not appear to realize,
until circumstances of conflict arise, that they have zero say in who is hired or who is
terminated in all positions of the charter school. This position is clearly stated in the
signed contracts, which is the legal endorsement management companies have and
present when personnel matters surface.
The Parallel Convergence and Triangulation of Transparency and Full Disclosure
Table 12 illustrates the convergence and triangulation of the qualitative and
quantitative findings, along with the contractual analysis as it relates to transparency and
full disclosure. It aligns to Research Question 3 that addresses the accountability and
transparency of public funds and the effect when contracting with a full-service for-profit
private management company. The effects are complex given the source of funding,
which are primarily public tax dollars and the transfer of those funds to a private
management company.
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Table 12
The Parallel Convergence and Triangulation of Transparency and Full Disclosure
Are accountability and transparency of public funds affected when Michigan charter schools’ boards of directors contract with full-service forprofit private management companies.
Part II 3. Transparency of public funds is affected when boards of
directors contract with full-service for-profit private management
companies.

1. From your perspective as a long serving member of a charter
school board of directors, what are the pros and cons relative to
governing the school that occur as a result of contracting with a
full-service management company
2. Reflecting upon your board member experience in contracting
with a for-profit management company, how would you describe
the specific contractual relationship between the board and the
management company
4. Do you believe that accountability and transparency of public
funds may have changed when contracting with a for-profit
company, or do you believe this is not an issue

46% of survey respondents selected strongly agreed or agree that
transparency of public funds are affected when boards of directors
contract with full-service for-profit private management companies;
42% strongly disagree or disagree; and 12% were uncertain

Based on inference from the interview data; 71% indicated they agree
that accountability of public funds is affected when boards of directors
contract with full-service for-profit private management companies;
29% disagree.

From a quantitative perspective; 46% of the survey respondents agreed or strongly agreed that accounting of public funds is affected when boards
of directors contract with full-service for-profit private management companies; and 42% disagreed or strongly disagreed. 12% were uncertain.
Interview participants summarized their position as follows; participant E summarized: Well, my question at the end of the day is, how much
profit are you making, you don’t want to show me that, and if you don’t want to show me how much profit you are making then I am not quite
sure that the children are getting what they are supposed to get; you can tell me anything, but I need to see the figures, I need to see the numbers, I
need to see where the money is going.” Participant E continues,” Oh absolutely, and the amount of money we are paying in rent and who is
getting these contracts, are you putting the bids out there like you are suppose to and sharing it with the board; you tell me that you are spending
millions of dollars on the school but I don’t see what you did, the children do not have a lunch room, they are eating in their rooms. They have no
gymnasium, we are totally in the dark.”

The data from the surveys indicated role confusion and potential conflicts given
the lack of consensus and variance of responses indicating that many boards feel that
transparency of public funds is affected when boards of directors contract with fullservice for-profit private management companies. The quantitative analysis provided the
complexities of transparency given the ample functions that are conducive to
transparency issues such as budgets, financial reporting, and data involving sub contracts
and student performance.
Data from the experiences of interview participants substantiated the quantitative
data results. A significant percentage (71%) of the interview respondents indicated that
public funds are affected when boards of directors contract with full-service, for-profit
management companies. The interview participants provided statements that inferred
high levels of discomfort regarding the reports that are provided on costs, reporting
finances, students’ performance, and most of all the transformation of public taxpayer
dollars into the private accounting of management companies.
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The contractual analysis illustrated the ability of the management company to
legally report on broadly required functions to meet the requirements of the state of
Michigan. However, it does not explain these functions from a novice and detailed
perspective. The average board member will be perplexed with these financial reports
given its complexity, such as those from the Contract C, containing in its Article IV --Financial Arrangements --- a detailed reporting of revenues and expenditures from the
preceding month:
a. Budget projections, Summary Actuals and Summary Budget
b. Balance Sheet
c. Academy account summary
d. Historical Aged Trial Balance
e. Monthly statement of actual and projected cash flow of Academy funds
received and disbursed
Other:
a. Reports on other Academy operations and student performance
b. Other information on a periodic basis to enable the board to monitor the
management company's performance and the efficiency of its operation of the
Academy.
Analysis of Transparency and Full Disclosure Parallel Convergence
Transparency and full disclosure issues cause role confusion, which creates
conflicts due to the lack of reporting requirements placed in the obligation section of the
contracts between the boards of directors and the management companies. For example,
it is clear in the contracts that the management company will manage the finances and
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budgets of the charter school. However, the specifics of the contracts allow a variance of
interpretations as to what has to be reported out and to what degree. Role confusion
results in conflicts due to the board of director’s inadequate knowledge of the contract
between the two parties. The lack of knowledge of the financial information reported to
the board of directors creates a situation where the board is not clear of their role and
lacks an understanding of the management company’s role, thus resulting in conflicts.
Many of the interview participants illustrated a concern that they are being told
only what the management companies want to tell the boards of directors. To reiterate a
perspective of one of the interview participants, she stated, “You tell me that you are
spending millions of dollars on the school, but I don’t see what you did. The children do
not have a lunchroom; they are eating in their rooms. They have no gymnasium. We are
totally in the dark.”
Whereas the example of the contract meets the requirements of financial reporting
standards for the state of Michigan, it does not provide financial information that is
conducive for the average board member to comprehend. The management company has
professionals with the appropriate education and training to understand the fiscal
dynamics of charter schools, and the board may or may not have a member with a
financial pedagogy to understand the details of formal and technical terms such as
balance sheets, trial balances, and cash flow statements, to name a few.
The complexity of these reports enables the management company to report based
on minimal state requirements and not translate fiscal data into language of content that
boards of directors would understand. When decisions have to be made on such data, it
places the board of directors at a disadvantage where they must rely on the management
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company for interpretation. These issues of transparency not only exist for fiscal matters,
but also include areas such as special education, expulsions, performance outcomes, and
other compliance related reporting matters.
The Parallel Convergence and Triangulation of Everything Goes Back to the
Contract Theme
Table 13 illustrates the convergence and triangulation of the quantitative and
qualitative findings, along with the contractual analysis as it relates to awareness,
familiarity, and understanding the contract. It aligns to Research Question 1, which asks
do the contractual relationships between Michigan charter school boards of directors and
full-service, for-profit private management companies contribute to conflict in
governance, and Research Question 2 that states that assuming that parallel governance
systems created in charter schools whose boards of directors contract with for-profit
management companies contribute to governance conflict, what are the factors in the
relationship that contribute to conflict in governance.
Table 13
The Parallel Convergence and Triangulation of Everything Goes Back to the Contract
Do the Contractual Relationships Between Michigan Charter School Boards of Directors and Full-Service For-Profit Private Management Companies
Contribute to Conflict in Governance
Part II 4. The board of directors understand the articles, terms, and
content of the management contract between the board of directors
and the full-service for-profit management company.

1. From your perspective as a long serving member of a charter
school board of directors, what are the pros and cons relative to
governing the school that occur as a result of contracting with a fullservice management company
2. Reflecting upon your board member experience in contracting with
a for-profit management company, how would you describe the
specific contractual relationship between the board and the
management company.
5. Given what you know about leadership and school governance, are
there things that could be done contractually or legislatively to
improve the governance of Michigan charter schools

71% of survey respondents selected strongly agreed or agree that the
board of directors understand the contract with the boards of directors and
the full-service for-profit private management companies; 14% strongly
disagree or disagree; and 15% were uncertain.

Based on inference from the interview data; 57% indicated they agree that
finances and resources are affected when boards of directors contract with
full-service for-profit private management companies; 43% disagree.

From&a&quan+ta+ve&perspec+ve;&More&than&half,&71%&of&the&survey&respondents&agreed&or&strongly&agreed&that&the&board&of&directors&understand&the&
contract&with&the&boards&of&directors&and&the&fullAservice&forAproﬁt&private&management&companies;14%&disagreed&or&strongly&disagreed.&A&signiﬁcant&
number&(15%)&were&uncertain.&Interview&par+cipants&summarized&their&posi+on&as&follows;&&&par+cipant&H&summarized:&”&I&would&say&contract&wise,&
anything&we&ask&for&is&provided&to&us.&If&we&get&into&a&shady&or&gray&area&our&aOorney&advises&us;&some+mes&even&the&aOorney&has&a&diﬀerent&view&
than&we&have.&But&again&as&a&board&we&make&that&decision.&They&have&been&very&good&as&far&as&the&contract&and&following&it.&We&know&what&is&
expected&of&us&and&how&to&func+on.”&Par+cipant&B&stated,&“The&metrics&must&be&placed&in&the&contract&to&understand&what&are&the&targets&for&
everyone&including&the&esp.&iden+fy&in&the&contract&either&hit&these&marks&or&reap&the&consequences;&there&must&be&visibility&and&accountability&
around&everything&we&do;”&and&Par+cipant&F&said,”&contractually,&of&course&in&your&contract&you&hold&the&management&group&accountable&for&
maintaining&certain&academic&mile&stones&and&goals&and&growth.”&
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Findings of Everything Goes Back to the Contract Parallel Convergence Theme
From a quantitative perspective, 29% strongly agree and 42% agree that the
boards of directors understand the terms of the contractual agreement between the boards
and the for-profit private management company; 15% were uncertain; and 15% selected
strongly disagree or agree. The data from the quantitative surveys illustrated discrepancy
and a lack of consensus regarding how surveyed boards of directors feel about their
understanding of the contract between the charter school boards and their full-service,
for-profit management company.
The qualitative data from the experiences of interview participants substantiated
the quantitative data results and reinforced role confusion, which leads to conflicts in
governance. Most of the interview participants conveyed an awareness of how important
the contractual agreement is in terms of governance; however, many of the interview
participants admitted that many board members are not aware and do not understand the
dynamics of the contractual agreement between the board of directors and the for-profit
private management company. Interview Participant F stated, “I think a lot of board
members aren’t really aware that the contract governs the relationship. I just don’t think
they quite understand it.” He continued to share his perspective regarding his board’s
insufficient knowledge, not only of the board’s roles, but their insufficient understanding
of what the management company’s role is; he added, “I really don’t think they know
what is required and what the management company is supposed to do.”
Participant G referred to the importance of utilizing the board’s lawyer for times when
the contract was confusing or difficult to interpret. His experience is polarized to that of
Participant F’s and appears to be positive, based on having legal counsel. He said,
If we get into a shady or gray area, our attorney advises us. Sometimes even the
attorney has a different view than we have. But again, we as a board make that
decision. They have been very good as far as the contract and following it. We
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know what is expected of us and how to function.” Some of the interview
participants wanted to add provisions to their contracts with the management
company subsequent to signing the agreement.
Participant E also indicated the need for the board of directors to have legal
counsel. Her perspective is that it needs to be a lawyer or legal entity that is employed to
what is in the best interest for the board. She expounded, “Well, if when the board comes
in play, they should have their own attorney. Someone they trust who is looking out for
their best interest and not the management company’s best interest. If it starts there, I
think the rest will follow.”
Participant B stated, “The way that we were structured with our prior
management company, it actually worked well with exception to the educational
component.” She elaborated on the lack of foresight during the point of negotiations. She
continued, “My thought is if we had the foresight to change or put something in the
contract so that we had some latitude in terms of the educational component, then I think
it would have been a better contract.”
The final qualitative example also resonates from Participant B. He stated what
they would have done in retrospect. He said, “We would have placed a clause in the
contract saying that we have the final decision on the selection of the school’s leadership
team. I think that would have made a difference in how things would have progressed.”
The previous quantitative and qualitative data enabled the researcher to converge
the methodologies for comparison and relatedness. The following contract analysis
explored elements of the contract that aligned with the theme of everything goes back to
the contract.
The macro findings of the sample contracts between the boards of directors and
the full-service, for-profit private management companies uncovered many similarities
and some differences in terms of content and style; however, it is obvious that most of the
contracts are based off of a generic template. The contracts were clear and listed the
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obligations of the board of directors and the management company. The contracts
indicated the roles and responsibilities of the management company; and the limited
roles, responsibilities, and obligations of the board of directors. The contracts with fullservice management companies overtly indicated that the management company has sole
responsibility for important functions such as hiring, managing the budget and finances,
responsibility for special education, and responsibility for managing the day-to-day
operations.
The macro findings also uncovered many areas of needed interpretation. For
example, the contracts did not state who is responsible for taking board minutes and
managing agendas; who is responsible for nominating board member candidates; and
who is responsible for capital expenditures. These key functions and many others were
left to interpretation often requiring knowledgeable legal counsel to navigate the
challenges.
Analysis of Everything Goes Back to the Contract Parallel Convergence
The quantitative analysis provided evidence that boards’ awareness and
understanding varies from board to board. The lack of consensus regarding the
quantitative survey data is an indication that role confusion permeates many Michigan
charter school boards and contributes to conflicts in governance.
The lack of contractual awareness and understanding exacerbated role conflicts in
many areas including fiduciary responsibilities, subcontracting, expulsions, compliance,
student performance, etc. The interview participants also stated how important it is for
boards of directors to receive specific training on the contract to increase awareness and
understanding to minimize confusion and enable better and more effective governance. In
addition, many participants referred to the importance of having legal counsel that has the
board of directors’ best interest.
The quantitative data and the qualitative data for everything goes back to the
contract aligns and supports the concept that most, if not all, decisions goes back to the
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contact between the board of directors and the full-service, for-profit private management
company. It supports the position of the board’s role confusion and subsequent conflicts
in governance. This convergence, along with the contract analysis lends credence to the
findings and unveils the circumstances that exacerbate conflicts between the board and
management company. It is clear that the contract contains parameters, definition of
roles, and certain levels of recourse. However, if the contracts between the board of
directors and the management companies are not understood, then board members will
struggle to understand their roles and the roles of the management company.
The Parallel Convergence and Triangulation of the Ultimate Responsibility
The convergence included the Figures 20 through 23, which illustrated the
triangulation of multiple quantitative findings with the emerging theme of the board is
ultimately responsible from the qualitative research findings. The contractual analysis
was also presented as it relates to the quantitative and qualitative results and the
implications that come from boards of directors contracting with full-service, for-profit
private management companies.
The	
  Convergence	
  of	
  Data	
  Related	
  to	
  Hiring	
  Key	
  Personnel	
  	
  
Quan/ta/ve*Data*3*Responsibility*for**
hiring*key*personnel/leadership*

Qualita/ve*Data*(Theme)*3***
Input*into*hiring*school*leadership*

Analysis*and*
compara/ve*of**
ﬁndings*

Interpreta/on*

Contractual*analysis*
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Figure 20. The convergent parallel mixed methods of hiring key personnel and
leadership.
The	
  Convergence	
  of	
  Data	
  Related	
  to	
  the	
  Transparency	
  of	
  Public	
  Funds	
  	
  

Quan0ta0ve*Data*–*Transparency*of*public*
funds*is*aﬀected*when*boards*hire*private*
management*companies*

Qualita0ve*Data*(Theme)*A***
Transparency*and*full*disclosure*

Analysis*and*
Compara0ve*of**
Findings*

Contractual*Analysis*

Interpreta0on*

Figure 21. The convergent parallel mixed methods of the transparency of public funds.
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The	
  Convergence	
  of	
  Data	
  Related	
  to	
  the	
  Board	
  of	
  Directors	
  Understanding	
  the	
  Contract	
  	
  

Quan/ta/ve*Data*–*The*board*of*directors*
understand*the*contract*with*the*
management*company*

Qualita/ve*Data*(Theme)*?***
Everything*goes*back*to*the*contract*

Analysis*and*
compara/ve*of**
ﬁndings*

Contractual*analysis*

Interpreta/on*

Figure 22. The convergent parallel mixed methods of the board of directors
understanding the contract.
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The	
  Convergence	
  with	
  Multiple	
  Quantitative	
  Data	
  Points	
  	
  –-‐-‐	
  Board	
  is	
  Ultimately	
  
Responsible	
  Theme	
  
Quan%ta%ve)Data)
8*Input*into*hiring*school*leadership***
8*Managing*the*day8to8day**
8*Determining*curriculum*
8*Managing*ﬁnance/budget*
8*Determining*curriculum*

Qualita/ve*Data*(Theme)*8***
The*board*is*ul/mately*responsible*

Analysis*and*
compara/ve*of**
ﬁndings*

Contractual*analysis*

Interpreta/on*

Figure 23. The convergent parallel mixed methods of the board are ultimately
responsible theme.
Figures 20, 21,22, and 23 are reiterations of the previous tables, which illustrated
the triangulation of data displaying findings in the research questions surrounding the
following; data for hiring charter school personnel, data for transparency and full
disclosure, and data for everything goes back to the contract. Figure 23 illustrated five
contractual areas representing quantitative findings from the survey research and was
aggregately converged with the theme of the boards’ ultimate responsibility. The
convergence also included an analysis of the contract and how it relates to research
findings. The five quantitative data areas included; hiring, managing day-to-day,
awarding of contracts, managing contracts, and determining curriculum.
Figure 20 specifically reiterated the findings regarding the responsibility of hiring
charter school staff. It displayed the circumstances and confusion, which may cause
impending role conflicts in the governance of Michigan charter schools due to boards of
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directors contracting with full-service, for-profit private management companies. The
convergence also included an analysis of the contract and how it relates to research
findings.
Figure 21 specifically reiterated the findings regarding the research question; is
transparency and full disclosure affected when boards of directors contract with for-profit
private management companies. Role conflicts resulted from the possibilities of
confusion and lack of knowledge around understanding what and how the management
companies are required to report. The contracts have room for interpretation that may
require legal competence in order to effectively comprehend and enforce. The contractual
analysis illustrated the contract and legal jargon that may be beyond novice
interpretation.
Figure 22 specifically reiterated the findings regarding how everything goes back
to the contract. This theme is an indication of how imperative it is to have awareness and
knowledge of the contract between the board of directors and the for-profit management
company. In many instances, the contracts clearly denote who is responsible for specific
functions and operations of the charter school. The quantitative findings illustrated role
confusion and role conflict, which resulted from a lack of contractual awareness that
commensurately mirrors a lack of contractual understanding. The qualitative interviews
displayed many examples of board members wanting to change structure and clauses in
the contracts retrospectively. The contract analysis disclosed contracts that are in many
ways clear and inclusive of role definitions for both the management company and the
board of directors.
Figure 23 illustrated a conglomerate of quantitative data aggregately triangulated
with qualitative data and the contract analysis. The five areas from the quantitative data
included: hiring, managing day-to-day operations, awarding of contracts, managing
finance/budget, and determining curriculum. The theme that emerged from the qualitative
data is described as ultimate responsibility. This theme summarized the feelings of the
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interview participants who felt that regardless of the functions or circumstances; the
boards of directors have ultimate responsibility. The previous quantitative data is
converged with the qualitative data and the contract to confirm or disconfirm findings as
it relates to role conflicts in the governance of Michigan charter schools.
Managing the Day-to-Day and the Theme of Ultimate Responsibility
In terms of the survey question of who has the responsibility for managing the
day-to-day operations of the school, the response did not have consensus. Instead,
responses were spread over four possible selections: 73% indicated the management
company, 17% mostly the management company, 8% selected the board of directors, and
2% selected mostly the board of directors.
The qualitative summary for the Board Is Ultimately Responsible theme surfaced
in the majority of the interview transcripts of each board participant. Approximately 57%
mentioned that the board is responsible for everything regarding the operations and
functions of the charter school.
The qualitative and quantitative findings both indicated a lack of consensus
regarding day-to-day operations and functions. Both forms of data are an example of
confusion, which leads to role conflicts. Participant A commented,
From my perspective and a governance perspective, you can’t be there every day
to ensure that the education is disseminated in classrooms, but we can ensure that
the right level of resources and the right educational platform is being presented
because we sign off on that.
His comments contain an acknowledgement that it is improbable for board
members to be daily engaged in the operations of the charter school; however, he does
indicate a desire to impact the routine operations by making resource decisions that
prudently allocate resources to the benefit of the day-to-day activities. Participant A
discussed how efficient it is to have an entity fully control the routine aspects of
operations, however he re-emphasized that the board of directors have apex responsibility
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when it comes to the charter school. He stated, “Contractually, we ask the ESP to handle
those things for us, but we the board are ultimately responsible that the school’s
milestones are met every month.”
The contract analysis illustrated the specifications of the contractual agreement. It
is clear in the contracts that the full–service for-profit private management companies
have the responsibility for the day-to-day operations and functions of the charter schools.
Board members do not have the time and inclination to engage in the day-to-day
operations of their charter schools. Also, a board mindset to engage in the day-to-day is
counterintuitive with contracting with a full-service, for-profit private management
company.
Awarding of Contracts and the Theme of Ultimate Responsibility
In terms of the quantitative question of who has the responsibility for awarding
charter school contracts to various vendors and suppliers, the response lacked consensus.
Instead, responses were spread over all five possible selections: 2% indicated the
management company, 13% mostly the management company, 37% selected the board of
directors, 15% selected mostly the board of directors, and 33% selected that the
responsibility for awarding contracts should be equally shared between the board of
directors and the management company.
The qualitative summary for the Board Is Ultimately Responsible theme surfaced
in the majority of the interview transcripts of each board participant. Approximately 57%
mentioned that the board is responsible for everything regarding the operations and
functions of the charter school.
The qualitative and quantitative findings both indicated a lack of consensus
regarding what entity should award contracts to suppliers and vendors. Both forms of
findings contained examples of confusion, which leads to role conflicts. Participant F
commented, “I think the best thing we can do at the end of the day is to ensure that we as
a board have selected the very best whether it’s a management company, CPA, board
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counsel, custodial services, you name it; that we select the best; the best professionals to
assist us.” He indicated the perspective that it is the board that hires suppliers and
vendors. However, the findings illuminate an issue that develops given the perception of
suppliers and vendors that their contracts are with the management company and not the
board of directors. He exclaimed, “The prior management company, the head of it, told
me on several occasions, ‘Oh that is our contract,’ well, that is not correct. These
contracts are board contracts. They contract with us, but they tend to see it as the
management company that they are actually contracting with, and that is just not
accurate.” His comments acknowledged the potential for confusion and conflicts in
governance as it relates to the selection and awarding of contracts to suppliers and
vendors.
Another qualitative example regarding confusion and conflicts in who is
responsible for awarding contracts was found in the experience of Participant C. She
stated,
In our experience we had contracts that were made between the management
company and the vendors that put liability on the board and school; which
resulted in a lawsuit and other negative things…still the board is liable in the end
and even though it was the management company making the deals.” From her
perspective, the board was liable regardless of who made the contract with the
specific supplier or vendor.
She continued to elaborate on the issue of awarding contracts and stated, “The
contracts were made by the management company and expected to be signed off by the
board. Finances and contracts were set ahead of time and we were not fully grasping what
we were doing at that time as board members.” She acknowledged her board’s confusion
of not comprehending what was going on which appears to enable the management
company to lead and guide the bidding process. She elaborated, “For example, since all
of the contracts were prepared by the management company; and the bids were done by
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the management company; they would tell the board who they wanted to select instead of
allowing the board to make the decision.”
The contract analysis typically illustrated that, unless otherwise specified, the
management company was responsible for bids and sub-contracting. For example,
Contracts A and C between the for-profit management companies and the boards of
directors stated, “The management company reserves the right to sub-contract any and all
aspects of the services.” This may be interpreted as the management company has sole
responsibility for awarding contracts.
Managing Finance and Budget Matters and the Theme of Ultimate
Responsibility
In terms of the quantitative question of who has the responsibility for managing
finance and budget matters of the school, the responses lacked consensus and varied
according to these following metrics; 4% indicated the management company; 31%
mostly the management company; 6% selected the board of directors; and 10% selected
mostly the board of directors; 48% indicted that the responsibility for managing finance
and budget matters should be equally shared between the board of directors and the
management company.
The qualitative summary for the Board Is Ultimately Responsible theme surfaced
in the majority of the interview transcripts of each board participant. Approximately 57%
mentioned that the board is responsible for everything regarding the operations and
functions of the charter school.
The qualitative and quantitative findings both indicated a lack of consensus
regarding the responsibility for managing the financial and budgetary matters for the
charter school. Both forms of findings comparably reinforced role confusion and
resulting conflicts in governance relative to whether it is the board or management
company that should be responsible for the charter school’s finances and budget. Boards
of directors may monitor finances and budgets very differently. They are asking the

CONFLICTS	
  IN	
  THE	
  GOVERNANCE	
  OF	
  MICHIGAN	
  CHARTER	
  SCHOOLS	
  	
  

269	
  
	
  

management company to adhere to specific reporting formats. For example, Participant B
commented, “Historically, we would ask to be made aware of anything transferred over
$25000.00. We would want to know what got transferred and why? Sometimes small
things would be done without board knowledge.”
Participant E provided insight as to her board’s experiences regarding the
responsibility for managing the finances and the budget. She conveyed a belief that the
overall fiduciary responsibility resides with the board of directors. She said, “Overall it is
the board, as far as the governance of the funding; we are responsible for that.” She
continued providing examples of what the board should know in terms of stakeholder’s
needs. “We should know, and we do as far as budgetary needs, what our needs are, what
our student count should be, maintaining a healthy fund balance in case we need to move
some monies around for instructional people to help the instruction of students.” She
continued to place emphasis on the board’s ultimate responsibility regarding allocation of
resources. Even though she acknowledged the management company’s involvement, she
clearly believed that managing the finances and budget is the board’s responsibility. She
said,
Financial resources; there are always struggles as to how we are going to use
these little bitty funds that we have and how we are going to distribute them and is
it going to go to more teachers or getting school buses so we may bring more
students in from outlying areas into our school district.
Her comments reinforced the belief that she felt the board is ultimately
responsible for finances and budgetary matters of the charter school. However, the
potential for conflicts are great given the structure of the contract with the management
company, which clearly states that they have the responsibility for managing these
functions. Contracts A and C stated, “The management company shall be the chief
administrative officer and be responsible for the sound financial operation of the academy
within a budget approved by the academy board.”
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Curriculum and Academic Programs and the Theme of Ultimate Responsibility
In terms of the quantitative question of who has the responsibility for determining
curriculum and academic programs of the charter school, the responses did not have
consensus and varied according to the following metrics: 31% indicated the management
company, 38% mostly the management company, 6% selected the board of directors, and
6% selected mostly the board of directors; and 19% indicted that the responsibility should
be equally shared between the board of directors and the management company.
The qualitative summary for the Board Is Ultimately Responsible theme surfaced
in the majorities of the interview transcripts of each board participant. Approximately
57% mentioned that the board is responsible for everything regarding the operations and
functions of the charter school.
The qualitative and quantitative findings both indicated a lack of consensus
regarding the responsibility for who determines the curriculum and academic programs
for the charter school. Both methodologies of findings comparably reinforced role
confusion and resulting conflicts in governance relative to whether it is the board or
management company that should be responsible for the charter school’s curriculum and
academics. Participant E mentioned the implications of testing and how the board of
directors is accountable for student performance. She mentioned the challenges of the
board in terms of understanding the dynamics of improving test scores. She stated:
The climate of accountability changed a lot in the state of Michigan;
accountability to standardized testing, and holding the board and school
accountable for how well their children performed. It became a lot more laborious
for the board members to be aware of how academically astute our children are
based on the standards put in place and then have to account for any shortfalls;
either we have to do a lot of the research ourselves or put onus on our
management group to provide us with the proper resources to keep us aware of
where we are as far as the standards are concerned, and where we should be…so
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it became a situation where having a full time job makes it difficult for me to give
the attention needed to be effective.
She continued to discuss the challenges of tight budgets and how the
management company is given leeway to provide sound curriculum and academics in
order to improve testing:
It is a challenge because you have to balance the student count right, that impacts
what you are able to do; the cuts in state funding, it is a delicate balance, but we
know that we are ultimately responsible for that and we give our management
group the lee-way to make sure that they get the proper pieces or parties in place,
so we can do what we need to do to maintain or help to improve the academic
success of our students.
Participant E reiterated the importance of having academic metrics in the contract
between the management company and the board of directors. She stated:
Contractually, of course in your contract, you hold the management group
accountable for maintaining certain academic milestones and goals and
growth…and that ties your authorizer [charter] contact as well; just making sure
all parties are aware of what the agreed upon contracts are, making sure that they
can be attainable, and that we strive towards obtaining those goals; at least we
want to see growth and we don’t want to see that students are going backwards.
In addition to the previous interview participant’s perspective, Participant B
provided the importance of having the contract metrically fortified with academic goals.
The metrics allow the board of directors to monitor academic performance. He
expounded:
Monitoring the components in the contracts such as (monitoring not necessarily
making specific selections but monitoring); the staffing levels, the budget process,
the maintenance, and this should have been number one, academic performance
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of the school; in doing that we would have the leadership team have to provide
information in terms of grades and performance on the academic side.
Interview Participant A reinforced his position of the boards’ responsibility
regarding the finances and academics of the charter school: “The board itself is ultimately
responsible from a fiduciary perspective and academically responsibility to make sure
students reach grade level.”
Interview Participant F shared the frustration of not feeling empowered to affect
academic outcomes regarding student performance. He said, “ Where my frustration
comes in is where I see weaknesses here or there and both being empowered to make that
academic change.”
Summary of Triangulation of Research Designs and Contractual Analysis
The quantitative and qualitative research methods were designed to provide a
convergent opportunity to analyze and better understand the phenomenon of role
confusion and resulting role conflicts in the governance of charter schools in the state of
Michigan. The convergence of quantitative and qualitative data was subsequently
triangulated with a contractual analysis, which provided a premise based on actual
contracts between Michigan boards of directors and full-service, for-profit private
management companies. As previously stated by Creswell (2014), the mixed method
design enables a parallel convergence. Creswell stated, “The key assumption of this
approach is that both qualitative and quantitative data provide different types of
information –- often detailed views of participants qualitatively and scores on instruments
quantitatively –-and together yields results that should be the same” (p. 219).
The quantitative data was obtained through the implementation of surveys, both
hard and electronic formats, to enable board presidents to provide the survey instruments
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in optional manners conducive to their eligible board members. The survey consisted of
two Likert Scale sections. Part I contained twelve questions focusing on if the board of
directors or the for-profit private management companies was responsible for specific
functions related to charter school operations, compliance, outcomes, and management.
Part II focused on the polarized levels of strong agreement to strong disagreement. The
qualitative portion of the mixed methodology consisted of a purposeful selection of
interview participants whose selection criterion included a preference of fifteen years of
experience as a Michigan charter school board member inclusive of officer roles such as
president, vice president, and treasurer.
The contract analysis was based on a review of five different contracts between
five charter schools and five management companies. The contracts provided an ability to
compare and contrast various forms of comprehensive management models, so that
similarities and differences could be analyzed. In addition, the contract analysis also
provided an opportunity to triangulate data with the quantitative and qualitative data from
the surveys and interviews.
The convergence and triangulation of data strengthened the analysis of the
phenomenon of conflicts in the governance of Michigan charter school boards
contracting with full-service, for-profit private management companies. The quantitative
and qualitative data provided evidence of role confusion, which resulted in role conflicts
due to the lack of consensus in the quantitative data; and the experiences captured from
the interview participants provided the foundation of the thematic development and
analysis. The in-depth contract analysis provided a view of the complexities of charter
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Chapter 7: Conclusions, Implications, and Recommendations
Introduction
The governance of charter schools in the state of Michigan is a very complex
phenomenon with multiple entities playing an integral part in this aspect of education
reform. Three of the entities have significant roles in Michigan’s charter school system;
they include authorizers, boards of directors, and full-service, for-profit private
management companies. The interactions and inter-relational dynamics of these three
parties impact charter school reform and governance from every perspective. It is
therefore imperative that charter school boards of directors understand not only their role,
but also the roles of authorizers and management companies. A lack of understanding of
the governance roles will lead to board confusion and resulting conflicts within the client
and agent relationship. The governance challenges and conflicts of Michigan charter
schools were the impetus of the study: An analysis of role conflicts in the governance of
Michigan charter schools when boards of directors contract with full-service, for-profit
private management companies. Full-service, for-profit private management companies
are currently contracted with more than 80% of the charter schools in the state of
Michigan. The penetration of full-service, for-profit private management companies in
Michigan is by far much greater than any other state in the nation. In respect to Education
Management Organizations (EMOs), Miron (2013) stated:
Michigan is a real anomaly in terms of the extensive involvement in for-profit
EMOs that open and operate charters schools. Seventy-nine percent of Michigan’s
charter schools are operated by for-profit EMOs, and another 10% of these
schools are operated by nonprofit EMOs. After Michigan, Missouri (37%),
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Florida (34%), and Ohio (31%) follow in terms of prevalence of for-profit EMO
involvement in the operation of charter schools. (p. 18)
These for-profit private management companies may bring a plethora of skills,
professionalism, and experience to the operations of their portfolios of charter schools
and rely on economies of scale in order to achieve and maintain levels of profitability.
Their primary purpose is to make a profit. The volunteer appointed boards of directors,
on the other hand, bring a sense of community, goodwill and charity; their primary
purpose is to give back to the community by volunteering to help the charter school
achieve its mission of providing an educational alternative to the community in which it
exists. The polarized philosophies set in motion dynamics that generate governance
conflicts between the two parties.
The volunteer and appointed board members will vary in terms of their
awareness, understanding, and knowledge of the management contract and charter school
operations. The greater the lack of contractual awareness and understanding turns into a
commensurate level of confusion resulting in governance conflicts. As a result,
governance conflicts emerge because of the blurring, overlapping, and confusion between
the roles of the boards of directors and the full-service, for-profit private management
companies. The confusion of roles results in conflicts that permeate the governance
spectrum of charter school operations in the state of Michigan.
Research Questions
The three questions that framed the research of the analysis of conflicts in
Michigan charter schools’ governance as a result of boards of directors contracting with
for-profit private management companies are as follows:
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1.) Do the contractual relationships between Michigan charter school boards of
directors and full service for-profit management companies contribute to conflict
in governance?
2.) Assuming that parallel governance systems created in charter schools whose
boards of directors contract with for-profit management companies contribute to
governance conflict, what are the factors in the relationship that contribute to
conflict in governance?
3.) Are accountability and transparency of public funds affected when Michigan
charter schools’ boards of directors contract with full-service, for-profit
management companies?
The three research questions provided an outline of conclusions from the mixed
methodology approach. The approach provided both quantitative and qualitative data that
was fortified with a supplemental analysis of five sample contracts between five different
charter school boards of directors and their contracted full-service, for-profit private
management companies.
Research Methodology
The mixed methodology consisted of quantitative and qualitative designs. The
findings from both designs were separately analyzed. Subsequently, the quantitative data
from surveys and the qualitative data from interviews were converged and triangulated
with the qualitative data from the contract analysis.
The quantitative design encompassed hard copy and electronic formats of a twopart Likert Scale survey. The first format included surveys that were provided to charter
school board presidents to engage their board members who met the survey profile of
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having a minimum of 12 months of board experience. Electronic survey access were
randomly sent to various charter school boards in the state of Michigan in order to
effectively and efficiently generate a significant number of responses from a diverse and
broad range of charter school board members.
The qualitative design encompassed a series of interview questions. The questions
were presented to a purposeful selection of seven board members with a preferred ten to
fifteen or more years of board service experience inclusive of participation in board roles
such as president, vice president, treasurer, and secretary.
The contract analysis consisted of two parts. Part I was a brief review of charter
school contracts in order to provide insight into the development of the survey and
interview questions. Part 2 was a post research in-depth analysis of sample contracts to
provide an additional qualitative component as a third source of data. The post research
contract analysis provided a detailed comparison of five contracts between Michigan
charter schools’ boards of directors and full-service, for-profit private management
companies. The qualitative findings from the in-depth contract analysis provided data to
converge with the quantitative data from the surveys and the qualitative data from the
interviews. The application of the mixed methodology allowed data exploration,
gathering, findings, and analysis from three different sources around the phenomenon of
conflicts in charter school governance. The convergence of all three sources of data
provided opportunities to further strengthen research findings and increase understanding
of the governance conflicts that occur when boards of directors contract with full-service,
for-profit private management companies.
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Conclusions Organized by Research Questions
Research Question One
The conclusions are organized by the research questions that framed the analysis
of potential role conflicts in the governance of Michigan charter schools when boards of
directors contract with full-service, for-profit private management companies. The first
research question asked: Do the contractual relationships between Michigan charter
school boards of directors and full service, for-profit private management companies
contribute to conflicts in governance?
Contractual Relationships
The contractual relationship between Michigan charter school boards of directors
and for-profit private management companies set the parameters for the inter-relational
dynamics between the two parties. A firm awareness and understanding of the contract is
imperative for both parties and enables roles to be defined and acted out in a manner
conducive to the expectations and obligations of the contracted parties. The client (board
of directors) to agent (full-service, for-profit private management company) relationship
and interactions are defined by the contractual elements, which are formalized when the
entities sign. The contract sets the premise for the relationship and affects the boards of
directors’ ability to govern from a position of authority or a lesser position based upon
the formal transfer of their power to the full-service, for-profit private management
companies.
The findings and analysis in chapter four presented exclusive and convergent
evidence that the contractual relationships between the boards and the management
companies contribute to conflicts in governance. These conflicts stem from the boards of
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directors’ general and specific lack of collective awareness and understanding of the
fundamental principles upon which the contract was based. The lack of contractual
awareness and understanding is possibly perpetuated by boards’ turnover, which
facilitates novice replacements that are not receiving effective overviews and training in
the contractual governance roles. This overlooked training includes defining of the roles
and responsibilities of both the boards of directors and the for-profit management
companies.
Contractual Relevance, Awareness and Understanding
Given the scope and relevance of the contract, it does not typically receive the
attention required by board members to effectively understand the roles of the boards of
directors and also the roles of the full-service, for-profit private management companies.
Therefore, when governance issues arise due to role confusion and conflicts, boards
become frustrated and find themselves in a position with limited, and even possibly nonexistent, recourse. This is due to the contractual agreement, which gives the agent (fullservice, for-profit private management company) the latitude to comprehensively manage
the operations of the client (charter school board of directors). Some pervasive examples
from the findings included; selecting the charter schools’ leadership and staff, managing
sub-contracts, allocation of resources, determining curriculum and academic programs,
and facilities’ management.
The contract analysis provided insights into the structural core elements of the
management agreement. The sample contracts articulated the expectations,
responsibilities, and obligations of the full-service, for-profit private management
companies and the boards of directors. The articles of the contracts clearly indicated that

CONFLICTS	
  IN	
  THE	
  GOVERNANCE	
  OF	
  MICHIGAN	
  CHARTER	
  SCHOOLS	
  	
  

281	
  
	
  

the management companies are “solely responsible” for all elements around hiring
leadership and staff; budgeting, financial, and accounting responsibilities; curriculum and
academic programming; sub-contracting, and some of the specific responsibilities for
facilities management.
Factors Contributing to Tension and Governance Conflicts
One of the major factors that caused tension between the boards of directors and
the full-service, for-profit private management companies were the responsibilities for
hiring. The quantitative data illustrated a lack of consensus regarding the specific survey
question of who is responsible for hiring charter school personnel. This question focused
primarily on hiring administrative leadership positions. In the qualitative findings,
interview participants from the board indicated that responsibilities for hiring became a
major contention. The interview participants indicated that they thought the board of
directors had input into hiring principals or they wanted to subsequently augment the
contract with clauses enabling the boards of directors to affect hiring decisions. Both the
quantitative and qualitative data provided evidence of role confusion and resulting
conflicts relative to hiring charter schools’ personnel. The sample management contracts,
on the other hand, clearly stated that the full-service for-profit management companies
had the “sole responsibility” for hiring all of the charter schools’ staff. For example,
language from the contracts clearly specifies that the management company, as stated in
Contract D, “will have sole responsibility and authority to determine staffing levels, and
to select, evaluate, assign, discipline, supervise, manage, transfer and terminate
personnel.” The quote from Contract D confirms that the management company has sole
responsibility for hiring and the peripheral elements that come along with it such as
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evaluations, discipline, and termination. These contractual terms contrasted with the
perceptions of the board member participants in the study who thought they had the
ability to influence the hiring of charter school staff, especially leadership positions. That
confusion is significantly part of the cause for tensions and conflicts due to board
members’ misperceptions of their roles and responsibilities when they contract with fullservice for-profit private management companies.
Research Question Two
The second research question asked the following: Assuming that parallel
governance systems created in charter schools whose boards of directors contract with
for-profit private management companies contributes to governance conflict, what are the
factors in the relationship that contribute to conflicts in governance?
Parallel governance structures as defined by Alexia Stainer (2010, July) are as
follows: “Parallel governance is closely related to the concept of institutional multiplicity,
as both refer to situations where non-state actors perform state functions. These are
associated with conflict situations and have impact on the processes of state formation.”
Factors Contributing to Role Confusion
In terms of the factors in the relationship that contributes to conflicts in
governance, the boards of directors and the management companies have responsibilities
that overlap due to industry practices, assumptions, and misperceptions from board
members. Such factors include, but are not limited to the responsibility for
recommending board candidates, responsibility for conducting student expulsion
hearings, responsibilities for special education policies; and the responsibility for
developing board meeting agendas and minutes. Some of the previous factors are
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articulated in the contractual agreement, while others are left for interpretation. For
example, it is clearly stated in the contract that management companies have
responsibilities for special education policies, however, it is left for interpretation as to
who has the responsibilities for recommending board candidates, student expulsion
hearings, and the responsibilities for developing board meeting agendas and minutes.
The convergence of quantitative and qualitative data provided evidence that there
is confusion and resulting role conflicts regarding who is responsible for the development
of special education policies. The lack of general consensus relative to all data fortifies
the position of role confusion and resulting conflicts. The quantitative data lacked
consensus and it may be inferred from the qualitative data that the board of directors
believes that it has input in special education. The contract analysis clearly indicated that
the management companies have responsibility for special education just as they do for
general education students.
The previous example of the responsibility for special education policies was
stated in the contracts between the boards of directors and the management companies;
however other factors that contributed to governance conflicts do not have contractual
references and are left again to the interpretation of the two contracted parties.
The survey question for who is responsible for the recommendations of board
candidates did not have consensus; however, it was one of the few responses that had
zero percent for the response of solely the responsibility of the management company.
Interestingly, there was a small percentage that believed that the management company
should have some shared responsibilities in recommending board candidates. Overall, the
collective responses did not have consensus and indicated possibilities for confusion.
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There is also potential for conflicts of interest when management companies have a say in
determining who is selected to be a charter school board member.
In terms of the survey question regarding who is responsible for student
expulsions, the quantitative and qualitative data lacked consensus and indicated
confusion as to whether the boards of directors or the management companies are
responsible. The Michigan Department of Education empowers the school boards to
establish their own guidelines regarding suspensions and expulsions. In a brief prepared
by the Department of Education (2013), it stated,
Suspensions and Expulsions in General: The Revised School Code provides each
school board with the authority to establish a local discipline policy. Each local
school board has the authority to make reasonable recommendations relative to
anything necessary for the proper establishment, maintenance and management of
the schools in the district. (p. 1)
In reference to expulsions, Interview Participant A stated,
Expulsion hearings are brought to the board for final disposition because the
board is the only entity that can expel a student. We at times see that this is not
taking place; and expulsions may occur unknown to us, which is a problem. Or
kids leaving and the board has not had full disclosure of the circumstances of how
and why they left.
The final example of an area left for interpretation is who has the responsibility
for the development of the board meeting agendas and minutes. The lack of consensus
around board agendas and minutes emerged from the quantitative data and was
inferentially apparent in the qualitative data. Many board members seem unaware as to
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the legal implications of public board meetings, agendas, and minutes. These documents
are critically important to the maintenance of the charter school’s history, policy
resolutions, and the compliance as a public entity to federal and state mandates. The
agendas and minutes are most often deferred as tasks for the management companies;
however, if boards truly understood the legal implications of these public documents and
the significance of board meetings they would maintain development and control of this
critical element of their responsibility.
Research Question Three
The third research question stated the following: Are accountability and
transparency of public funds affected when Michigan charter schools’ boards of directors
contract with full-service for-profit private management companies?
Accountability and Transparency of Public Funds
In terms of the question, if boards of directors contracting with full-service, forprofit private management companies affect accountability and transparency, the findings
demonstrated that both are impacted. Nearly half of the survey respondents indicated that
the accountability and transparency of public funds are affected. The quantitative data
resulted in a lack of board member consensus; and the qualitative responses also lacked
consensus in terms of the responses from interview participants. Accountability was
paired with transparency as a joint topic. However, where both were seen as an issue,
transparency received most of the emphasis from the interview participants. The conflicts
of transparency threaded through multiple topics including reporting around; budgets,
finances, sub-contracts, and performance outcomes. The interview participants mentioned
multiple times high levels of discomfort regarding transparency and full disclosure. The
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previous concerns tied directly to the transition of funds from a non-profit public status to
a private status once transferred to the full-service for-profit private management
company.
The qualitative findings provided multiple examples of the board members
questioning how money is allocated, monitored, spent, and reported. The budgetary and
financial reports prepared by the full-service, for-profit private management companies
met the requirements of the state, however, the reports struggled to meet the expectations
of the charter school boards in terms of being presented in a user-friendly manner and
codified for novices, such as board members who do not have financial expertise.
Awarding of Contracts
The findings from the quantitative data illustrated a lack of consensus regarding if
the boards of directors or the management companies have responsibility for awarding
contracts. One-third of the survey respondents selected the option that the responsibility
for awarding contracts should be equally shared between the two parties. Many of the
interview participants provided qualitative data, which indicated that the contracts should
be directly between the board of directors and the vendors of the charter school. The
majority of contracts in the contractual analysis indicated that the management company
reserved the right to sub-contract the services provided to the charter school. The contrast
is perpetuated by the perspectives of the board members, which are misaligned to
contractual provisions between the boards of directors and the management companies.
The findings indicated role confusion, which resulted in governance conflicts regarding
critical aspects of the charter schools’ operations.
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Transparency and Full Disclosure of Performance Outcomes
The final example regarding accountability and transparency is in reference to
performance outcomes. In terms of the quantitative findings and accountability, boards
had mixed reviews, indicating feelings of being ultimately responsible for academic and
non-academic outcomes, and many survey participants indicated that it is the
management companies’ responsibility to provide the curriculum and academic
programming. The qualitative findings illustrated a sense of ownership by the boards for
performance outcomes; however, this position was tempered by an understanding that
curriculum and academic programming are the core technology of what the management
companies provide. The comprehensive contracts reviewed in the contract analysis
indicated that it is the responsibility of the management companies to provide the
curriculum and academic programming for the charter schools.
Implications/Recommendations for Board Members
Professional Development for Officer Roles
One of the key findings that permeated most of the interviews was the need for
professional development in the areas of board members’ roles (individually and
collectively), finances, and training on the contract with the full-service, for-profit private
management company. It was clear in the qualitative data that the board members
believed that the officer roles, such as president, vice president, treasurer, and secretary
included expectations that required time to prepare, facilitate, and follow-up on boardrelated activities in order to provide effective governance. There are major differences of
time requirements between charter school board officers and general board members.
Officers of the board are expected to understand the dynamics that come with their
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specific roles. For example, the board president is considered a generalist and is expected
to know something about all aspects of charter school governance. The board presidents’
most significant role is to facilitate the board meetings and manage all of the peripheral
dynamics that public board meetings encompass. The board presidents must guide,
collaborate, and lead the board members in an effective manner to meet the governance
requirement outcomes of fiduciary, compliance, and academic performance. The vice
presidents’ most significant role is to fill in as needed for the president and provide
support for committee development and general support to the board as a whole.
The treasurers’ role is to be the financial expert for the board. The board treasurer
is the most technical role and requires a base level of skills and knowledge in both
financial and accounting management. Charter school board members, in the role of
treasurer, is detrimental to the board if they lack the financial skills, knowledge, and
capacity to effectively analyze cash flow statements, budgets, balance sheets, trial
balances, and other basics of fiduciary reporting. The board secretaries’ most significant
role includes keeping the board members collectively organized with compliance matters
and signing key documents such as board resolutions, subsequently making sure that
signed documents are recorded, and logged as permanent records of the public board
meetings. General members have the least demands of their time; however, their most
significant role is to provide input and objectively vote on important matters regarding
the charter school and its obligation to deliver the purpose set forth in the articles of the
charter. Each member must understand that the power of the board is embedded in its
collective membership; and board members alone do not constitute the decision-making
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for the charter nor wield any individual power and authority other than that granted to the
board in its entirety as one group collectively.
Charter school board members’ meticulous understanding of board roles and
responsibilities is imperative to achieving effective governance. Boards cannot govern
effectively if they do not understand their roles and the roles of the other key players in
the charter system, specifically management companies, and authorizers. The selection of
the management decision model that the boards of directors choose is of great relevance
and impacts their ability to govern. There is tremendously polarized disparity between the
models of self-management and opting for a full-service, for-profit private management
company. The qualitative findings illustrated that the boards did not realize that once they
chose a full-service management company, their power and authority becomes
diminished and their ability to govern is impacted. When a standard full-service
management contract is signed, the board of directors has transferred its power to effect
key operational aspects such as hiring, financial reporting, vendor selection, and
management of curriculum and academic programming.
Need for Retaining Legal Counsel for the Boards of Directors
The need for legal counsel surfaced in the qualitative data findings multiple times.
Some of the interview participants expounded on the need for the charter school boards to
have knowledgeable legal counsel to assist the board of directors with navigating the
complexities of the legal, contractual, and legislative elements of the charter school
system in the state of Michigan. The board members often referred to engaging legal
counsel for objective advice, especially in terms of conflicting matters with the
contracted management company. One of the interview participants specifically argued
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that the attorney should be exclusively hired to represent the sole interest of the board of
directors; and not be retained by any person or entity other than the board of directors.
The rationale for legal counsel centers on the complexities of contractual
management, legalities, and legislative matters. Contractual management is generally a
difficult topic to comprehend. It requires in-depth analysis and attention to details given
the importance and longevity of management agreements between charter school boards
and management companies. Management companies have a distinct advantage over
boards given the professional disposition of the management companies and their
knowledge of the charter school industry. A legal professional or a law firm that is
employed directly by the management company to manage risk and provide consultation
on complicated legal issues often accompanies this knowledge. When governance
conflicts arise, it is best managed between the agent and client. However, when complex
issues emerge, it is prudent to have legal counsel engaged who are aware of charter
school laws, policies and legislation.
Legalities also occur and are most often spontaneous. Disputes happen given the
number of formal and informal relations and the complex inter-dynamics of entities that
work with the charter school boards of directors. Disputes between the boards of directors
and the full-service, for-profit private management companies will lead to governance
conflicts and boards that are not well equipped with legal capacity will be at a
disadvantage and contractually inept to confront issues and pursue recourse.
The final component that increases the boards’ need for legal counsel is the
complexities of legislation. The legislative component also contains political implications
that affect policy formation. Legislative and policy formation is typically driven by state
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and federal agencies to monitor and regulate the charter school system. Legal counsel
provides insight and input for the volunteer appointed charter school boards of directors
to be able to navigate complexities that could put them in a vulnerable position when
working with management companies who have the professional and legal acumen to use
these laws and policies to their advantage. The boards of directors’ action to secure
effective legal counsel may prevent governance conflicts related to role confusion due to
lack of awareness and understanding of the management contract.
Board Professionalization
Charter school boards of directors have a complicated and important role to play
in terms of being appointed volunteers. A lot of responsibility is entailed with being a
charter school board member, however, the scope of the commitment required to be an
effective board member is seldom communicated with accuracy to board candidates;
especially the roles of board officers which were previously discussed. Charter school
board members are responsible for fiduciary, compliance, and performance outcomes; all
three areas are demanding, especially the fiduciary responsibilities. The probability of
being an effective board member includes basic skills of management, communications,
leadership, community activism, and finance. The findings, especially from the interview
participants, demonstrated that the experience and knowledge that board members bring
to the role has an impact on their ability to provide effective governance.
A focus on professionalization of the board could be achieved through a variety of
means. This may include support from the authorizers to provide better processes to assist
charter school boards of directors with attracting, selecting, and maintaining effective
candidates and members to positively influence its composition and professionalization.
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This could also be supported through universal board role definitions inclusive of
descriptions of duties and training outlined by the Michigan Department of Education.
The Michigan Department of Education could mandate certain requirements and
qualifications for certain board roles, such as financial literacy for those holding the role
of treasurer; and Robert’s rules of order training for board presidents, vice presidents and
secretaries. A final recommendation would be to transform the mindsets and perceptions
from boards of directors being volunteers to public officials with the collective authority
to provide effective stewardship and governance of Michigan charter schools. This
transformation would require policy changes such as moving toward charter school board
members being elected directly by the communities in which they serve similar to
traditional public school boards. True empowerment of Michigan charter school boards is
a step toward preventing role confusion and resulting conflicts in governance when
boards of directors contract with full-service, for-profit private management companies to
comprehensively manage their operations.
Everything Goes Back to the Contract
The quantitative and qualitative findings and analysis illustrated many issues
related to the boards of directors’ lack of awareness and understanding of the contract
with the full-service, for-profit private management companies. The summarization of the
survey responses illustrated a consistent lack of consensus. It became apparent that board
members had varying perspectives of which party (boards of directors or the full-service,
for-profit private management companies) had or should have ownership of specific
responsibilities relative to the operations of their charter schools. The perspectives from
the quantitative findings were reinforced by the qualitative findings where the majority of
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the interview participants made statements contrary to the parameters, expectations and
obligations of the contractual agreements. The board of directors’ lack of contractual
awareness emerged frequently in the areas of hiring charter school staff, awarding of subcontracts, transparency, and roles and responsibilities in general.
The responsibility of hiring charter school staff is a quintessential example of
conflict resulting from the boards of directors’ lack of awareness and understanding of
the contract with the full-service, for-profit private management companies. In the survey
results, nearly one-third of the survey respondents selected options that indicated that the
board members had equally, partially, or full responsibility for hiring key charter school
personnel. The majority of the board member interview participants indicated perceptions
that boards of directors had or should have input in the decision-making process for
hiring staff. Some of the interview participants wanted to subsequently augment their
contract to have the superintendent and or principals chosen by and report directly to the
charter school boards of directors. Other board interview participants felt comfortable
with an ability to influence the decision of who is selected for key leadership roles in the
charter school. All of the previous positions are misaligned and contrary to the findings in
the contract analysis, which universally and emphatically included terminology such as
the management company had “sole responsibility” for all aspects of hiring and
terminating employees. These responsibilities included evaluating, re-deploying, and
reprimanding employees as the management company saw necessary. This also included
the mandatory and optional peripheral responsibilities of providing health insurance,
retirement programs, and life insurance.
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The responsibility for awarding sub contracts is a premier example of conflicts
resulting from the boards of directors’ lack of awareness and understanding of the
contract with the for-profit private management company. There was disparity in the
survey responses, which illustrated a wide range of board members’ perceptions as to
who should be responsible for awarding contracts. Half of the respondents indicated that
awarding sub contracts should be entirely or mostly the board of directors. The
qualitative findings and analysis showed that some boards felt that they were only
tolerated and seen as, “rubber stamps” in the process to award contracts and that the
management company went through the motions of a selection process only to choose the
subcontractor they wanted. Conflicts resulted as boards felt they should be responsible
for subcontracts. The contract analysis disclosed that some contracts contain clauses that
give the management companies the obligations of subcontracting. This is an area of
conflict because it is not universally clear who has subcontracting authority; or if it is
shared between the two parties.
Another illustration of confusion is found with the intent from the Michigan
Department of Education to facilitate transparency of the bidding and procurement
processes to prevent the awarding of contracts based on subjectivity. The memorandum
from the Michigan Department of Education on competitive bid thresholds (2015) stated:
The purpose of this letter is to communicate changes to the base amount above
which competitive bids must be obtained for remodeling, procurement of
supplies, materials, and equipment. Sections 623a, 1267, and 1274 of the Revised
School Code establish a base above which competitive bids must be obtained and
provide an increase in the base that corresponds with increases in the Consumer
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Price Index. The fiscal year 2015-2016 base for Section 1267, pertaining
construction, renovation, repair, or remodeling and the new base for Sections
623a and 1274, pertaining to procurement of suppliers, materials, and equipment,
is $23,230.
The memorandum presented intent to prevent the awarding of contracts
subjectively. However, even though the state presents a mandate on bidding thresholds, it
leaves it up to the boards of directors to decide how and what entity will handle the
process. It is not stated in the contracts that were analyzed that a bid process is required
for amounts more than $23,230.00. This discretion exacerbates the role confusion and
perpetuates governance conflicts.
The Contrast of Paradigms
A clash of paradigms was discovered in the qualitative data. The interview
participants illustrated a powerful sense of volunteerism in response to the opening
interview question of why did they have a desire to become board members of a charter
school. The response was unanimous in terms of their rationale for volunteering to be an
appointed board member and was summarized as follows; the interview participants all
felt a sense of community, charity, and student advocacy. They wanted to give to an
effort that was providing opportunities for children who they felt were underserved by a
strained education system that was falling short of providing quality education. Many of
the interview participants indicated a philosophically opposing paradigm from the fullservice, for-profit private management companies. They expressed the concern of the
management companies’ primary reason for its existence, to make a profit. The profitcentric motives of the management companies and community-centric motives of the
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volunteer charter school boards presented a clash of values, which created inherent
governance conflicts.
The interview participants’ rationale for becoming a board member had threads of
consistency inclusive of altruism, making a difference in the community, and providing
an alternative to status quo education for children in typically underserved school
districts. These intentions clashed with those of the full-service, for-profit private
management companies when conflicts arose from inherently different values. The
boards were making decisions based on the desired outcomes of student performances
and management companies were making decisions influenced by the ever-present
requirement of making a profit.
Another example of governance conflicts derived from opposing values are the
challenges of transparency and full disclosure. The charter school board is a public nonprofit entity inclusive of non-profit values. Transparency is critical in terms of fiduciary
planning, budgeting, and acquisitions. Finances are primarily from public tax dollars and
accountability is to the funding sources and the constituents of the community served by
the charter school boards’ stewardship. Transparency becomes compromised when public
funds are transitioned to a private entity and the ability to track and monitor such funds
becomes improbable if not impossible.
The inherent conflicts are a result of the different, and somewhat opposing,
paradigms, beliefs, and values of the charter school boards of directors and the fullservice, for-profit private management companies. The volunteer philosophy of the
charter school board and the private corporate philosophy of the management company
have different values and motivations. These forces result in role conflicts as each entity
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pursues their organizational objectives within their distinctive paradigms, which impacts
the responsibilities and requirements for operating charter schools in the state of
Michigan.
Policy Recommendation
Universal	
  Role	
  Definition/Descriptions	
  
Many	
  of	
  the	
  challenges	
  in	
  the	
  charter	
  school	
  infrastructure	
  in	
  the	
  state	
  of	
  
Michigan	
  include	
  the	
  inconsistencies	
  with	
  the	
  roles	
  and	
  responsibilities	
  of	
  three	
  of	
  
the	
  primary	
  stakeholders;	
  charter	
  school	
  authorizers,	
  charter	
  school	
  boards	
  of	
  
directors,	
  and	
  full-‐service,	
  for-‐profit	
  private	
  management	
  companies.	
  Boards	
  of	
  
directors	
  conduct	
  their	
  governance	
  responsibilities	
  differently	
  from	
  other	
  boards	
  of	
  
directors;	
  charter	
  school	
  management	
  companies	
  manage	
  very	
  differently	
  from	
  
other	
  management	
  companies;	
  and	
  authorizers	
  conduct	
  their	
  oversight	
  
responsibilities	
  differently	
  from	
  other	
  authorizers.	
  There	
  are	
  examples	
  of	
  
inconsistencies	
  throughout	
  the	
  practices	
  of	
  all	
  three	
  stakeholders;	
  despite	
  initiatives	
  
to	
  regulate	
  and	
  standardize	
  the	
  fundamental	
  practices,	
  roles,	
  and	
  responsibilities	
  of	
  
each	
  of	
  these	
  critical	
  three	
  actors	
  in	
  the	
  Michigan	
  charter	
  school	
  system.	
  The	
  lack	
  of	
  
universal	
  practices	
  permeates	
  activities	
  such	
  as;	
  how	
  charter	
  schools	
  are	
  awarded,	
  
monitored,	
  evaluated,	
  re-‐authorized,	
  placed	
  on	
  probation,	
  and	
  possibly	
  revoked	
  or	
  
discontinued.	
  The	
  inconsistencies	
  of	
  general	
  practices	
  and	
  the	
  absence	
  of	
  universal	
  
principles	
  for	
  all	
  three	
  actors	
  contributes	
  to	
  role	
  confusion	
  and	
  conflicts	
  that	
  
impacts	
  the	
  governance	
  of	
  charter	
  schools	
  in	
  the	
  state	
  of	
  Michigan.	
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Universal	
  Oversight	
  and	
  Governance	
  Principles	
  	
  
The	
  literature	
  review	
  provided	
  examples	
  on	
  how	
  many	
  of	
  the	
  practices	
  of	
  
boards	
  of	
  directors,	
  management	
  companies,	
  and	
  authorizers	
  are	
  different	
  in	
  many	
  
functions	
  and	
  similar	
  in	
  others.	
  The	
  differences	
  in	
  practice	
  make	
  it	
  difficult	
  to	
  deploy	
  
oversight,	
  governance	
  accountability,	
  and	
  measure	
  what	
  is	
  successful	
  performance.	
  
As	
  Frazier	
  (2011)	
  stated	
  in	
  the	
  literature	
  review,	
  “Charter	
  school	
  board	
  
accountability	
  continues	
  to	
  be	
  a	
  problem	
  in	
  charter	
  schools	
  in	
  part	
  because	
  
sponsors	
  and	
  boards	
  are	
  making	
  up	
  the	
  rules	
  as	
  they	
  go	
  along.”	
  Frazier	
  is	
  referring	
  
to	
  the	
  variance	
  in	
  business	
  practices	
  and	
  the	
  variance	
  of	
  how	
  authorizers	
  and	
  
charter	
  school	
  boards	
  are	
  held	
  accountable.	
  This	
  accountability	
  factor	
  is	
  also	
  
applicable	
  to	
  the	
  full-‐service,	
  for-‐profit	
  private	
  management	
  companies	
  that	
  really	
  
do	
  not	
  have	
  a	
  government	
  agency	
  to	
  regulate	
  them.	
  One	
  could	
  argue	
  that	
  the	
  market	
  
forces	
  hold	
  boards	
  of	
  directors	
  and	
  management	
  companies	
  accountable.	
  However,	
  
when	
  charter	
  schools	
  fail,	
  the	
  authorizers	
  and	
  management	
  companies	
  then	
  move	
  
on	
  to	
  the	
  other	
  challenges	
  while	
  the	
  boards	
  of	
  the	
  directors	
  and	
  the	
  charter	
  school	
  
constituencies	
  are	
  left	
  to	
  cope	
  with	
  the	
  ramifications	
  of	
  school	
  closures.	
  This	
  leaves	
  
behind	
  devastated	
  communities,	
  families,	
  and	
  students	
  who	
  had	
  limited	
  input	
  from	
  
the	
  beginning	
  and	
  no	
  recourse	
  in	
  the	
  end	
  other	
  than	
  commencing	
  the	
  search	
  for	
  a	
  
different	
  option	
  for	
  another	
  public	
  school.	
  The	
  results	
  are	
  the	
  communities	
  and	
  
families	
  that	
  were	
  served	
  by	
  the	
  charter	
  schools	
  are	
  abandoned	
  to	
  face	
  the	
  residual	
  
consequences.	
  	
  
The strategy of deploying universal oversight and governance principles would be
a significant step toward improving industry-wide expectations and practices. A tool that
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would help boards of directors and other stakeholders is the development of a universal
charter school governance manual. The reason for a universal governance manual would
be to provide written guidelines that give consistency and a common criterion for issues
such as: fiscal management, compliance, and outcome performance. This would assist all
three of the actors by equipping them with a common perspective of requirements and
guidelines created by a cross-section of representatives, versus myopic and incongruent
perspectives from the individual actors alone. With boards of directors, management
companies, and authorizers operating from a common source of guidelines, it would
mitigate role confusion and governance conflicts. The universal manual would provide
common languages, guidelines, standards and practices for all of the authorizers,
management companies, and charter school boards of directors to follow in the state of
Michigan. This action would also provide an additional means of standardizing oversight
processes for authorizers to provide to all boards of directors regardless of their location
in the state of Michigan. The manual would provide guidance for processes and
procedures to hold all three actors accountable. In order to increase probable success and
implementation, such an initiative should be led by a state agency to mediate
disagreements and make decisions when consensus cannot be reached.
When conflicts reach levels of urgency, boards of directors often times feel they
do not have recourse regarding both the full-service, for-profit private management
company they selected, and the authorizer that sponsored the charter of their school. The
qualitative findings indicated the boards of directors’ feelings of lacking recourse
regarding conflicts pertaining to transparency and full disclosure. As one of the interview
participants stated, “It is really hard; I think when we look at having someone work on
your behalf and not getting full disclosure.” The conflicts arise from a lack of trust and a
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feeling that if the management company does not cooperate, there is not much a board
can do beyond idle threats. The exception is during the period where the contract is
nearing an end, at which point the charter school boards may renegotiate for other
resources and options for changing to a different management company or changing to a
different management model altogether.
Board of Directors Recourse for Major Conflicts
Another area of governance conflicts, relative to transparency and full disclosure,
was around student performance regarding academics and behavior. Many of the
interview participants mentioned that it was difficult to obtain data from the management
companies when the results are negative. For example,
It is really easy to disseminate that into data and say everything is good, but when
you dig deeper and pull back the layers of the onion you find out in many cases
that the right level of visibility is not always disseminated to the board of directors
and that things are being swept under the rug or hidden to make the overall
picture look better than what it actually is.
One of the interview participants even went as far to say, “Lip service is given to
full disclosure, but there isn’t full disclosure.” Such feelings were pervasive in the
qualitative data. Boards may respond differently and experience confusion, especially if it
is a novice board of directors. The same interview participant did share an observation
regarding empowerment or the lack of empowerment. He basically stated that the
authorizer is key: “If you don’t have the support of the authorizer, there is not a lot you
can do.” The previous statement is an indication that board members need support and
empowerment from their authorizers to govern effectively.
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The quantitative and qualitative research findings show that boards need
assistance and support in obtaining transparency and full disclosure in the areas of
operations, whether it is regarding fiscal matters, bid processes, and accurate reports of
the success indicators for the school, including student performance and test results. The
authorizer is one entity that may provide clarity in this area. Authorizers often times will
work indirectly with a full-service, for-profit private management company. The
management companies may have multiple contracts with different charter schools’
boards of directors who may share the same authorizer. A management company’s
positive relationship with its board of directors may be an indication that they are
functioning in an ethical manner inclusive of operating with transparency and full
disclosure. The other entity that has an ability to provide recourse for charter school
boards of directors is the Michigan Department of Education. It is ambiguous as to how
much jurisdiction the Michigan Department of Education has and if boards of directors
can consider them as a reference for recourse, clear protocol for the boards to file
grievances, complaints, and concerns. This leaves charter school boards of directors
feeling like they have little to no option when governance conflicts occur and authorizers
do not step in to provide them with support.
The clear choice for the boards of directors to ensure transparency and full
disclosure is to insist that it is in the contract with clearly outlined metrics that the fullservice, for-profit private management companies must abide by or risk breach of the
contract. This will require a level of contract proficiency and expertise that may be
probable if the boards of directors select astute legal counsel who is aware of charter
school laws and legislation. The period of contract negotiations is a time when the boards
of directors can leverage their position to mandate systems of controls and objectives for
the management company to achieve; such as tying the percentage of the management
fee to achieving certain academic goals as one of the examples provided by an interview
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participant. The Michigan Department of Education could also mandate or strongly
suggest that boards of directors hire legal counsel that work strictly on behalf of the
boards’ interests.
Authorizers’ Recommendations and Practices
The Authorizers’ Role and Impact on Conflicts in Governance
The role and impact of the authorizers are arguably one of the most critical
components to the success of the charter school system in the country. The authorizers in
the state of Michigan have the added challenge of overseeing the highest penetration of
charter schools managed by full-service, for-profit private management companies; by far
more than double any other state. Their decision to remain neutral or engage in the
conflicts between charter school boards of directors and the private for-profit
management companies have reverberating ramifications. The authorizers’ primary
relation is with the board of directors as defined by the charter agreement. The authorizer
is the legal body that is granted the range of power to create or dissolve charter
agreements. The authorizers have the power to grant, revoke and terminate the charter
contracts along with singularly appointing every member of the charter school boards of
directors. Vergari (2001) echoes the responsibility of the authorizer by stating, “Charter
school authorizers occupy a critical position in the charter school system. Indeed, they
serve as the public’s primary formal agent for holding charter schools accountable for
performance” (p. 131). The legal contracts of the charters are specifically between the
authorizing bodies and the governing boards of directors. The charter contract typically
indicates that it is the board that has the comprehensive responsibilities to uphold the
principles on which the charter was predicated and granted.
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Technically,	
  the	
  authorizer	
  does	
  not	
  have	
  a	
  formal	
  and	
  contractual	
  
relationship	
  with	
  the	
  management	
  companies;	
  however,	
  informal	
  relations	
  with	
  the	
  
management	
  companies	
  sometimes	
  germinate	
  and	
  impact	
  the	
  formal	
  and	
  
contractual	
  relationships	
  between	
  charter	
  school	
  boards	
  and	
  for-‐profit	
  private	
  
management	
  companies.	
  It	
  is	
  important	
  that	
  authorizers	
  provide	
  tailored	
  support	
  
strategies	
  to	
  boards	
  given	
  the	
  unique	
  and	
  varied	
  differences	
  of	
  boards	
  of	
  directors	
  in	
  
their	
  collective	
  knowledge,	
  skills,	
  experience,	
  and	
  composition.	
  Boards	
  of	
  directors	
  
must	
  feel	
  confident	
  that	
  the	
  authorizer	
  is	
  a	
  source	
  of	
  support	
  and	
  empowerment;	
  
existing	
  and	
  poised	
  to	
  oversee,	
  develop,	
  and	
  assist	
  with	
  the	
  charter	
  schools’	
  success	
  
in	
  pursuing	
  their	
  missions	
  as	
  stated	
  in	
  the	
  charter	
  agreements	
  with	
  the	
  boards	
  of	
  
directors.	
  	
  
The ability to hold the players in the charter school system accountable is
extremely difficult. Critics refer to the lack of accountability as a glaring issue in charter
school practices. Despite the disposition of critics, it is clear that authorizers hold boards
accountable. It is also apparent that boards of directors who choose the model of
contracting with for-profit private management companies should be responsible for
holding management companies accountable. However, the boards of directors’ ability to
do so are impacted by the parameters of the contract and the empowerment of their
authorizers. Issues inherent in the contract and lack of authorizers’ support may generate
board confusion and predicate conflicts in governance. These issues were prevalent in the
quantitative data and the qualitative data.
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As previously mentioned in the literature review, the key actor in charter school
oversight in Michigan is the authorizer. The Michigan Department of Education (2012)
explained the authorizer role as the following:
Pursuant to section 380.502(4): An authorizing body shall oversee, or shall
contract with an intermediate school district, community college, or state public
university to oversee, each public school academy operating under a contract
issued by the authorizing body. The authorizing body is responsible for
overseeing compliance by the board of directors with the contract and all
applicable law. (p. 13)
The authorizers’ control of the boards’ membership by appointment has been a
source of conflict. There are no term limits for board members and they may continue
service unless negative behavior or some kind of violation, conflict of interest, or
member defect takes place. The authorizers have the power to take members off the
board or simply allow their term to expire without renewal. They also have the power to
pressure or coerce the board to vote members off or force them to resign. The
authorizers’ sole power to remove members also contains elements of conflict as Dixon’s
(2014a) Detroit Free Press investigation found examples where board members were
threatened with removal by the authorizer for trying to obtain financial information from
their management company. Some of the qualitative data illustrated board members
feeling a lack of effective systematic support from the authorizer led to some conflicts in
governance.
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Contributions To The Field
The contributions to research manifests as a result of exploration in the
governance of Michigan charter schools when their boards of directors contract with fullservice, for-profit private management companies. The literature review illustrated high
levels of confusion regarding roles of board members, overlapping of roles and
responsibilities with the full-service, for-profit private management companies, and
resulting conflicts derived from such circumstances. The phenomenon of conflicts is clear
and related to areas of operations where boards typically have jurisdiction and
governance. However, when boards of directors opt to contract the services of fullservice, for-profit private management companies, their control and authority transfers to
the private management companies. These actions appear somewhat subliminally and do
not surface unless conflicts arise between the two parties; at which time the boards realize
that they are disempowered due to contractual terms and obligations within the
management agreement that empowers the management company to control operations
and the peripheral responsibilities of managing charter schools. This subsequently
perpetuates disempowered feelings within the board as some of the qualitative interview
participants phrased as feeling like a “rubber stamp.”
Michigan laws seem to favor management companies and not the boards of
directors. Boards are the most disadvantaged of the three main actors in the state of
Michigan; authorizers, charter school boards of directors, and full-service, for-profit
private management companies. The complexities of the charter school industry are
typically and understandably beyond the average citizen’s comprehension and therefore
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require access to professional and legal counselors who may guide the charter school
boards of directors into the practice of effective governance.
The main discovery from the research is that all things lead back to the contract.
The findings and analysis revealed that boards of directors are not aware of and do not
understand the pertinence of the contract with the full-service, for-profit private
management companies. In order for charter school boards of directors to govern
effectively, they must invest the time and effort to become aware of and versed in the
contractual dynamics. Boards of directors must also retain legal counsel who has the
capacity and experience to guide them to contractual prudence. Such levels of contractual
awareness will enable charter school boards of directors in the state of Michigan to
consciously decide which management model to pursue. In this pursuit, they can
objectively make informed decisions to contract with a full-service, for-profit private
management companies or decide to maintain a level of authority and control of their
charter schools and act out the governance purpose of the boards of directors.
Suggestions for Further Study
The quantitative and qualitative data yielded opportunities to discover
phenomenon worthy of exploration regarding the evolution of charter schools in the state
of Michigan and the country. Some pervasive challenges that warrant further analysis
included the opposing forces of two business models (non-profit and for-profit) working
side-by-side, how to improve transparency and full disclosure in charter school systems,
testing the implementation of having elected boards for charter schools, comparative
analysis of two polarized management models, non-profit charter management
organization (CMOs), for-profit private management companies or education
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management organizations (EMOs) and their impact on charter school governance, the
impact of governance on charter school performance, who is ultimately accountable for
charter school governance in the state of Michigan, and finally an analysis of the
authorizers impact on the governance of charter schools in the state of Michigan.
Researcher Reflections
The analysis of inherent role conflicts in the governance of Michigan charter
boards contracting with full-service, for-profit private management companies provides
many insights into the inner-workings of a different structure in public school education.
It has reinforced what is working and what still needs to be restructured in order for
charter schools to become what it was originally intended to be or make a conscious
effort to accept what it has become and understand its position in the reform of education.
The challenges of charter school boards of directors are vast and centered on their
awareness and understanding of the contracts they sign to facilitate their vision of
governance and leadership. Their range of decisions is between the extreme choices of
self-managing, and choosing to contract with full-service, for-profit private management
companies. If they choose the former, they maintain the full span of governance control
and operational responsibility; empowerment is at its fullest. If they choose to contract
with a full-service, for-profit private management company, then their control is
diminished and authority transferred to the management company. However, despite the
mitigation of control they still have full responsibility.
One of the primary issues of the research is that boards of directors do not realize
the inter-relational governance dynamics given the parameters of the contract due to a
lack of awareness of the contract. This occurs for many reasons, such as new board
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candidates and new members who may have never been trained on the elements of the
contract. When new members become part of a board, they are excited to give back to the
community and are given erroneous impressions that they have ultimate authority; this is
not the case when they contract with full-service, for-profit private management
companies. The state of Michigan has many examples of such instances given that private
management companies manage four out of five charter schools.
The implication of charter schools choosing a full-service, for-profit private
management company affects how the schools are managed and operated. The decision
infiltrates every part of the charter school including governance, leadership, operations,
and finances. Governance becomes confusing because many of the boards’
responsibilities have become convoluted ranging from exclusive control to varying
ranges of control given to the private management company. The best example is the
responsibility for hiring charter school staff. Under the full-service management scenario,
the private management company has sole responsibility for hiring everyone from top
leadership to paraprofessionals and the board has no input into the process of selecting
the school’s human resources. The determination of school leadership and the boards of
directors’ inability to impact such decisions is a primary impetus of governance conflicts.
The contractual analysis provided evidence that every contract reviewed indicated
terminology phrased as; the management company has sole responsibility for hiring
school staff and all of the peripheral responsibilities such as training, evaluating,
placement and termination.
Many aspects of governance are compromised under the models of education
management organizations. However, the problem is not with the model; the problem is
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with the charter school boards of directors not being aware of and not understanding the
contracts. The importance of the contracts must be placed at the forefront of board
training so that boards of directors may build their contractual acumen and make a
conscious, purposeful, and strategically aligned decision in terms of how they want the
school to operate. If they choose the model of having a full-service, for-profit private
management company, then they make such a decision fully aware that their ability to
govern is diminished and they relinquish significant parts of their responsibilities and
authority to the management company.
The governance roles of charter school boards of directors are crucial to the
success of charter school reform. Board members have fiduciary, compliance, and
performance outcome responsibilities for the charter schools. If these board roles are
ambiguous, it will harness conflicts in governance that may negatively impact the charter
schools. These conflicts may be identified and solved; however, it could also lead to
negative scenarios that may result in school closure. As paraphrased by one of the
references, governance of charter schools does matter, and so do charter school boards.
Summary
The analysis of inherent role conflicts in the governance of Michigan charter
school boards contracting with full-service, for-profit private management companies
provided quantitative and qualitative perspectives from experienced board members.
These perspectives included their view of board governance and how responsibilities are
divided and shared with for-profit private management companies. The responsibilities
include the management of operations, compliance, and outcome components of charter
schools. The analysis included three major sources of data generation: quantitative
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research, qualitative research, and a qualitative contractual analysis that provided the
essence of the contracts between charter school boards of directors and their contracted
full-service, for-profit private management companies.
The data was triangulated and provided analysis to strengthen findings and
galvanize perspectives on the causes of confusion that resulted in governance conflicts
when boards contract with full-service, for-profit private management companies.
The theoretical framework that grounded this analysis included three theories;
agency theory, stewardship theory, and contract failure theory. These theories were
collectively rooted in economic, psychological, and sociological foundations. The
theories synergistically illustrated a framework of potentially inherent conflicts in the
agent-to-client relationships. The charter school boards (client) relationships with the
full-service, for-profit management companies (agent) encompassed the complexities of
non-profits entities working side-by-side with private for-profit entities. This relationship
creates anomalies that contribute to confusion, tensions, and factors that result in
governance conflicts, which affect the operations of charter schools. The anomalies
included a phenomenon of parallel governance, which covertly impacts the governance of
charter schools in the state of Michigan.
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Please fill in the circle aligned to the columns with the ending that you
feel bests completes the questions
Management Mostly
Shared
Mostly board board of
companies’
management responsibility of directors’ directors’
responsibility co.
equal
responsibility responsibility
responsibility between the
and some of
and some of Board of
the
the Board of directors and management
Directors
the
co.
management
co.
1. The
responsibility
for hiring key
personnel such
as
superintendent,
principal, and
teachers should
be
2.The
responsibility
for managing
finance and
budget matters
should be
3.The
responsibility
for managing
the day-to-day
operations of
the school
should be
4.The
responsibility
for awarding
contracts should
be
5.The
responsibility
for
recommending
board
candidates
should be
6.The

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O
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responsibility
for state and
federal
compliance
should be
7.The
responsibility
for determining
curriculum and
academic
programs should
be
8. The
responsibility
for conducting
student
expulsion
hearings should
be
9. The
responsibility
for special
education
policies of the
school should
be
10. The
responsibility
for developing
board meeting
agendas and
board minutes
should be
11. The
development of
the contractual
agreement
between the
board and
management
company should
be
12. The
acquisition of
real estate,
facilities, and
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O
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O

O

O

O

O
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capital projects
for the school
should be

1.The
management of
funds and
resources is
affected when
boards of
directors
contract with
full-service forprofit
management
companies
2.Accountability
of public funds
is affected when
boards of
directors
contract with
full-service forprofit
management
services
3.Transparency
of public funds
is affected when
boards of
directors
contract with
full-service forprofit
management
services
4. The board of
directors
understand the
articles, terms,
and content of
the management
contract
between the

Please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement with the
statements on the by filling in your response.
Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Uncertain
Agree
Strongly
(1)
Agree

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)
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board of
directors and the
full-service
management
company
(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)
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Qualitative Interview Questions – Board of Directors
1. From your perspective as a long serving member of a charter school board of directors,
what are the pros and cons relative to governing the school that occur as a result of
contracting with a full-service management company?
2. Reflecting upon your board member experience in contracting with a for-profit
management company, how would you describe the specific contractual relationship
between the board and the management company?
3. Considering that the relationship between the board of directors and the management
company is a critical element in the successful operation of the school, what do you think
are factors that might contribute to tension in governance as a result of this relationship?
4. Do you believe that accountability and transparency of public funds may have changed
when contracting with a for-profit company, or do you believe this is not an issue?
5. Given what you know about leadership and school governance, are there things that
could be done contractually or legislatively to improve the governance of Michigan
charter schools?
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Contract E

Contract D

Contract C

Contract B

The contract;

Contract A

Comparative Contract Analysis Between Five Michigan Charter School Boards and
Their Management Companies

Comments
Note: (MC denotes
Management
Company)

Template/Format of Contract
Is in standard
format
(boilerplate or
common with
other
management
companies)

ü

ü

ü v

ü

¢

Three of the five
MC’s call the
contract a
management
agreement (A, B,
D) while
companies C and
E call it a service
agreement. Other
that MC “E”, there
appears to be little
to no real
difference except
for the title
terminology.
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Is unique in
comparison to
other
companies

ü

MC “E” has an
agreement that is
titled differently
and lays out its
contract in an
unique manner
than the other four
MCs. MC “E”’s
service agreement
specifies tasks,
deliverables,
budgets and fees
associated with
each category.

Recitals
References the
authorizer

ü

ü

Contractual /service relationship

ü

ü

Four of the
ü vmanagement
companies (A,B,
C, D) clearly
mention the
authorizer while
MC “E” mentions
the authorizer in
the scope of the
work.
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CONFLICTS	
  IN	
  THE	
  GOVERNANCE	
  OF	
  MICHIGAN	
  CHARTER	
  SCHOOLS	
  	
  
Indicates
comprehensiv
e educational
programming
and
management

Indicates that
the facility is
owned or
acquired by
the
management
company

Indicates that
the
management
company has
sole
responsibility
for hiring and
terminating all
employees

ü v

ü

ü ¢

ü

ü

ü

ü

ü

ü

¢

¢

¢

ü

ü

Two of the five
MC’s ( B and C)
use the words
“comprehensive
educational
program” while
MC’s(A and D)
state they will
provide adaptable
and flexible
programs that are
not prescriptive.
MC “E” says it
will provide a
presentation for
the board to pick a
curriculum.
Only MC “A”
indicates their
capacity to provide
facilities and
facilities’
management for
the board.
Therefore, having
the board lease
from the MC. All
others do not
mention provisions
for facilities.
All management
contracts/agreeme
nts clearly indicate
that the
management
company is soley
responsible for the
hiring and
termination of all
employees. This
also includes
management of
payroll health care
benefits,
insurance, etc.
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CONFLICTS	
  IN	
  THE	
  GOVERNANCE	
  OF	
  MICHIGAN	
  CHARTER	
  SCHOOLS	
  	
  
Indicates that
the
management
company will
provide startup funds for
charter school
boards

Indicates that
the
management
company has
the right to
subcontract
any and all
services

ü ¢

ü

Terms and Terminations

ü

ü

ü

¢

¢

ü

ü

Management
companies A and
C are the only
MCs that will
provide startup
funds for the
charter schools
they manage. The
MCs will be
reimbursed
through the school
revenues. MC A
and C make
provisions for the
boards to apply for
financing.
Three of the MCs
(A, B, C) reserve
the right to
subcontract all
services it provides
to the charter
schools. MC “D”
states that they
may subcontract in
coordination with
the board of
directors; MC “E”
does not indicate
provisions for
subcontracting
except for using
subcontractors to
find facilities to
which they will be
reimbursed
$10,000.00 for site
research and
selection.
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CONFLICTS	
  IN	
  THE	
  GOVERNANCE	
  OF	
  MICHIGAN	
  CHARTER	
  SCHOOLS	
  	
  
Indicates that
the
management
company has
responsibility
for special
education
services

Specifies the
compensation
to the
management
company

ü

ü

ü

ü

ü

ü

ü

ü v

Obligations of the management company

The contracts for
three of the MCs
indicate that the
ü management
company is
responsible for
special education
services. MC “D”
and “E” do not
clearly specify
their roles in
special education
except in a general
statement that they
will provide
general
supplemental
service as required
by law.
All of the contracts
and service
ü vagreements
between the MC
and the board of
directors indicate
the MC’s
compensation.
However, each
compensation
structure is
different.
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CONFLICTS	
  IN	
  THE	
  GOVERNANCE	
  OF	
  MICHIGAN	
  CHARTER	
  SCHOOLS	
  	
  
Indicates the
management
company has
the
responsibility
for curriculum
and academic
programs

Indicates that
the
responsibility
for board
agendas and
minutes is
provided in
the contract

ü

¢

ü v

¢

Obligations of the Board

ü

¢

ü

¢

ü

¢

All of the contracts
specify that the
MC has
responsibility for
the curriculum and
academic
programs. MC “B”
has significant cost
and proprietary for
its curriculum
programs. MC’s A
and C also have
proprietary rights
to their curriculum
and academic
programs
including
materials.
None of the
contracts specify
whether the boards
of directors or the
management
companies have
the responsibility
for board meeting
agendas and
minutes.
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CONFLICTS	
  IN	
  THE	
  GOVERNANCE	
  OF	
  MICHIGAN	
  CHARTER	
  SCHOOLS	
  	
  
Clearly
specifies the
roles of the
board

Clearly
specifies the
roles of the
management
company

¢
ü

ü v

ü

ü

ü

ü

Financial Arrangements

¢

ü

ü

All of the contracts
and agreements
except for MC “D”
and “E” specify
the obligations of
the boards of
directors. MC “B”
does not indicate
obligations but
uses the phrase
“relationship of the
parties” and MCs
D and E says
words and phrases
synonymous to
partnerships and
alliances with the
board of directors.
The roles of the
management are
clearly specified in
the contracts
regarding key
areas such as
hiring; day-to-day
operations;
financial and
budget
management;
curriculum and
academic
programs.
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CONFLICTS	
  IN	
  THE	
  GOVERNANCE	
  OF	
  MICHIGAN	
  CHARTER	
  SCHOOLS	
  	
  
Clearly states
that the board
retains the
school’s fund
balances

Three of the MC’s
leave the fund
¢
ü ¢
ü
ü balances with the
school, however
two make the
charter school’s
fund balance part
of their
management fee.
The remainder of
the balance after
the operational
cost becomes the
profit of MC “A”
and “C.”
Expulsions, capital acquisitions, academic performance and day-to-day
operations
Indicates who
None of the
is responsible
contracts indicate
for expulsions ¢
¢
¢
¢
¢
whether the board
and behavior
of directors or the
management
company have
responsibility for
student expulsions.
Indicates that
None of the
the board or
contracts indicate
the
whether the board
management
ü ¢
ü
¢
¢
or the management
company is
company is
responsible
responsible for
for capital
capital acquisitions
acquisitions
except for MC “A”
and “C” who
provides startup
funds and
financing to the
board, which is
later reimbursed
from their charter
schools’ revenues.
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CONFLICTS	
  IN	
  THE	
  GOVERNANCE	
  OF	
  MICHIGAN	
  CHARTER	
  SCHOOLS	
  	
  
Indicates who
is responsible
for academic
performance
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MC “D” is the
only contract that
¢
¢
¢
ü ¢
has metrics
regarding
academic
performance. In
MC “D”’s
contract, there are
financial
incentives for the
attainment of
academic goals
agreed upon with
the boards of
directors.
Indicates that
The contracts do
the
indicate that for all
management
ü
ü
ü
ü
ü MCs that the daycompany is
to-day operations
responsible
of the school are
for the day-tothe responsibility
day operations
of the MC.
Notes: The v denotes a slight difference from the common format of the specific item.
The checkmark indicates that the attribute is applicable to the identified contract. The ¢
indicates that the attribute is not applicable to the identified contract. The abbreviation
“MC” represents, “the management company” in the comments sections.

